Catherine Sendak
Good morning, good afternoon. Hope everyone can hear me. Thank you so much for joining us this morning. My name is Katie Sendak, and I am the director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security team here at the Center for European Policy Analysis. I’m absolutely thrilled this morning to be moderating a discussion with three of our absolutely wonderful experts, taking a look at defense technology in the Middle East and lessons that NATO should be learning from what we’re seeing over the past three weeks in the Middle East. Just a few housekeeping notes. This is an on-the-record press briefing, and before we get started, I’d like to outline that CEPA is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy institution headquartered in Washington, DC. Any opinions expressed by our panelists during the briefing are their views alone. If you’d like to ask a question during the briefing, please use the chat function in Zoom or the raise-your-hand function, and we will try to get to as many questions as possible. So, to set the stage a little bit before we turn to our wonderful experts on all of these issues, we are seeing a rapid, fluid situation with dozens of nations directly involved in what’s been going on over the past few weeks in the Middle East. With drones alone, we have seen Ukraine send over 200 experts to the region, on Shahed drones, on drone technology, on counter-drone technology. President Zelensky has offered a further 30 experts to join the region for expertise. Most recently, President Zelensky has offered interceptors to partners and allies in the region, 1000 interceptors a day based on their production availability, with keeping 1000 at home in Ukraine based on their needs on the battlefield, but we’re seeing so many regional considerations with major global impacts. We’re seeing munitions stockpiles dwindling, we’re seeing what we look to understand more, and hopefully our experts will be able to enlighten us, with the coordination of allies and partners, what the role of NATO Allies currently is, what it could be in the future, and of course, we’re seeing it daily in the global markets of commodities, energy commerce, fertilizer, as the Straits of Hormuz are very restricted by the Iranian government. So, we look at the role of tech in this most recent conflict. Obviously, we’ve seen this over the past four years in Ukraine and in other parts of the world. What lessons need to be learned? What’s working, what’s not working, what is the United States and its allies taking away from this conflict? And with that, with all of those burning questions, I want to welcome our three experts. We have CEPA Fellow Federico Borsari joining us. We have CEPA Senior Fellow, retired general Skip Davis, joining us. Thank you so much. And we have Senior Fellow Jason Israel with CEPA also joining us. These are all amazing experts. Hopefully, you know their bios. They have a breadth of expertise in government, outside of government, in the military, in the industry, and in tech, and we hope you utilize their expertise as much as possible. So, I will take moderator privilege to start us off here with a level-setting question. If I may ask all three of you, and Skip, maybe I’ll start with you, where do we stand? What is this looking like, three weeks into this, from the perspective of Europe and the United States, from a transatlantic perspective? What are we missing? What are we seeing? We’d love to get your initial thoughts on the latest.
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Hey, thanks, and that’s a wonderful introduction, by the way, in terms of setting the context for today’s discussion, and good to see Jason and Federico. I’m glad I’m finally in America for once in the same time zone as a press call, so that’s wonderful. In fact, I’m in the CEPA headquarters right now. So, let me take the question. I’d say, three weeks into the war between the US, Israel and Iran, and let me put this in context for NATO and NATO allies, I think NATO and NATO allies should recognize that we’re seeing a decisive shift in the character of war, and what Michael Horowitz from the Council of Foreign Relations has called an age of precise mass I would simply call precision at scale. This war has demonstrated that advanced militaries no longer face a trade-off between precision and scale. Instead, they must contend with adversaries that combine both high-end missiles with large volumes of cheap and attritable systems, and Iran has shown that relatively unsophisticated weapons, like the Shahed-type drones, costing as little as $20,000 to $50,000 based on different estimates, can impose real operational stress and economic burden on even the most advanced militaries. The United States and its allies are being forced to use interceptors for defense and missiles for counter-offense, costing billions or at least hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars and creating a very unfavorable cost exchange. At the same time, Iran has adapted quickly, targeting air defenses, radars, and command and control nodes, rather than simply trying to compete symmetrically. This scores a critical point: modern adversaries do not need to defeat NATO militarily in a conventional sense; they will seek to stress NATO in terms of tempo, stretch, in terms of geographic need to defend, and exhaust it in terms of magazine inventory. But perhaps the most important lesson is that NATO adversaries, such as Russia and Iran, and a NATO partner, Ukraine, are ahead of NATO in one critical area: the ability to produce and employ low-cost systems at scale. Russia is working to produce up to 1,000 drones per day, while Ukraine has already scaled production of interceptor drones into the tens of thousands annually, and is delivering them to units at rates exceeding about 1,500 per day. These are not prototypes. These are operating systems shaping today’s battlefield, and Ukraine has demonstrated a new model of air defense as well. Instead of relying solely on expensive interceptors, it has built a layered system in which cheap interceptor drones costing as little as $2,000 to $5,000, so the order of magnitude below the Shahed drone cost, account for the majority of drone shoot-downs across Ukraine. That’s a fundamental shift. The question is no longer just how to defeat a threat; the question is how to do so at a sustainable cost and scale. So, I see five quick lessons for NATO, and I’ll just list them out. We could talk about it in perhaps one of the questions. First, integrated air and missile defense must be layered and cost-effective, not reliant solely on exquisite interceptors and high-end deep strike assets. Second, industrial capacity and magazine depth, as Katie mentioned in her opening remarks, are central to deterrence. Third, attritable and autonomous systems must be fielded en masse, not in niche roles, and NATO force doctrine, organization, training, and leader development must evolve to integrate autonomy at scale and breadth. Fourth, the kill chain- sensing, making sense, decision-making, and action-like targeting are decisive grounds in the modern battlefield. And fifth, resilience, both military and societal, is essential because defenses will be penetrated. The overarching conclusion, in my view, is that NATO must move from models built around technological superiority to one built out of integrated systems, scalable production, and rapid adaptation. Thanks, Katie.
Catherine Sendak
Skip, that’s a wonderful layout, thank you so much, of things that we all need to be taking a look at. If I can turn to Jason next. Given Skip’s really clear layout of what NATO needs to be learning for this, I mean, should we have been surprised? Where do we stand in terms of whether we should have been surprised by how this has unfolded in terms of technology?
Jason Israel
Yes, thank you, Katie, and it’s always an honor and daunting to follow Skip, but I do think that one of his great points that he made at the end about doctrine and operations in C2, about how we move forward, is a really good place for me to start, because taking a step back to my background, I would say my expertise and the work that I do at CEPA is very much about the evolution of interoperable unmanned systems, so that is software, that is C2, that is procedures. And in my previous role as the Senior Director for Defense Policy at the National Security Council, we had the operation that I keep going back to in my mind which is Prosperity Guardian, where we, as an alliance, came together and tried to defend merchant shipping in the Red Sea, primarily from the Houthi threat, and some similarities and differences which I’d like to get to. But I think, following up on Skip, one thing that I could add to his excellent overview of the hardware challenges for scaling and what we’re looking at in hardware, and, frankly, hardware tends to get the attention and the numbers, but I think I’d like to start my comment when you asked about whether we are surprised. The one thing that is not surprising to me is that the software has not caught up, and to me, if you have two or three or 1,000 different unmanned systems without the software layer and the C2 layer, you could get a completely different outcome from the same pieces of equipment, and that is a massive difference between manned systems. Manned systems, if you think about the training of the pilot who is working to ensure that the outcome is similar each time, these will, from headquarters all the way to the effect, what some call the kill chain, or the kill web, the software is decisive, and a lot of our work at CEPA has been focusing on that. It was probably my biggest takeaway from the Munich Security Conference, when I was there, that you had many, many stars of retired generals and admirals talking about the importance of this year and next year being the year that we sync software to the hardware. So, considering the software and data architecture in both Prosperity Guardian and Epic Fury, for example, it becomes an immediate question as to what the drone that you’re using, or the unmanned system that you’re using, what software is behind it? So, the question will be, I think, twofold. One is, does the software allow it to be interoperable with the headquarters? And then the question is, is that off? Is that software relatively easily flexible to bring into other platforms? And as we’ve seen on the US side, the scale of the hardware has not quite gotten there yet, and software, as we know, is relatively easy to scale, but we’re not seeing interoperability between the systems to the point that we would need to fight as an alliance in the future, and I think that’s one of the big questions that I have. So, in the Q&A, we can get more into the Prosperity Guardian versus Epic Fury comparisons, if you’d like. The final point I’d like to make, and again, it springs from Skip’s last point, which is on doctrine, and I talk about this a lot at CEPA, and we do a lot of strategic scenario exercises, I’d be very happy to do one for the press at some point as well, because it puts us in a sort of a scenario-based problem that we could work through some of these issues, but it’s the question of doctrine that Skip mentioned. There’s an ongoing question about whether unmanned systems or manned systems are considered more escalatory, and that is a key question that has not been answered. We could actually examine that question a little bit, but I have two lessons from Ukraine that stand out to me in this regard, and then I’ll leave it here and turn it over to Federico. One is that we didn’t do much to stop Russia from attacking civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. We helped Ukraine to make it more resilient, but we didn’t, as a global community, try to reestablish a norm that attacking civilian critical infrastructure during winter, for example, was something outside of the boundaries of modern warfare. And now, what you’re seeing is that that lack of a norm is absolutely being tested right now, where civilian infrastructure, global, if you will, oil infrastructure is being damaged, so that is one. The second is that Ukraine is probably building and evolving faster than anybody in the world right now, and so the way that companies and countries can partner with Ukrainian companies because of the experience that they’ve had is going to be very important. But that said, and I’ll finish where I started, the Ukrainian model does not have software that blends and all drone interoperability, and so as that lesson learned from Ukraine is applied, we can’t have 200 different types of drones in the future that don’t speak to each other. We need to be able to develop the software. So, I’ll finish again where I started, that it’s all about the software. Thanks, Katie.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Jason; that’s a really key element as we look at the combination of conventional firepower that we’re seeing in the Middle East, combined with this new technology that we’ve been seeing in Ukraine for years. Federico, I know you pay such close attention to these issues and the evolution of this technology on the battlefield. Would love your impressions from the last three weeks.
Federico Borsari
Yeah, thanks so much, Katie. It’s always a pleasure to be with Skip and Jason and discuss this topic. I think there are plenty of elements that we can touch upon in this discussion, and, of course, coming after Skip and Jason always makes it difficult to have more ideas, because they have already laid out a lot of important elements, but I want to stress one of the key aspects, according to my opinion, when it comes to uncrewed technology and uncrewed systems, as we have seen them being so important in the current operations in the Middle East, both Skip and Jason mentioned doctrine and interoperability as key elements, and I think training is also essential. We know that, of course, automation and AI-based functionalities are becoming increasingly reliable and also affordable, and you can integrate them at scale in many systems now, but at the same time, for many of the use cases and for many of the capabilities that have been employed in the Middle East these days, training remains a critical part of the equation, because, for instance, in the counter US mission set, you need to have very skilled operators. Integrated air missile defenses have been relying on automated systems for decades. Radar technology and high-end interceptors function based on very automated processes, and the operator, as you know, has an important task, but at the same time is really supported by technology and needs to be very prepared for any kind of contingency, and so training and rehearsal of realistic situations is increasingly important, also for the counter-US in part of the equation. I think this aspect is often overlooked in discussion, and we tend to look at the technology. For the government, for the planners, it is always easier to say, “I want to buy that number of radars and effectors and sensors and put them on the field,” and “I feel very protected,” but actually that is only one part of all the things that you have to do. And training is a critical element, because you need to be sure that you have the operators who are able to use those systems. If you look at the technology ecosystem and defense tech, it’s really diversified, but I think there is a key concept that we need to consider when we discuss this topic, and it applies to many different types of capabilities. It’s not just about drones or counter-drones. This concept is what we can define as a triangle of three Ts. One of the Ts is technology, another T is tactics, and the other T is training. So, these three elements are interconnected and work in symbiosis, and they cannot be separated from one another, because otherwise you end up having only part of the capability that you want to have, and that capability will not work properly. But that said, in general, I think one of the many takeaways from what is happening in the Middle East now is that exquisite systems alone are not sufficient, but at the same time, cheap mass is not sufficient for itself. You need to have both. I think we are hearing a lot these days that Iran has been able to achieve important results in terms of destroying key targets, whether they are radars, hangars, or other infrastructure, across the Middle East, but using drones, right? They have been mentioned a lot in the media debate, but at the same time, it’s also true that with those systems alone, Iran has not achieved any kind of significant victory. Of course, if we look at the long term, operational and tactical are not the only levels of war. You also have the strategic part, and so in the long term, we still need to see how this heads. But, at the moment, Iran has not been able to obtain significant military results against the US and Israel. That’s one of the key takeaways. And so, you need much more than just cheap drones to win a battle, I think, or a war.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Federico; that’s such a great point. What is that combination? And again, I know my colleague Michael wrote this in the chat. If you all have any questions, please use the raise-your-hand function or put it in the chat. I’m happy to relay them to our experts. And with that, I’m going to turn back to Skip because there’s been so much conversation already about training, doctrine, personnel, making sure we have the right processes in place to really utilize this technology to its greatest extent possible. We know that NATO is good at that; NATO is good at making the lists and coming up with the standards and doing all that kind of stuff. But we also see this rapid evolution of technology. Iran has been at the forefront of unmanned systems with its Shahed drones, with its technology, sending it to Russia to be used in Ukraine, etc. We continue to see that. How does NATO stack up in that degree, recognizing that you do need all of that to be successful, but how do you assess where NATO is in terms of those capabilities?
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
So, firstly, I think there’s a lot of ground that NATO has to cover to be able to be prepared for a fight like we’re seeing currently between Russia and Ukraine as the primary issue, but also what we’re seeing play out in the Gulf. There are a couple of aspects I could grab on to, and since Federico and Jason both talked about software and then the concepts, I’ll talk to technology first, and perhaps maybe I can come back later, because I’ve got some ideas on doctrine and mindset changes as well. If I think just about what the kind of most urgent capability priorities for NATO are, I can rapidly cover them, and I think four or five stand out. First, integrated, layered, affordable air missile defense. That’s absolutely critical to protecting from the infrastructure damage that Jason was talking about that we see right now in our Gulf partners, what we should see in Ukraine from the Russian salvos, etc. And in that, the first thing NATO must do is dramatically expand its lower-tier defenses. These are the counter-UAS systems, kinetic EW, and all sorts of interceptor drones, etc., that need to be developed in mass. And in Ukraine, experience shows that these systems can be integrated, but they’d have to be the most numerous and the most cost-effective layer of their integrated air missile defense. Second, you talked about this: munition stockpiles and production at scale. The Iran war has shown just how quickly inventories can be depleted, and the US has already used hundreds of cruise missiles, over 1,000 interceptors, and in three weeks plus days, while production rates for those key systems still remain in the hundreds per year. So, how do we make up what we’ve already expended for three weeks, if not in several years, of existing contracts or rapid changes? By contrast, Russia has scaled up production toward 1,000 per day of its drones. Ukraine is producing tens of thousands of interceptors annually and is aiming for about 1,000 per day. That’s the scale that NATO’s got to plan for. The third thing is low-cost, long-range, precision strikes, because all our cruise systems from our air, sea launches, land-launched missiles, etc., are millions of dollars per unit. Now, the new cost is a couple 100,000, but that’s still an order of magnitude higher than the Shahed, so we’ve still got some work to do to bring down the expense while maintaining the range. The LUCAS drone that’s being used, which Shaheds are made to look alike, can theoretically go out to 1,000 kilometers. That’s the kind of range that NATO and NATO allies have to seek, and there’s an offset of those multi-million-dollar cruise and ballistic missiles. The fourth is a resilient command and control, and we’ve seen the targeting of critical radar systems, like the one in Kuwait that was hit, highlighting the vulnerability of centralized systems. NATO needs a kind of distributed, redundant C2 central network that can operate in a derivative mode when attacked, and peace points are lost. The fifth is integrated C4ISR and targeting networks, and this goes to Jason’s point on software; software is a big part of it. NATO has a digital transformation strategy and plan that’s been working on for several years that will enable interoperability, but the focus has got to be integration of sensor networks, national and NATO C2 nodes, and, of course, the factors from various tiers, of all types, for both defense and counter-offense or offensive strike. And the efforts on open architectures are ongoing; data standards, cybersecurity, all those are important, but they’ve got to be like Federico just mentioned. They’ve got to be regularly tested at scale through training and major exercises to ensure that they are ready for use in defending NATO according to its new plans, and then determine what those gaps and obstacles are, and then go after them. So, the theme is scale, sustainability, system integration, and not just capability.
Catherine Sendak
And those are three S’s, Skip, that’s awesome. Thank you so much for laying that out for us. It sounds like, and we know, as we work on these issues, there’s still a lot of work to do. Across the alliance, every ally is involved in making sure we have what we need and that we are prepared, and there are so many things to take away from current conflicts. Jason, if I can turn to you with your policy hat on, Skip’s laying out so clearly the work that the alliance needs to do, the priorities that we need to undertake to make this happen. What do you envision the policy ramifications being as we look at securing Europe and the alliance in light of this technology use, in light of what we’re seeing on the battlefield, targeting civilian infrastructure, resilience issues? I would love your thoughts on policies that need to take shape.
Jason Israel
Yes, thank you, Katie, and I’m ready to spend the next two hours discussing that, because, as you know, this is a passion of mine, but I will keep it to just a few minutes. So, let’s step back. It is very hard to step back right now, because there are people in harm’s way, and we have 13 Americans killed, over 20 casualties from Gulf States and Israel, and thousands killed and tens of thousands injured in Iran, and that is all very, very important. I want to start with that, because people are in harm’s way today. Stepping back, how did we get here? There are lots of questions about how this operation, Epic Fury, was commenced amidst negotiations, so there’s a precedent there, and we’re not gonna be able to answer those here. The takeaway from it, though, for me, is a reminder that everything we’ve talked about thus far in this call is a tool; it is a tool to try to signal to another nation to either defeat or to reestablish deterrence, and how is that going to be done? And so, we’re seeing that happen in Epic Fury, but the question would come then, which, once again, we’re not gonna be able to answer today, but what are the off-ramps to the conflict, and how will all these technologies that we’ve discussed assist us in getting to some of those off-ramps? Of course, from the United States and Israel perspective, they want that to be a reestablishment of deterrence and for Iran to be unable to reestablish a nuclear program, and then other objectives, I’m sure, even though it has not been exactly clear what the US and Israel objective is right now. But I bring that up because we have to remind ourselves that a drone can be an ISR; it can be offensive, it can be defensive. So, I’ve discussed the meaning of it from a policy perspective. We’ve discussed doctrine a bit, and I’m happy to answer more questions on that, if you like, but the final one that I’d like to discuss, and I kind of discussed this on defensive, is from the NATO perspective, there’s a lot of spending ongoing, certainly nowhere near the 5% yet that they’ve committed over the next 10 years, but at CEPA, we spend a lot of time talking to ambassadors and diplomatic corps in capitals. I really enjoy listening to the members of parliament of the various NATO countries because the question is: how are they selling the ongoing conflict, if you will, to voters, as far as saying, “We actually have to increase defense spending,” because it’s still a wide spectrum of support for defense spending across the alliance. And so, while the commitment has been the headline, the next NATO summit will be in July in Ankara, and there’s going to be, I wouldn’t say necessarily a report card, but something like it, where there’s going to be looking at each country and how they are progressing during that spending. I think there’s a question right now with this, going to Skip’s point, about exactly how there has to be rapid scale at this point amongst NATO partners; will it happen rapidly? And then the question is, if it happens rapidly, can it happen back to my original point in a way that reduces the fragmentation there? Then finally, because there’s been a big question, obviously, I don’t need to get into the details, because everybody’s seen it, about whether and how NATO countries are supporting the United States in the Strait of Hormuz and committing, I would say the question would be for each country that is saying whether “this is not our war” type of comments, or is it about not putting people in harm’s way, which is a big part of the unmanned systems, is that you’re not actually putting people in way. In democracies, generally, we do not want to put people in harm’s way these days because we don’t want casualties, because they’re unpopular. That’s not a bad thing, but it does raise that from a policy perspective about how you’re using unmanned systems over and over, and so my question would be, what does an unmanned escort future look like to be able to solve a problem like this, whether you have subsurface, surface, land-based, air-based, that are supporting a cargo ship as it goes through the Strait. We’re not there yet, but you could envision that if you could press a button and start to safely escort merchant vessels through a strait in the future, then that would have massive policy implications. I’m going to stop there, because I could go on about this for a while, but I’m very happy to.
Catherine Sendak
I mean, there are just such dramatic policy implications as we look at this over time, and this is something we’ve been studying in all of these allied capitals, about how we do this, so it’s a great outline. Thank you so much, Jason. We do have a question in the chat from Demian Shevko from the New Voice of Ukraine, which actually ties in really nicely to the question that I was going to pose to Federico, so maybe I’ll do a little combo. Demian asks, how interested are NATO allies in integrating Ukrainian battlefield-tested technologies into their defense planning? Really interested? Federico, maybe. Skip, you want to weigh in on this too, but Federico, my question was really going to target how Ukraine is sending all of these experts, all of these hundreds of people, to partners in the Middle East to really teach some of our partners about the implications of Iranian technology. What are they able to do? What are they able to show our partners on this? But maybe you want to answer the NATO question first: how are we integrating, or are we interested in integrating Ukrainian battlefield technology?
Federico Borsari
Thanks, Katie. I think NATO countries are definitely very interested in integrating Ukrainian technologies. But I think first and foremost, they are interested in the Ukrainian experience because, I think, also regarding your question of how it is possible that Ukraine has been able to send hundreds of experts at this point to the Middle East to support counter-US efforts in the region. There’s one simple explanation for that. Ukraine has been battling large salvos of all sorts of accrued systems, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles combined for four years now, actually more than four years. They have been in a war with Russia for more than 11 years, and so I think they have plenty of experience when it comes to using these sorts of technologies. Just as a reminder, Ukrainian forces started to use commercial-derived unmanned systems around 2015 when volunteer organizations were helping really depleted Ukrainian forces at that time to resist Russian aggression in the Donbas region. And so, over the years, they have developed extremely sophisticated and extremely effective tactics, techniques, and procedures, and also concepts of operations that are really the treasure trove at this point for NATO countries. Technology is also a component of that interest, and we have seen it, especially with drone interceptors. I think, as Skip and Jason mentioned, drone interceptors will be one of the most interesting and revolutionary components and parts of integrated air missile defense, especially for the low-tier threats. That’s the reason why many countries are interested in these systems. I think there are almost 10 companies that have developed drone interceptors in Ukraine. It’s not just the famous Sting Interceptor from the Wild Ordinance company; there are almost ten of those very similar systems that have been developed. European countries are catching up, and they have developed similar solutions, but at the moment, the price comparison is really favorable to Ukraine. These are really cheap, and they are also very effective, because they have been tested in a real operational situation. But besides the technologies I mentioned, I think what is really interesting for NATO countries and for Gulf countries at this point is the experience and how they can integrate counter-US systems into a broader architecture of sensors and effectors, and how they can use them to really solve one of the key problems that we have seen in this conflict against Iran. You know that cheap trade drones launched in large numbers are often sufficient to penetrate even sophisticated air missile defense systems. So, I think I will stop there, but I’m more than happy to continue the discussion.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Federico, that’s super helpful. And I see Skip coming in with a two-finger. Skip, please.
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Yeah, I think that Federico hit it on the head in terms of countries are interested, but I don’t see the sense of urgency from the political level, from the governments. I see great interest from the military. We’ve seen a significant collective interest from NATO, the establishment of a joint analysis and training center, the J Tech, to identify lessons learned, and then propagate them across the alliance, and we see certain NATO exercises focusing on integration of a variety of systems, specifically lower-end counter-US type of systems. But what we don’t see is the response to, frankly, what’s being on offer, and Federico just mentioned that, in preparation for today’s press call, identified about 15 different available systems from the US to across our European allies that are being made by a variety of defense agencies that are in that field that have not yet resulted in programs of record. So, the supply is out there; the demand, in terms of actually buying things based on the defense investment plan from The Hague last year, hasn’t yet connected. I think hopefully the Iran war will be another wake-up call to the relevance of these systems and the need to focus on integration, like Jason was talking about- the lower-tier, lower-cost, affordable systems, and then production at scale, absolutely.
Catherine Sendak
Let me turn to one more question in the chat, and then John, thank you for your patience. I see your hand up; you’ll be next. Skip, I want to add on just exactly what you were saying. Kalal from the Hindu Newspaper in India, thank you for joining us, really lays out how Iran is using its proxies. Iran is using a wide range of tools to perhaps not secure a big military victory but make this a more complicated and nuanced effort in the Middle East. The question posed is, can cheap technology, when mixed with a rules-free war that some of the actors might be playing at, be a formidable challenge to conflict in the future? And I think that relates to how this technology and deep technology, autonomy, uncrewed systems, are really changing the battlefield?
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Yeah, so I think the answer to the question is yes, and we’re seeing it as a formal challenge right now. And as Jason pointed out, we don’t have the dial in terms of finishing this war when we want to. Iran has significant capabilities, and, frankly, a mindset that they’re willing to impose costs on their adversaries: the US and Israel specifically, but also the Gulf partners, partners that they see enabling the US presence in the Gulf region. So, they are going to continue as long as they desire to continue. We have to, frankly, respond accordingly, and for the European alliance, they need to see that Iran will continue to be a potential threat in the future, regardless of significant degradation; that they have an interest, obviously, in ensuring security in the Gulf for the significant amount of maritime traffic that brings energy resources to them. So, that’s an issue that they’ll deal with, despite the method and tone that perhaps the US is using right now to entice allies to a response. But I’d like to go one step further, and I think that in terms of doctrine mindset, we need to be thinking about where the big adversaries, Russia and China, are going. With respect to autonomous systems, and in this regard there’s a great article out in Foreign Affairs last week by General Petraeus talking about the autonomous battlefield and the kinds of trends that we need to prepare for, where systems are integrated as such and have the onboard technology and AI tools to be able to, from launch to mission effective completion, operate almost autonomously, perhaps with a human on the loop. And we’re not there yet in terms of employing the same types of capabilities or concepts, because we haven’t developed them, and nor are we ready for defense against them. So, we’ve got to think about, how do we enable a force that can employ systems that are integrated, that can have the right kinds of algorithms, the right kind of computing support, etc., to be able to do the right kinds of targeting with minimal human intervention and have the capabilities for rapid in-the-field software changes like we see going on in Ukraine right now, but even to a more accelerated degree, if we were involving multiple allies against a Russian foe, so to speak. So, we have some work to do, and I think that we’ve got to think not just about what we need to do to respond to current capabilities, but where is this heading? Skate to the bucket, in other words.
Catherine Sendak
Skip, thank you so much, and as we’ve all experienced, policy has a tendency to not move at the rapid rate by which we need it to in some of these degrees. So, really appreciate you highlighting that. Now, how do we take the present and apply it to the future and make sure that we’re prepared? So, thank you so much, John. Thank you so much for your patience. If you wouldn’t mind asking your question and telling us where you’re from.
John Seward
Thank you. Yeah, of course. John Seward with the Washington Times. I cover defense and national security for them. Both of you, gentlemen, actually, all three of you have mentioned software being one of the critical aspects of this, and recently we saw the US invest- well, commit to investing $20 billion in Anduril’s Lattice Software, and that same company has also made contracts with Belgium and with other NATO partners, specifically, sort of showing off Lattice. And the CEO, actually, has said that there’s a point there to help with integration with NATO. So, my question is, General Davis, I know that you have seen many different communications programs in the past promise this level of interoperability, this level of communications, and then not be particularly successful despite their cost. So, how do we avoid those pitfalls that we’ve seen in the past, and what does this look like moving forward, that this might actually be that software platform that we’re talking about, but very much owned and developed by this one specific private company?
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Thanks, John. I’m going to leave some space for both Jason and Federico to come in behind me. I’m not familiar with specific performance characteristics of the lattice software, but if I get the concept, certainly that’s something which should greatly interest the allies, because integration is so important, and we’ve got to come up with a method of integrating all the various types of sensors and effectors with the C2 node, so that targets can be rapidly identified, rapidly prioritized, weapon effects associated with them, and then distributed tasking to not just national forces, but to a variety of allied forces to be able to either deal with them, be the incoming threats and integrated animals defense scenario, or in a counter offensive, to strike the arch before they come, or whatever. You know the logistics and see two layers: EW and air layers; behind that are involved in an offense against NATO or allies, so hugely important, but there are so many things to integrate. And so, this could be, perhaps, something that integrates autonomous systems. That’s great, that allows them to talk together and with machines and humans, but we have to think at the entire integrated air muscle fence level, which we be multi-tiered, be geographically dispersed, and that might not serve that particular overall, overarching architecture need, but could provide a component of it, and it needs to be able to work into an integrated C4SR, which is all about sensing, making sense, and then enabling decision making. And then finally, of course, the targeting is, which is the first one that we talked about; I think that’s probably the target network, which would be directly enabled by that. But there are other architectures that are part of and critical to defense.
Catherine Sendak
Jason, Federico, would you like to weigh in?
Jason Israel
I’ll just jump in very quickly, thanks. Thanks so much, John, and just to follow Skip, just maybe two points on Anduril and Lattice. The thing that stood out to me is that everybody is watching. The Andurils and the Helsings, the unicorns that are not profitable yet. This was a good signal that their model is working right, and that’s what we’re looking for in this area, because they’re making a big gamble about how they’re going to be able to create something that they know will be needed by the Pentagon. For most of my career, and I’m sure you know Skip feels the same, it’s been about developing a requirement that is then put out for bid, and so to be able to have companies that can get a $20 billion contract like this, I do believe that it is part of the solution. The question is, is it still small in comparison to your F-35 and submarine contracts, so will that scale? And having sat in and represented the White House and at all the Pentagon budget meetings, we have these D-MAG meetings where you basically go through every dollar, and you make the tradeoffs, and $800 billion actually goes by pretty quickly when you’re looking at these contracts. I know it sounds crazy, but it does, because you have so many things that you have to say no to and invest in the future, but software is certainly one that has to be increased. And then the second point, besides the Anduril-specific point, is that there is an ongoing question, and this is a very key question, of whether the many different software systems that countries will try to procure, particularly from NATO and others, will be able to speak to each other, because AI technology will allow them to basically become interoperable on their own. That is a theory that’s out there, and a lot of the people I meet, they’re going around saying, “Hey, we have to make sure that this software, just like in the past, can speak to one another.” But there are others saying that, “Don’t worry, by the time we get these together, you’ll basically tell the AI to make the data encrypted, or double encrypted and triple encrypted, and make sure it speaks to these other systems, and they’ll just be able to do it.” So, the jury’s out on that one.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Jason. We have two questions in the chat, and I think we have about 10 minutes. So, let me turn to the two questions for our experts. So, this question is from Nokai. I hope I’m pronouncing your name correctly, from Voice of Nigeria. Thank you so much for joining us. Her first question is: Is there a conflict in capability and precision between unmanned and manned systems in today’s battlefield domain, in terms of the accuracy of force application and targets? Federico, maybe I’ll turn to you on this one if you have any insights. Her second question relates to whether unmanned systems have these abilities of quick damage assessment, as we’re looking to explore how we do this with humans in the loop or not in the loop. So, Federico, over to you.
Federico Borsari
Yeah, I mean, we could stay here for hours to discuss this. At the moment, if you compare crewed and uncrewed systems, you can have very different performances in terms of accuracy, in terms of ability to stay in the target area, to ensure persistence, to provide endurance, and at the same time, also be able to have a significant payload. So, it really depends on the mission. It really depends on the type of target that you are seeking to acquire, or also for a different type of task that is not necessarily a combat task. It can also be for other things, so I don’t really see a huge difference in terms of accuracy, for instance, regarding the question between crewed and uncrewed systems, and it also goes down to the type of weapon that you are using. If it comes to accuracy and the type of sensors that you have there, uncrewed systems are really capable of providing absolutely astonishing quality in terms of accuracy and in terms of fidelity of the target feed and everything. So, I really don’t see the need for this comparison. And when it comes to the persistence part, I think it’s critical, really, where they excel, and speaking of uncrewed systems, it’s really the persistence part. Persistence is really what they offer compared to most of the crewed assets that we have, with a few exceptions. But then you have the pilot in the cockpit, and so it really also increases the risk for human losses. So, the persistence part is really what differentiates crewed from uncrewed systems at the moment.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Federico. Great way to look at it as we debate how this looks over the future. We do have a question from Mohammed from the Business Standard Newspaper in India, and Skip, maybe I’ll turn to you for this question. How should NATO think about the vulnerability of its own rear area infrastructure and civilian data ecosystems in such a model? And does this require rethinking what constitutes a, quote, military target in a high-intensity conflict?
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Well, that’s a great question, and let me say a number of things. First off, I think we can see from both the Ukraine war and the Iran war that the adversaries, Russia and Iran in this case, are not constrained by the types of military targets, rule of law, law of armed conflict, etc., that we’re used to and that we consider as prohibitive or prohibited targets. They will strike those, and so that means we need to be prepared to defend them and protect that infrastructure well. What NATO has done is they’ve come up with a very clear, categorized set of what constitutes critical infrastructure for resilience at a time of conflict, and so they understand, and they track that at the national level, and accurately at the NATO level. These various types of critical systems, be they transport systems, be they transport nodes, be they communications, be they government C-2 nodes, but also energy infrastructure, etc., and so at least NATO knows what to protect. It doesn’t have the integrated distributed system to protect that, so what we would expect them to do is they’ve got to prioritize protection, and they’ve got limited air and missile defense assets. Now, that goes back to my opening remarks about the need to scale low-cost tiered systems in a distributed manner across nations, across allies, so that they can protect at least their priority targets. But they’ve got to come up with a prioritization first and think through what the adversaries will be targeting to undermine both the nation’s ability to support the military defense, as well as what they may view as a vulnerable way to attack the will of the people to sustain the defense against aggression. So, a huge amount of work to be done there, but some of the initial foundational analysis has been done.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Skip. There has been so much conversation, as everyone on the line knows, about resilience, and what does that actually look like, and how do we execute, so thank you so much for that. Jason, thank you for your patience with your hand up. Please, over to you.
Jason Bellini
Thank you. Jason Bellini from Scripps News, our senior international correspondent, just returned from Ukraine and the Middle East. I followed the drone and counter-drone technologies very closely. One thing I’m not up on, and maybe you could enlighten me, is naval drones. What’s the state of play now for intercepting naval drones, and what would it take to secure an area as vast as and also as confined as the Port of Hormuz from threats that are in the water? We know those aren’t the only threats that shipping would face and that military naval assets would face, but if for that alone, what would it take right now, and is that technology available?
Catherine Sendak
Thank you so much, Jason. Skip, I see your finger up, but I think everybody would probably want to chime in on this. Skip, please go ahead, start us off.
Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr.
Okay, so Jason, I’d say, yes, there’s quite a bit of technology out there. I only know a little bit about the US programs of record; there are a number of them. They have the equivalent of the Marine Autonomous Defense System, the L-MADIS, which is a mix of EW and kinetic response, and can jam, and then it can engage with drones. They also have the HELIOS, the laser weapon system, which is aboard many of the ships, and that’s a laser hard kill. And then, of course, they’ve got the C-RAM, which is used against drones, specifically talking about the surface drones that you see. Underwater drones are much more difficult to counter, and I don’t know if systems are currently available to counter those, so that’s a gap that must be worked on. Even the US Navy is looking at a whole series of small-to-large, uncrewed ships, and from surface to underwater, and so they realize the importance of that capability, but there’s a lot more work to be done on defense.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Skip. Jason, perhaps I’ll turn to you.
Jason Israel
Yes, thank you, and thank you, Skip, thank you, Jason. I guess some similarities and differences in general, just the speed at which you scale a surface vessel and even an unmanned system; it’s not as fast in scaling the hardware, and then it’s more difficult in scaling a lot of the software and C2 issues we have. As a submarine officer, formerly active duty, currently reserve, and, of course, all these opinions are my own; I’m not on duty, but you end up with more communications challenges in subsurface. And then back to my point about Anduril, I think it’s very interesting to watch companies like Soranik that are building larger, I mean, 150 feet I think the Marauder is, surface unmanned systems, because it really does go back to my point about redefining what is the potential mission of an unmanned system, to be able to escort or to be able to provide a sort of a defense of a strategic line of communication. As a strategist, I see lots and lots of opportunities there. I mean, you could basically print them in an unlimited fashion and have a use for them, but whether or not you’re actually able to get the communications to end the scale yet, it’s just that they’re slower, and they’re behind in that regard. But obviously, everybody brings up the U-force technology in the Black Sea for a country that has, for Ukraine, a very limited Navy that was able to basically get a strategic checkmate on the Russian Navy in the Black Sea. So, there’s a lot to be learned from that analogy.
Catherine Sendak
Thank you, Jason. We have about two minutes left. Federico, I don’t know if you want to weigh in on this for just a minute before we close out, please.
Federico Borsari
Yes, thanks, Katie, thanks, Jason, for the question. I echo what Jason said. I mean, when it comes to surface vessels or underwater drones, it’s a completely different defense picture against them. This type of access is more in an embryonic phase compared to counter-US more generally. But I think there are some very elementary ways to counter them, especially when it comes to the subsurface threat. I mean, the Russians have been using nets to close access to ports and critical docks in Crimea and elsewhere, so I don’t see any reason why we shouldn’t use the same technique. I mean, nets can be very helpful, and it’s a kind of passive tactic that can be really, really, really useful. And at the same time, you have to disperse assets, and that’s the first thing, I think, so these passive countermeasures are critical when it comes to surface vessels. Skip mentioned EW and other types of kinetic ways to defeat them. So, yes, you can also use other surface vessels, other drones with the same mission to destroy incoming drones. So, that’s my kind of very general take on that. And just very briefly on the questions from Demian on interest in Ukrainian technologies, I think I definitely agree with Skip. I think the real problem lies at the policy level, and especially from planners who do not see the priority to invest in these capabilities after their many decades of peace dividends. We are not used to scaling the investments to the point that is needed now, and so the demand signal, I think, is the real problem. We don’t have a sufficient demand signal for industry to scale production, because no company, with very few exceptions, will invest resources to start the production line without the certainty that there is a contract coming.
Catherine Sendak
Yeah, thank you so much. Federico. We are at 10:30, as you all can tell. The four of us could talk about this for another hour, but we want to be cognizant of everyone’s time. We want to thank you all so much for joining. I’d like to turn it over to my colleague Michael for some final notes.
Michael Newton
Hi, everyone. Thanks very much for joining today’s press briefing, and thanks to all of our experts and Katie for excellent moderation. We will be sending out a recording and an auto-generated transcript of this briefing to you all. If you have any questions that you’d like to follow up on, please reach out to press@cepaorg.pages.dev, and I’ll put you in touch with our experts and all of our other fellows if you have questions on other topics. So, thanks very much for joining, and thanks to everyone who spoke at today’s event, and have a great day. Goodbye.
