Sam Greene
Good morning to those of you joining us in Washington, DC and elsewhere in the United States. Good afternoon to those of you like me joining us here in Europe and welcome to the Center for European Policy Analysis. My name is Sam Greene. I’m Director of the Democratic Resilience Program here at CEPA, and it’s my distinct honor to welcome you today to this on the record briefing on incoming military support for Ukraine. The saying has that late is better than never but US policymakers have seemed pretty intent on testing that proposition taking nearly six months to approve supplemental aid to Ukraine, a delay that has allowed Russia to make significant advances in the east and to mount a new offensive just today in the northeast, with knock on consequences for Ukraine’s ability to mobilize new fighters to defend its territory, to plan for future counter offensives, and for Europe’s ability to count on American solidarity in resistance to Russia. To explore those complexities and more, we’re joined by an excellent panel of fellows Hanna Shelest, Senior Fellow in our Transatlantic Defense and Security Program, Director of Security Programs at the Ukrainian Prism Foreign Policy Council and Editor in Chief of Ukraine Analytica. Pavel Luzin, Senior Fellow in our Democratic Resilience Program, Visiting Scholar at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and in the past, advisor to the campaign’s of Alexey Navalny on defense and military matters. Admiral Andrew Lewis, Senior fellow, also in our Transatlantic Defense and Security Program, spent 36 years in the US Navy, including developing the Navy strategy and the national defense strategy in the United States. And last but not least, Nico Lange, Senior Fellow, also in our Transatlantic Defense and Security Program, teaches military history at the University of Potsdam and the Hertie School of governance in Berlin, and served as Chief of Staff of the German Ministry of Defense from 2019 to 2022. To remind, this conversation is on the record and is being recorded, we will distribute the transcript and be available for follow up questions after the after the end of this event. But I will start with some questions for each of the panelists, and then we will open it up to those of you who are joining us today from the press. You can use your the usual functions here in Zoom, raise hand, or post a question to the chat. And we will call on all the questions that we can get to over the course of today’s conversation. Hanna, if I may start with you. Can you give us your read of the situation on the front lines at the moment? Was the supplemental too late to have a material impact on Russia’s advance, particularly around Chasiv Yar, but also obviously what we’re seeing today, in Kharkiv oblast.

Hanna Shelest
Definitely the earlier would be much better because each additional months of not receiving that’s definitely allowed Russia either to prepare better the counter offense because at this time, they were also the accumulating efforts. Plus, there are a lot of statements from the military that Russians intensified these last weeks. There are activities on the north, east and southeast. Exactly because they wanted to reach a certain gains before the biggest bulk of the ammunition promised to Ukraine would arrive. Because now the fact that we are waiting for the two packages, the package shipped from the United States and so called Czech initiative, because the main problem was with ammunition and the Czech initiative should guarantee some part of it. So before that significant increase in Ukrainian capacities, Russians are trying to use their chance probably to to reach at least in one or two directions where they consider a weak point of Ukrainian defense. However, at the same time to say that it is late I would not tell these because, so while Ukraine been waiting for the US package, definitely we’ve been actively working with other partners. And for the last month, as you heard that different countries tried at least a bit of what they had to supply to Ukraine, so to allow, if not the counter offense, because these definitely we didn’t have any capacity, but to keep the line. So those fights that been happening, they were logical, like Chasiv Yar are some others because it is like the next up, or the fights around glanced. That’s where we had for two years, the constant battles. It just the question, are they more in the news less than in the news, depending whether journalists are able to reach those places. But if you look to those places, they never had the really hard time, if you compare, even with reporting, for example, on the south east of the front line. So now the question will be that we have the promises, we have the first deliveries, how quickly the main deliverys would reach Ukraine. We would not have exact and quick news about these that’s also done so Russia would be less prepared in their actions. But at the same time, we understand that even logistically it sometimes is needed. And that’s the question is who will use these time, time limits timeframes, let’s say more effectively, from what we see from today use from Kharkiv region, it looks like some amount of ammunition managed to reach on time. And that is really important, because they definitely demonstrated that they were able to prevent at least the attempt attack that had been happening since morning.

Sam Greene
Thanks, Hannah. Pavel, I’m going to turn to you next we can, we can switch to the other side of, of the front. You know, Hannah has suggested I think, logically that the Russians have wanted to use the moment right before Western aid does make it to to the front of for Ukraine, at least in his largest volumes. How much of a concern Do you think this renewed Western support is to Russia’s military command? How much is it factoring into decision making in Moscow and on the Russian side of the front?

Pavel Luzin
Good morning, everyone. Yes, the Russian military leadership and Russian political leadership, they are warning enough, because in previous months, previous several months, they believe that the amount of Western assistance will decrease. And today, they are facing the protests when the Ukrainian Armed Forces are being reinforced. And new portions of arms are coming. And the military assistance to Ukraine will be stable during the year, but at the same time, on the Russian side, the situation is not so bright. Because currently the Russian military see the foreign observers. We are all see the situation that Russia is going to exertion of its storage of arms. Because during the previous more than two years, Russia relied on the Soviet era storage bases of artillery, armored vehicles, main battle tanks, even some storage of engines for cruise missiles. Russia got everything from the Soviet era. And to restore the losses, Russia tried to use the storage to weapons and now after two years, we see that maybe up to two years, Russia still has in advance, but two years of storage. But the problem is that the storage bases are not endless. And the rational capturing capabilities are not unlimited. Russia still was not able to solve the question of the issue of deficit of workforce, on arms, manufacturing factories. Russia is facing growing troubles with machine tools. Because China made machine tools cannot replace German made machine tools, for instance, or American made machine tools. And so and so and so on. So the Russian military leadership and political leadership, they are in a hurry, currently. That’s why they’re trying to increase pressure here, here and there. And that’s why they were going to kill Zelenskyy. As we know, from recent days. That’s why currently, they’re conducting another round of nuclear blackmailing. So it’s, it’s every, everything demonstrates that Russia is in a hurry, because Russia realized that military assistance to Ukraine will be almost endless. And the Russian capabilities are not endless, are not unlimited.

Thanks for that, I think we’ll circle back to a bunch of that as we go on. But Admiral Lewis, I want to actually come to you next. Jake Sullivan said earlier this week that the plan is for this aide to see Ukraine through the remainder of this year and help prepare for a larger counter offensive in 2025. First of all, does that makes sense to you? And second of all, you know, is Ukraine going to have, or going to get from the US what it needs to mount that counter offensive in 2025?

Andrew Lewis
Yeah, I think, first of all, I think that, that the opening comment that Mr. Sullivan made, it does make sense, I think it’s adequate to meet the need to, you know, kind of get to 2025. Now, beyond that, as far as military hardware and support, direct support from the US, you know, that’s really kind of in the, in the hands of Congress and the American people, frankly, and I don’t think that you can equate just, you know, one for one equation, you know, provide this much direct military aid and assistance, it’s, it’s beyond that, it’s more than that. And it’s, and it’s beyond the US support directly, it’s, it’s NATO support directly to other partners within the region directly. And then, you know, actually, to really, to really get through for to support the Ukrainian military, to the degree that to really launch a counter offensive that will be ultimately successful against the Russians, I think will be even, it will be beyond providing stuff. It will be about, you know, being directly involved in a fight, and where however, that comes. However, that manifests itself. I, you know, I would, I would wouldn’t care to guess but for it to be ultimately successful, from a military military perspective, we just can’t we can’t buy it, we can’t buy it. It’s not something that can be bought. It’s a it’s about, you know, fighting alongside the Ukrainians. That’s, that’s my personal belief as with my back my background.

Sam Greene
Okay, I do imagine we will certainly come back to to that issue. And I imagine were Jake Sullivan here he might, he might dispute that idea. But we’ll, we’ll come back to that. You did, though mention the importance of not just US aid. And with that in mind, I want to turn Nico to to you. What should we expect to see in terms of European military support to Ukraine for the remainder of 2024? What’s the trajectory as we head into 2025 on on that side of the Atlantic?

Nico Lange
I’m not sure what we can expect to see. I know what is needed in Ukraine, but unfortunately, if you look into European policymaking on these days, there is no European leadership there is no unity between the main European actors. And it’s not, I think the sense of urgency has not increased, there’s more a sense of relief now that the US is delivering again, that the Europeans can continue in the very incremental way they are helping Ukraine. The question to me is very much what we now see in Kharkiv Oblast, will the Europeans be strong enough to lift, from a military point of view, ridiculous restrictions on weapons systems, only to use them on Ukrainian territory? Especially if you look into the Kharkiv Belgorod area, that doesn’t make much sense. The Europeans tried to get better at air defense with delivering more Patriot batteries to Ukraine. Germany started this. There are discussions with Greece and Spain on delivering more, also Germany ordered more Patriot batteries. There will be also increased production, especially on artillery ammunition, I think that will help at the end of the year, and then next year to meet the Ukrainian needs. But apart from that, unfortunately, the Europeans were not strong enough to meet the $61 billion from the US with 61 billion euro from the European partners. It seems to me something bad has to happen for the Europeans to get more active again, on the front of assisting assisting Ukraine more. And for the Europeans, there is, I think, a looming discussion whether troops will be sent to Ukraine, some countries are open to this when it comes to training, maybe also helping on air defense, some are very stiffly resisting it, including my country, Germany. So this debate, I think, has to get more more shape. And some pragmatic decisions I think have to be made about this. And maybe maybe one last point about European support for Ukraine, it’s very questionable how the European institutions will manage to continue their support for Ukraine that’s first and foremost, financially and macro financially. But there are many elements to the European assistance to Ukraine, when it comes to European institutions, we are going now into the cycle of elections and forming the European Commission. And it is it would be a pity if this takes a very long time, and nobody on the European level is really in charge of the Ukraine issue.

Sam Greene
Again, a lot to pick into. Looking through the list of people in the room, I know there will be questions on all these fronts, and probably others. So I would invite you to start raising your hand, post questions in the chat if you’d like to get involved in in the conversation. While you’re doing that, though, Hanna I’d like to return to you. And can you tell us a bit about how the the delivery and the pace of support from the west interacts with the efforts to increase military mobilization in Ukraine.

Hanna Shelest
The mobilization has several aspects and I would not make the direct correlation with the military support that Ukraine receives. Because when we speak about the military mobilization, we need to consider three aspects. Aspect number one is the rotation. So it is not bringing just new people but allowing those for at the frontline at the very first line, to have certain rest to rehabilitation to to have the fresh forces on the route. And when the new minister came, they tried to understand how many real forces they have. And they found out that it is the still significant reserve of the Ukrainian military who are serving somewhere in the western or central regions, for example, and during the two years of the war, never been at the front line. So theoretically, when we speak about mobilization very often, we also means these people who are already serving in the armed forces, many of whom are professional military or been mobilized in the first days. So they have some basic background, at least in the military training, they don’t need additional military training, but who been just sitting in the headquarters or somewhere in logistics and never been over there. So that would allow a certain rotation that definitely bring a new brace to the forces. The second point, second aspect of the rotation of the mobilization, that is the new comers. And here the situation is more difficult because even if you have volunteers or those who are normally coming and mobilized when they are called, you need time for their preparation, because that’s Soviets type of the preparation when all men served in the military, even that technically, it still exists with a certain restrictions. But the fact that were the last 20 years, no real training, so most of these people don’t know the basics of what they need to be sent to the front line. And that is a huge problem now, and there are, that’s why the process started with the even HR channels used, like Lobby X, for example, where recruitment is done by the military units by themselves, in addition to the classical process of recruitment. Why? Because some of the units or brigades, they have very good reputation. And they realize that for many soldiers, they trust more the particular brigades, rather than Ministry of Defense, for example, or general staff where they seeing due to the propaganda for some time the news from the region that they would not be prepared. But for these new comers, it’s always the question is who will finance their preparation, the ammunition and everything for them to be ready for fighting. And here we hear all the discussions from the social, psychological political discussion inside of the country, to the conversations with our partners about the increase of the training, not only for the NCO or the officers who are already in the armed forces, but also how to build these effective system of the training of the newcomers, either in Ukraine or outside of Ukraine. So for them quickly to be prepared in case we need a big amount of the forces on the ground. That’s why when we come to the military support, here, we need to understand that two things are important. First of all, is ammunition. The enough amount of ammunition would allow less soldiers in the infantry to be at the front line, less wounded, less killed. So definitely, that will influence the necessity and the numbers of those who should be newly mobilized to their armed forces. And the second is air defense. Because with the air defense, there’s also the possibility to change the dynamic on the battlefield. And the protection of the cities for where we can take additional forces that are currently in the mobile groups, for example, are protecting the seas, to wee cannot put the direct connection and correlation between the foreign military support and mobilization, but at the same time, we understand that indirect correlations definitely exist, because that’s also about the readiness of the Ukrainian population to fight, to defend their country, to be able to use those ammunition that are ammunition that are coming to play. Because we also need to understand that all those who are newcomers, they will need the skills, how to use let’s say, even and law or high marks or something. So it’s not just a rifle, that you can have one week of the training, good to be able to use to do something with it. So the more complicated and sophisticated weapons we receive, the better training we will need for the forces and to think who we are engaging in the armed forces.

Sam Greene
Thank you. Again, please do post your questions to the chat or raise your hand. Pavel, you mentioned that, you know, Russia is nearing its capacity, if not already at capacity when it comes to military industrial production. We’ve seen recently, you know, pretty clear evidence of now North Korean missiles being used. We’ve obviously seen Iranian drones. How much do we know about the spare capacity of Russia’s friends, those who are willing to supply it with military lethal aid to supplant the capacity that Russia itself may not have.

Pavel Luzin
So let’s see on for instance, North Korean missiles. During the last several months since January 2024. We saw at least 50 ballistic missiles from North Korea, which were used by Russian forces. These missiles are not so sufficient, but 50 missiles, it is exactly the amount of Iskander missiles ballistic missiles which Russia can produce annually, a year. So, that means that okay, Russia tried to rely on North Korean assistance for compensating some likes of ballistic missiles. But at the same time, North Korea is also not a missile superpower, which can supply Russia hundreds of these missiles or which can produce hundreds of such missiles every year. Oh, I I presume that the industrial capacity on North Korea in terms of missiles is much lower then the Russian capacity but of course, North Korea has storage of missiles and storage has been created in recent two, three decades so North Korea can continue to supply some amount of missiles which can change almost nothing. They might create damage to Ukrainian cities, they might kill some Ukrainian civilians, but in terms of of the war, this North Korean missiles cannot change the situation dramatically. The same is true towards North Korean artillery ammunitions. Okay, since since the fall 2023, North Korea supplied significant amount of artillery ammunitions. We saw the assessment that up to 3 million artillery shells has been supplied from North Korea to Russia. In my opinion, this assessment is too high. Maybe we can speak about 1 million or 105 million artillery shells. But yes, this is a big amount. Before 2022 Russia was able to produce or 107, 108 million artillery shells a year. But the quality of this artillery shells, North Korean artillery shells, is is not so high, it is much lower than the quality of artillery shells which Russia produces by itself. The same is true towards supplies from Iran. Yes, Iran supplies drones and drones is a separate topic. Iran also supplied some artillery ammunitions for for Russia. And this ammunitions also did not change the situation was a combat situation, strategically. Yes, some supplies take place, because this supplies are limited to now because neither North Korea nor Iran has an advanced manufacturing capacity. So for Russia, for Russia, these supplies plays the role of palliative measures. Russia is trying to compensate its weaknesses. Russia is trying to win some time to produce a little bit more missiles, artillery shells domestically. But the reality in strategic prospects and long term prospects, the reality is that Russia is hardly able to, you know, to change the situation, the combat situation dramatically. And the supplies from Russian allies cannot change the situation dramatically as well. However, however, we still have to count the potential role of China because as for now, China does not supply any arms to Russia. But we don’t know whether or not China will continue to avoid the supplies. Or maybe China one day in next several months or next year we’ll decide okay, we we have to prevent Russia from defeat. We can supply them I know several millions of artillery shells. We have to have to take this into account. China’s factor is a factor of uncertainty.

Sam Greene
Thanks for that Pavel. I see a hand up. Josh, if you can unmute yourself and ask your question if you want to address it. Anybody In particular, or to the panel as a whole, please let us know.

Joshua Posaner
Hi guys, thank you very much for the question. It’s just Josh Posaner from Politico. It’s just a query to go back to what Nico was saying before about the provision of air defense systems to Ukraine. I know there’s been pressure from the German government on both Spain and Greece. So far, both governments seem to have been clear, they won’t send the platform’s. Anybody to anybody on the panel, maybe Nico first, would you expect any movement on this? Do you think there could be a change in stance from Greece and Spain? Specifically, and I also saw this week that Romania was asked to dispatch its Patriot unit two. So any thoughts on that would be much appreciated. Thanks.

Sam Greene
Nico, do you have a response to that, or I’m looking at Hanna as well.

Nico Lange
I mean, the numbers, the numbers, who has how many patriots systems, I think, are widely known. And it’s obvious that I mean, Germany, now went forward with one more battery could maybe give one more, if there is pressure. Spain and Greece are the only countries that are not directly on the eastern flank, which still have systems. Spain is now ready to supply ammunition for Patriot systems to Ukraine. But I think that will not take the pressure away, there will be continuous discussion. I think that I understand the discussion with Romania, maybe as a rotational idea that Romania donates the system to Ukraine, and then the Spanish system can replace the system in Romania. When it comes to Greece, it’s complicated. Because depending on where the systems are, the rig site might be afraid they will not be allowed to put them back there. And so the I think there are ongoing discussions. And there’s a new development, because Israel wants to renew the Patriot systems they have and replace them with Davids sling that has been going on for a while, but they announced that they have eight Patriot systems they want to retire within the next months. I think three of them were in originally delivered by Germany to Israel. So there might be a new opportunity here to buy those former Israeli systems for Ukraine, and also the opportunity for Israel to have a more forward leaning position, supporting Ukraine, Israel was very reluctant to do so. But if you ask me, now that the ties of Iran and Russia are so out in the open, and there’s even discussion of Russia, maybe supplying fighter jets to Iran, maybe Israel is rethinking this position, and that could free up the Patriot systems for Ukraine directly. So there is some movement in this. And on top of that, I think Ukraine had some success, with so called FrankenSAM systems. Combining former Hawk ammunition with the book launcher is stuff like that, which is not a solution against cruise missiles or ballistic missiles, but could help to find cheap methods to bring down Russian drones. Because the economy of air defense I think is something that we should be concerned with. This would include the delivery of more capable radars to Ukraine, and command and control system systems so that you can quickly decide to shoot down the ship treads, which ship weapons and spare the very valuable missiles for air defense systems for more advanced threats. When you look into last point, when you look into European production, I think it’s clear that for example, IRIS-T systems, and IRIS-T ammunition in Germany is produced too slowly. Diehl defense is trying to expand capabilities, but you probably heard of the ridiculous story of a mayor of some German city not wanting to give territory to Diehl defense to produce more ammunition. I think it’s an illustration of the internal debates, discourses in Germany.

Sam Greene
Thanks, Nico. While you’ve got the microphone, I might stay with you. We’ve got a question in the chat from Grier Stewart at CBC who asks about the Russian offensive in the northeast around Kharkiv Oblast. I know that’s something you’ve been tracking closely as it develops. Today, Grier notes that Ukraine had been expecting a Russian defensive in this area, and now it has to deploy more soldiers to the area. How do you think this will affect the dynamics across the entire front and what kind of position does it put Ukrainian at the moment?

Nico Lange
First of all, it is now happening exactly the way it was expected. And it’s a task I think not so much for Ukraine. I think more for Western media not to misinterpret the destabilization of the border region in Kharkiv Oblast and maybe Sumy Oblast by Russian forces with a big ground offensive to take the city of Kharkiv or take the city of Sumy. I think that is not what is happening. There has been political talk about buffer zones by Putin and also repeated by Lovrov. And that is giving Russia kind of a legitimation. To say we are incurring again into this these regions, even if they are not the regions that we formally annexed as the Russian Federation. And I think at the moment, it’s an effort to stretch the Ukrainian resources even further, to thin the Ukrainian defenses in Donbas, and to make resource management when it comes down to the new supplies that are coming in from the US more difficult for Ukraine. I do not see a bigger effect than that for now. But that’s difficult enough for Ukraine. But of course, it has I mentioned this, but I’ve repeated it has for all of us. the elements to rethink this idea. I mean, the US supplied ATACMS with higher ranges in the new package or even before that, but there was a public announcement ATACMS are there to be used on Ukrainian territory. But from a military point of view, if you see troop concentrations, just on the other side of the border, does not make much sense just to wait for them to encourage your territory it would be militarily absolutely useful to hit them while they are building. And from the perspective of international law, that’s, of course, perfectly legitimate. So I think the artificial restrictions have to be lifted like the UK lifted the artificial restrictions. The UK ambassador was summoned to the Russian MFA. Okay, so what I would not be worried about this. But I think that’s really necessary if we want to protect Kharkiv if and Sumy area. And the Russian bombing campaign when it comes to missiles and light bombs used on cities such as Kharkiv, if it is targeted at pushing people to move out of the cities, so that in a later stage, Russia might have an easier way when it tries to attempt to take them. And that’s why we should we should provide support not only for the infrastructures, and for the rebuilding, but also to give Ukraine the military means to protect the cities, I think this is strategically very important.

Sam Greene
Thanks for that. I would note, if you haven’t seen it yet, that CEPA published a report just recently, together with the Kyiv School of Economics on Ukrainian reconstruction making, you know, more or less exactly that, that argument. Hanna did you want to add anything to that analysis, particularly of what’s going on in the northeast?

Hanna Shelest
Yeah, [unintelligible] first of all, to the Patriots, we need to understand that the territory of Ukraine is huge. And the facts are themselves that Russians are currently using against the energy infrastructure. First of all, they are more and more targeting the western regions of Ukraine. So something far from the front line where you don’t have other forces to protect them. And that’s why and also the seaports and other critical infrastructure like railway stations and never seen so most of the big cities and most of the energy systems and we have quite a wide network of the heat stations, electric station hydro stations, and we see that Russia are charging them including even the huge damage that can lead to the attacker stroke like in the procedure, for example. So 25 regions, you need at least 25 Patriot systems to more or less protect from Kinzhal strikes frrom a few types that currently we don’t have with what to protect. Eith what is happening in Kharkiv, definitely we need to be very careful. The next few days was the news. Because what we are already noticed and we are talking since the morning among the experts that Russian channels like their military bloggers, I think they are called correspondants. It is from six o’clock in the morning, we are coming five directions, we are weeding, everything is good. Then the same Russian channels are saying like come on. Nobody moved anywhere in more than 100 meters in one direction in other look at the photos of all those times that just tried but didn’t manage. So now we will have both the physical attack but information attack and here uh it’s better to be very careful in terms of the numbers and the territories occupied or not. Because even during the day, the situation can change significantly. But these attacks everybody be prepared to it. Because Kharkiv is important. Russia understands they will not be able to catch Kharkiv as a city. It is a huge city with a lot of people there quite well prepared and with the significant residential area. So it’s not a small big move or something like this. However, it is much more important to keep the forces around it to damage the city as much as possible, and to create a zone of uncertainty. So in this case, the forces will not come to support more to the south, where another significant battle is happening to that. And also because a lot of forces have been expecting any type of attack from Belarus territory so again, that’s the possibility to disperse the forces as much as possible to the north. So not to allow any counteroffense on the south. But still, like I’m looking to the news. And I see that the situation is each 15 minutes the party is coming with new and new information that can be very contradicting or one to another. One small command that I wanted to add to what Pavel been talking about the North Korean weapons, I will be a little bit less optimistic than here. The reason is very simple. I’ve been in Korea in December, and we had these conversations with Southern Koreans and with the their military. 1 million, it is what the whole European Union were not able to produce and deliver to Ukraine, despite their promise for the previous year. So one supplier from North Korea, even if by different data 30% of those brokers have the best quality and don’t reach the intelligence. Still, it is 1 million, that has just allow you what we call the carpet shootings, when you’re just not allowing any counter actions against you, compared to the ammunition that Ukraine is not receiving. So it can be 500,000. But if we receive only 100,000 that still allow Russia to be in the dominance. The same with the Iranians, they still produce of the drones. And there is significant help to the Russian forces and these jobs are improved. What’s the important factor of this cooperation of Russia with Iran and with North Korea that we are forgetting that Russia are helping with money and technology to this country. So even if North Korea were not able to produce something, now they receive payments in Chinese yuan. And they absolutely okay, so none of the sanctions are working, why because 90% of what North Korea is buying, they’re buying from China. So they absolutely are happy with the payments in yuan. And these allows the circle of supply of technology improvement of technologists what we see with Shahed is now a much more improved first of all GPS systems where Russians were good, and where Iranians were bad. So Shahed in 2024, a much more improved in terms of their stability in the electronic warfare in terms of the GPS in terms of the amount of the explosion, that they can care, what Iranians would not be able to do, if not cooperating with Russia. So that is just a win win. Maybe temporarily. That’s another question. But the problem is how much they can reach, while they still have this one year of quite a win win solutions for these countries and for Moscow.

Sam Greene
Thanks for that. Please do keep your questions coming either by raising your hand or in the chat. Admiral Lewis how I turned back to to you. Last year, the Pentagon was you know, quietly but still publicly critical of how US support and other Western support was deployed by Ukraine in the context of that years counter offensive. As we look, you know, through the remainder of this year and in 2025, are you seeing signals that important lessons have been learned by either side either by by Kyiv or by Washington? On the back of that experience?

Andrew Lewis
You know, I think I think actually that yes, lessons are being learned and applied I guess would be more importantly. We have we have a tendency to to observe les- lessons but not actually do anything about them. But I think it’s at least from US policymakers standpoint and that are implementing that policy. I think those lessons are being learned and, and being applied going forward. I, I’m not as confident it from the Kyiv side of things, just because I’m not as familiar with the mindset of the individuals. And it’s, you know, they’re, they’re the ones who are actually, you know, feet to the fire, so to speak. So I don’t know that that statement is the same. But my observation has been, you know, in from a, very much of an outsider looking in, I think, that is, I think that, you know, I credit the administration and credit the policymakers for implementing, you know, learning some lessons that that we made some mistakes in the past, not just in the Ukraine, but in other places that are being applied. Well, in this case, I think another thing I would say about, you know, is the discussion of with a lot of the questions on the air defense systems, and on that, and the ammunition, and so on, and so forth. The way to look at that, from a military standpoint is if you’re, if you’re looking at from a defensive standpoint, air defense, for example, or, you know, ammunition to repel an attack, that’s a different equation, really, for a counter offensive, or air defense in support of a counter offensive. That’s a lot more ammunition, a lot more capability that needs to be put on scene. And I think somebody made a point about, you know, the more exquisite weapons systems that that are provided, be that from, you know, a Romanian system or a Spanish system, or wherever the case may be. There’s a lot of logistical support, lot of training support. The, you just, you just can’t put those systems into place and expect them to perform exactly as advertised without the, without the, the training and support to make them up without the security forces attached to and so on. And so, so that, that, but to answer the question, I think those lessons are being learned. And I think, you know, it’s, it’s a, it’s good to see that as a as a taxpayer and, and a supporter of the Ukrainian situation.

Sam Greene
Okay, um, one last call for questions. I know that everybody’s busy and has deadlines to, to get to so I won’t keep you here any any later than we need to. I’ll just do a quick run around our panel, see if there are any pressing issues that haven’t come up yet in the conversation that you think we ought to bring to people’s attention? Yeah, Nico, please.

Nico Lange
Just one last remark on air defense. One helpful, new quality of air defense from outside could also be to engage targets over the airspace of Ukraine, at least where we have them in reach in the western part of Ukraine, which would create a double effect a safe zone for defense industry for cities such as [unintelligible]. And for also, our health and our investment into recovery at the same time, valuable air defense assets of the armed forces of Ukraine would be moved further east. Again, under international law, it’s possible to do it’s a question of political will, arguably more for the European partners who have the Patriot systems in Poland and Romania, not so much for the US.

Sam Greene
Yeah, that’s it’s a good point. And it certainly did not go unnoticed in Ukraine or elsewhere, that the US and the UK were shooting down missiles and and projectiles aimed at Israel. So, point taken. Hanna?

Hanna Shelest
Very briefly, but I think that there are two moments that we need to consider into follow what are in the next months as well. We had a lot of promises within the last year, a lot of announcements of the support to Ukraine, first of all, by the US but not only the UK and some others. But the facts about delivery or the very delayed delivery. And that’s something would we need to put public to to speak about it what is the reasons the reasons are different sometimes. There are blocks in the contract. Sometimes it is the incapability of the producers of these types of ammunition. But the problem is that in the media, we hear all those right statements about how politician X or Y are promised to deliver. And everybody thinks that it means that in two days, it is in Ukraine, and we need to deliver the results, some victory. But we have the cases when six months is nine months or even one year, what been announced have not been delivered to Ukraine. So it’s not always what is in the package is what is are on the ground, or at least arriving up to Ukraine. And the second moment, I would definitely would like to support Nico about the what our neighbors of Ukraine are doing in case of the problems, because those cases when the Russians, missiles or drones or any other types of attacks are crossing the territory of the NATO members. And we don’t have any reaction, what the reaction is even trying to explain that no, no, no, no problem they have been just flying over here. That gives Russia a wonderful argument to say how weak is NATO, how they’re incapable. And also the questions are like, okay, so what is your defense and all those forces that are stationed in Poland, for example, if they are not capable, even to intercept one of the missiles that are crossing your territory for the significant amount of time? So that’s also the question that probably we need to start asking why all those NATO forces, the battles, groups that are currently stationed in the eight countries of the Eastern plan for what they are, if they are not ready or not capable to intercept the Russian attacks, even if it is just the crossing of the territories.

Sam Greene
Noted. I see one more question in the room. Unfortunately, I can’t I can’t see your name. So please do introduce yourself and pose your question. You’re muted. Think we may have an audio problems. Yeah. I think that maybe what’s happening at the moment, sorry. While, that’s happening, Pavel, what do you do you have any last closing thoughts of your own?

Pavel Luzin
Yeah. Maybe I can reply to Hanna. I don’t pretend to contradict to Hanna to Hannas conclusions, because they are correct. And, of course, Russia provides technical assistance to Iran to North Korea. Yes, but in a long term, prospect, all these three authoritarian and mostly non market economies. They are fundamentally incapable to achieve the result, positive for them competing with democratic and market economies of the United States, European Union and also, NATO and plus, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. So yes, the war is hard. The war is terrible. But Russia can be defeated. And Russia’s allies can be defeated. Russia must be defeated. And it is not an impossible task or something like that. It is not, I don’t know 100 year war or 30, 30 year war. So we all just need to do our job. And at the end, at the end, Ukraine will win.

Sam Greene
Thank you for that. I think we, it looks like you are maybe now on mute. Sorry. Now I still can’t, can’t hear you unfortunately. Okay, I see a question, though. This may be your question, do we have factual hints from Conrad Schuler? Do we have factual hints that US in Germany might try to force Ukraine into a premature ceasefire as some people have been suggesting.

Nico, did you want to address that?

Nico Lange
No, my my impression is that at this point in time, everybody relevant arrived at a conclusion that there is no possible discussion line with the Russian Federation at this point that could lead to this.

Hanna Shelest
We don’t have the actual science about this for now but we already have the increased discussion about these at the lower political level and expert level, let’s say so I cannot say is it coming from the bottom to the top or from the top to the bottom, but at least what I know just from the personal experience, that the conversation is about the certain compromise that Ukraine must go to it, maybe to reject Crimea, or maybe to set the line where it is now, or that you don’t receive enough ammunition. So maybe you need to see and speak. I mean, all those pushes are saying not what Russia should do, but how Ukraine should go to the compromises, I would say that they significantly increased in my conversations at the closed door events since October. And that is happening. And I’m hearing aid unfortunately, not only from the journal, German and the West, but even from the UK I hear experts from time to time and ex military sometimes, and what is bad is that you are hearing it even from those who presented themselves as friends of Ukraine. So all of these are not those who are with the pro Russian position. That was easier. That was situational 2022. But you hear this with people who are starting the sentence with that definitely I’m the biggest friend and supporter of Ukraine, but and then it is presented as the desire of the something the best of the best to Ukraine. However, unfortunately, all the arguments are sounding like the, you know, marriages in the 19th century that or these guys should be best of the best for you, who cares that it is domestic violence, he would be very good for you, because you need to marry. So I mean, that’s maybe very metaphorical comparing but I mean, that is coming without any real arguments why it should be better for Ukraine. Or what the what pressure will be against Russia or something like this, it coming more with this emotional component that okay, but what if you would not receive additional ammunition? You understand that you must do it? Usually most of the opponents and answering no, we don’t understand why we should allow Russia to win and we should surrounding current conditions. But these arguments since October, yes, what is open are sounding different that closed door events.

Sam Greene
I’m gonna have to draw to a close there, I will hand over to my colleague Sarah Krajewski in just a second to walk us through the logistics of what happens next. Thank you very much to all of you for joining us on today’s conversation. Please join me in thanking all of our panelists. Hanna Shelest, Nico Lange, and Admiral Woody Lewis. Sarah?

Sarah Krajewski
Thanks, Sam. And thank you, everyone, for joining today for this conversation, we’ll be sending out a recording of this briefing following it’s close when we get that all wrapped place today, and a transcript will be made available on our website in the coming days. If you would like to get in touch with any of our panelists or have any other inquiries, you can email press@cepaorg.pages.dev. and I’d be happy to direct you down to our panelists or other experts. And you can go to cepaorg.pages.dev for any further information and coverage on this topic. Thank you so much, everyone for joining us.

Sam Greene
Thank you, stay safe, stay well and good luck.