Executive Summary

Arctic military posture and threat perception

• Russia’s military posture and regional threat perception are steadfast. They relate to imposing cost on the access of foreign military assets to the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) and through the Northern Sea Route (NSR); ensuring defense in depth by expanding interdiction capabilities beyond the AZRF; and protecting the NSR from perceived foreign encroachment against its disputable status as a “body of internal waters”.
• Despite unchanging strategic priorities, the Kremlin has been compelled to adapt its military, defense, and security approach toward the region. These changes are compounded by over a decade of war against Ukraine, international isolation, sanctions, and the accelerating impacts of climate change. Russian authorities are vindicated but more vulnerable in the Arctic, a region where Moscow once held strategic dominance.
• Moscow feels that both its control and sovereignty over the Arctic are slipping away. Russia is feeling increasingly vulnerable in the Arctic, especially in the context of Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Conventional limitations amplify the Kremlin’s increasing sense of vulnerability, particularly in the European High North.
• Moscow’s Arctic narrative and policy are now entirely securitized. This situation affects future military decisions in the region: Command structures for the European High North have already adapted with the recent recreation of the Leningrad Military District.

Russia’s Arctic as a fortress, a frontline, and a contested space

• Russia is turning the Arctic into a fortress, a frontline, and a contested space. A fortress, as military retrenchment toward the AZRF emphasizes territorial defense and near-sea control. A contested space, driven by the Kremlin’s obsession with controlling the NSR and fears of foreign encroachments through freedom of navigation operations. And a frontline marked by persistent low-intensity-warfare and sub-threshold operations. 
• In the European High North, Russian retrenchment is creating a new frontline with NATO between the Barents and Norwegian Seas, a region where Russian forces will fight for near-sea control. This situation will make it harder for the US and NATO to access and operate in that part of the Arctic.
• In the Pacific Arctic, security issues in the Bering Sea and around the Aleutian Islands are becoming a new point of contention between the US and Canada on one side, and Russia and China on the other.
• Russia has a strong incentive to degrade the operating environment in the Arctic by conducting low-intensity-warfare operations in peacetime. These pertain to aggressive demonstrations of presence and signaling; the weaponization of notice to air missions; electronic warfare operations; seabed warfare and the disruption of critical undersea infrastructure; grey zone operations and intelligence gathering.
• From a security standpoint, Russia is leveraging China’s interest in Arctic operations as an asymmetric enabler to destabilize regional security and to create a broader impact on US and NATO interests. By increasing joint naval and aerial presence around Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, Russia is using Beijing as a disruptive force multiplier in the Pacific Arctic.
• Although there is no willingness in the Kremlin to start a conflict in the Arctic per se, Russia plans for all contingencies, including what is increasingly seen as an inevitable conflict with NATO. This “new normal” only heightens the risk of miscalculation from accidents, incidents, and tactical errors.
• The US and NATO allies must evaluate the role and strategic importance of the Arctic, especially the European High North, from the perspective of burden sharing, combatant command, domain awareness, forward deployments, and Arctic-hardened military technology. Much work still needs to be done to achieve integrated Arctic deterrence and technological dominance over Russia and eventually China.

Military command, capabilities, and infrastructure

• Russia continues to strengthen its military footprint in the region. However, considering the consequences of the war against Ukraine, all operational domains of war have shown limitations that will continue to restrict Russian ambitions in the region, as military forces continue to decline in strength.
• From a conventional ground forces perspective, the war against Ukraine has consistently weakened Russian troops and hardware deployments. Russian ambitions are constrained by the reality of declining capabilities. Aspirations to defend the AZRF in the European High North contrast with a reduced conventional land threat and a slower, uncertain force regeneration.
• The Northern and Pacific Fleets reflect a narrowing gap between projected naval ambitions and actual modernization efforts. Plans for larger blue-water assets were effectively replaced by a smaller, more agile navy equipped with standoff systems to protect both entry points to the AZRF, including with the help of “combat icebreakers”.
• Ukrainian drone strikes on Russia’s Arctic infrastructure metaphorically “burst the bubble” of the fabled Bastion Defense protective dome, forcing adaptations. Moscow will likely continue to invest in layered air defense and long-range strike capabilities. Yet regional air and missile dominance is increasingly challenged by practical exposure.
• Meanwhile, the network of dual-use Arctic infrastructure and bases continues to undergo modernization. Despite reinvestment in Arctic infrastructure, the Russian network remains relatively small, disconnected, understaffed, and plagued by issues such as resupply problems, poor construction quality, and climate change impacts.

Introduction

Russia’s Arctic is changing. For several decades, Russia’s Arctic territories, the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) have all faced several external impacts. The effects of climate change and the melting sea ice add uncertainty to Russia’s Arctic future. The ongoing demands of Moscow’s war against Ukraine also impact military capabilities and command structures, including in the Arctic. Ongoing economic degradation in Russia also shapes future Arctic policy. Economic factors notably constrain development plans for the AZRF and available resources for military build-up in the context of the upcoming State Armament Program (GPV) 2027-2036.

Broader geopolitical factors are significantly influencing future decisions, especially the effects of international sanctions on the development of the AZRF and the NSR, as well as the self-constructed perception of “NATO’s expansion” in the Arctic. From a governance standpoint, Moscow’s ambitions are further constrained by China’s advances and the stasis of the Arctic Council as the cornerstone of regional cooperation.¹

During the Cold War, the Arctic was a major theater of geostrategic competition and hosted a higher concentration of military assets than it does today. Russia’s post-Soviet military buildup is inscribed in this historical context. Over the past 20 years, Russia’s re-enchantment with the Arctic has been genuine, but its efforts to reinvest in the region are beginning to face limitations. Indeed, the consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine have reinforced preexisting conventional issues associated with Russia’s power projection and multi-domain military ambitions in the Arctic.

Yet Russian ambitions remain unchanged, with a continued focus on full control of the AZRF. The Arctic still represents a single strategic continuum stretching from the European High North, North Pole approaches in the central Arctic, to the Pacific Arctic. Despite increasing challenges, the Kremlin has been adapting its military, defense, and security posture toward the region. Moscow feels that both its control and sovereignty over the Arctic are slipping away. The war against Ukraine has revealed existing military vulnerabilities that are becoming harder to conceal and require attention. 

Consequently, Russia’s Arctic has become a fortress, a frontline, and a contested space. A fortress, as the military retrenchment toward the AZRF emphasizes territorial defense and near-sea control. A contested space, driven by the Kremlin’s obsession with controlling the NSR and fears of foreign encroachments. And a frontline marked by persistent Russian low-intensity-warfare and sub-threshold operations. 

This paper builds on and expands previous research on Russia’s military posture in the Arctic.² Given the changing environment, analyzing Russia’s ability to project power in the Arctic is necessary to assess the level of threat Moscow poses to US and NATO interests. The paper mainly concentrates on the European High North and the central Arctic, while also addressing key developments in the Pacific Arctic.

It examines how Moscow’s threat perception has been changing between vindication and vulnerability. It also discusses the main implications for Russia’s future presence, highlighting how the Arctic is becoming a fortress, a frontline, and a contested space. Finally, the paper analyzes key adaptations in Arctic command structures, deployments, and capabilities in the main domains of war.

Chapter 1 – Changes and Continuity in Arctic Military Posture and Threat Perception

Russia’s military posture and overall threat perception in the Arctic have remained steadfast since Moscow’s reassertion of control over the AZRF and the deployment of military forces there in the mid-2000s. Military-security priorities have been extensively studied and relate to the following strategic goals:³

• Impose cost on the access of foreign military assets to the AZRF and through the NSR,
• Ensure defense in depth by expanding interdiction capabilities beyond the AZRF,
• Protect the NSR from perceived foreign encroachment against its disputable status as a “body of internal waters”.

Above all, the Kremlin seeks absolute control over the AZRF and nearby waterways along the NSR. Nikolay Patrushev, head of the all-powerful Maritime Collegium (see below), recently reaffirmed these priorities and emphasized the “impenetrability” of the national borders in the Arctic.⁴

Beyond military dominance and national security, the Arctic is also crucial for Russian status projection. The region holds a special significance in the country’s collective imagination: Putin presented Russia as an “Arctic civilization” and the only “hyper-boreal” country.⁵ For instance, status projection is realized through North Pole educational expeditions for children⁶ and regular military-patriotic campaigns along the NSR.⁷

Despite unchanging strategic priorities, a decade of war, international isolation, sanctions, and the accelerating impacts of climate change, the Kremlin has been compelled to slightly modify its approach to Arctic security and to draw two main conclusions.

Vindication and Vulnerability

The first conclusion is that, like elsewhere, geopolitics is catching up with the Arctic, preventing the spirit of cooperation embodied by the Murmansk Initiative,⁸ and bringing military insecurity closer to the AZRF. From the Kremlin’s perspective, NATO is coming.

Finland and Sweden joining the Atlantic Alliance after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine fuels Moscow’s self-reinforcing obsession that NATO is “encircling” Russian territory in the European High North. The activation of NATO’s Arctic Sentry in February 2026, a multi-domain enhanced Vigilance Activity strengthening the posture and presence of the Alliance in the European High North,⁹ further vindicates Moscow’s threat perception.

This situation reinforces the fait accompli that the “Arctic 8” has been irremediably replaced by a ‘NATO 7’ in competition with Russia.¹⁰ In other words, the logic is that the non-Russian Arctic has become “NATO territory”. State narratives have filled Russian media and policy debates about the perceived expansion of NATO in the Arctic since the early 2020s.¹¹ They all contribute to a pattern of victimization where Russia is not held responsible for the decline of the regional cooperative environment.

The messages are clear: They all revolve around NATO forcing an “accelerated militarization in the European High North”,¹² creating a “new Cold War,¹³ “laying claim” to the Arctic,¹⁴ and overall turning the region into an “arena of acute strategic competition”.¹⁵ In the Pacific Arctic, the Kremlin is equally contesting US presence and deployments across Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.

Because of said actions, Russia has been “harmed”¹⁶ and “discredited”,¹⁷ therefore directly threatening national security. By doing so, Moscow feels validated in its military posture and believes the Russian Arctic must be defended. In particular, the new NATO border with Finland creates a sense of unease regarding Finnish drone capabilities that could be used to conduct intelligence operations against Russian nuclear infrastructure.¹⁸

However, this sense of vindication gives rise to a growing feeling of vulnerability. The Kremlin recognizes that receding sea ice due to climate change and increased human access to the region, particularly military access, are threatening Russian sovereignty over the AZRF and the NSR.

Recent strategic documents already outlined the connection between climate change, perimeter control, and sovereignty enforcement across the region and the NSR.¹⁹ Indeed, Moscow recognizes that the High North is seeing an increased NATO presence, that the North Pole approaches are no longer protected by natural ice coverage, and that the Pacific Arctic is becoming a theater of competition, not least because of Chinese inroads.

In the face of such challenges, Moscow is losing control and sovereignty. Russian authorities are concerned about whether the military assets, capabilities, and infrastructure in the Arctic will withstand growing competition. The war against Ukraine further shattered Russia’s safety, especially the Ukrainian strikes against the Olenya airbase in July 2024, which highlighted weaknesses in air defense capabilities on the Kola Peninsula (see Chapter 6).

Achieving Military Superiority

The second main conclusion from the past decade is that, given the challenges mentioned earlier, Russia must continue to militarize the AZRF. The Kremlin is no longer in a “wait and see” posture: It is learning the military lessons from NATO’s recent plans in Sweden and Finland,²⁰ US interest in developing military infrastructure in Greenland,²¹ and US systems that could reach Russian territory.

Admiral Alexandr Moiseyev, the new commander-in-chief of the navy, reminded in 2024 that “in the Arctic, there is only one objective: ensuring the security of our state”.²² A similar discourse now permeates recent foreign policy and military statements,²³ notably the claim that Russia must take “reciprocal measures” in response to adversarial actions.²⁴

The consequence is that Russian borders must be protected through military superiority⁴ and even “defense supremacy”.²⁵ The logic is that Russian armed forces, and in particular the Northern Fleet,²⁶ must preserve a favorable military balance²⁷ and continue to ensure strategic deterrence through nuclear-capable submarine and surface fleets on both sides of the AZRF.²⁸ More than ever, Moscow is preparing for all eventualities in the Arctic, including open military confrontation.

“Low tension” notwithstanding, the broader implication for the US and NATO is that the frontline with Russia has now expanded into the Arctic region. This situation will undoubtedly force NATO to focus on the “Northern dimension” in the European High North,²⁹ while the US will have to uphold security at the entrance to the Pacific Arctic.³⁰

From a military perspective, the war against Ukraine has produced several operational lessons that will inform future Arctic-related deployments and capabilities procurement:

• Integration of Arctic-dedicated uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), including reconnaissance drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), FPV strike drones, and loitering drones,
• Drone countermeasures and electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures. Counter-UAV capabilities go hand in hand with drone integration, especially electronic jamming systems,
• Precision-guided munitions and long-range strike systems, notably the continued “Kalibrization” of the Northern and Pacific Fleets,
• Arctic-enabled ISR capabilities to increase domain awareness across the AZRF, and notably early-warning systems, mobile reconnaissance units, and layered sensors.

Finally, this situation is worsened by recent changes in Kremlin policy toward the region. Along with the sense of military vindication and vulnerability, Russian networks related to Arctic affairs have been recentralized under the control of Nikolay Patrushev, a former longtime FSB director, head of the Security Council, and close confidant of Putin. 

The “Patrushevization” of Arctic Policy

In August 2024, the Maritime Collegium was established under Patrushev’s leadership and subordinated to Putin. The Collegium oversees the development of Russia’s maritime and naval policies to “preserve the status of a great naval power”.³¹ However, it was created to focus on the defense and security of the AZRF and the NSR: Additional bodies established under the Collegium include a Navy Council led by Patrushev and a Council for the Defense of the National Interests, focused on external threats.

Since 2022, the demands of the war against Ukraine have prevented Putin from maintaining “manual control” over Arctic policy. This led to ongoing, unmanageable infighting among power networks, mainly due to Rosatom’s concentration of economic influence. The changes also took place amid the disappointment with the soft approach chosen by the former “Arctic duumvirate” of Presidential Envoy to the Far East Yuri Trutnev³² and Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev.

It was ultimately decided that Patrushev would become an “Arctic overseer” reporting directly to Putin.³³ Federal Arctic discussions were removed from the Security Council and placed within the Collegium, likely to give Patrushev more leeway as a policy enforcer (and surely to smooth out Putinistic policies).

The Collegium serves as a single-entry point for Arctic-related lobbying groups and power networks, including security and military forces, energy and transportation sectors, and the shipbuilding and nuclear industries.³⁴ Previous dissent and conflict among key stakeholders have now been taken care of, with Rosatom reined in and more aligned with the Kremlin’s priorities. Under Patrushev, the siloviki will likely increase their influence in Arctic affairs,³⁵ thereby accelerating the region’s continued militarization and validating Russia’s threat perception. 

The Maritime Collegium is also responsible for developing the NSR, including its infrastructure and the fleet of dual-use icebreakers – a policy that resurrects the spirit of the Soviet Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput).³⁶

Since the mid-2010s, the management of the NSR has been further securitized to protect what are considered internal waterways. A comprehensive body of law was developed to control the NSR through discriminatory national rules that hinder freedom of navigation, such as requiring advance notification of passage for foreign vessels or the need for a Russian icebreaker escort and Russian operators on board transiting ships.³⁷ The December 2022 law On Internal Sea Waters, the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation tightens the legal regime regarding transit permits and advance notification of passage.³⁸

Federal control over the Arctic was strengthened in 2024 with the expansion of the territorial-administrative boundaries of the AZRF, marking the fourth such expansion since the mid-2010s.³⁹ Patrushev is also active in promoting the message that the NSR must be protected from foreign encroachment and that military presence should be strengthened.¹⁷ Both Rosgvardia and the Coast Guard Service (both part of the FSB) have recently been assigned greater responsibility for protecting NSR ports, straits, river mouths, and estuaries.⁴⁰

Overall, Russia’s Arctic narrative and policy are now entirely securitized.⁴¹ The emphasis on military and security aspects will likely be reflected in the updated Arctic strategy, which has been in preparation since 2025⁴² (and not yet released at the time of writing). A key implication is that hopes for Western cooperation with the current Kremlin leadership on Arctic security are now nonexistent.

The presence of Patrushev as “Arctic tsar” will undoubtedly lead to more anti-Western rhetoric, a deliberate focus on expanding regional military presence, and a potential return to Cold War thinking.³⁹ This situation affects future military decisions in the Arctic, especially in light of the consequences of the war against Ukraine.

Chapter 2 – Changes and Adaptations in Arctic Military Command and Infrastructure

While the war against Ukraine has not significantly impacted military forces and structures along the AZRF and the Pacific Arctic, several changes have occurred in the European High North to adjust Russia’s posture against the perceived expansion of NATO and to meet the ongoing demands of the war. Meanwhile, the network of dual-use Arctic infrastructure and bases continues to undergo modernization.

Wartime Adaptations in the High North

A sea change occurred in February 2024, when Putin signed a decree reestablishing the Soviet-era Moscow (MMD) and Leningrad Military Districts (LMD).⁴³ While the Moscow MD focuses on commanding the war effort against Ukraine, the Leningrad MD oversees Baltic Sea⁴⁴ and High North security.

Headquartered in Saint Petersburg, the LMD is responsible for the AZRF coastline in the western and central Arctic, encompassing the Republic of Karelia, the Republic of Komi, the Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Novgorod, and Pskov Oblasts, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and Saint Petersburg.⁴⁵ General Aleksandr Lapin, a Syrian and Ukrainian war veteran and former commander of the Central MD, was appointed head of the LMD in May 2024.⁴⁶ Yet, citing health issues and claiming retirement, Lapin was replaced by Evgeny Nikiforov as LMD commander in August 2025.⁴⁷

In 2021, force structure in the High North was organized under OSK Sever, a full-fledged Military District formed from elements of the Northern Fleet command.⁴⁸ Though innovative for the Russian armed forces, placing a fleet in charge of an MD was meant to streamline Command and Control (C2) across the Arctic. However, it was ultimately deemed a failed experiment due to organizational issues and a lack of institutional coherence and efficiency in the context of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The innovative idea of placing a fleet and a naval command in charge of their own Military District was therefore short-lived.

The creation of the LMD effectively removed the Northern Fleet former status as an independent theater command. Northern Fleet/OSK Sever ground forces, aviation, naval aviation, and air defense systems were also transferred to the LMD. The Northern Fleet resumed its primary mission of protecting and ensuring the survivability of strategic assets and infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula, as well as safeguarding the NSR in the western and central Arctic, in coordination with the Central MD.⁴⁴

Command and control changes within the LMD also led to the expansion of existing brigades into divisions as part of a broader restructuring in the context of the war. This willingness to increase mass reflects both the impact of the war against Ukraine and the need to secure the new border with NATO in Finland. LMD-related changes in different branches of the armed forces are discussed in subsequent chapters.

Reverting to Soviet-inherited command structures for the Arctic, however, is not specific to the Arctic; it merely reflects broader concerns about the war effort and the self-generated perception of NATO’s expansion. Essentially, C2 changes support Russia’s overall force posture and the need to protect national security interests, ultimately preparing for possible regional escalation. Beyond the High North, the LMD is responsible for defending Russia against NATO’s Northern Flank. This situation highlights the significance of the Arctic-Baltic theater in terms of horizontal escalation.

Putin announced that the structuring of the LMD should be completed before the end of 2025.⁴⁹ Yet it is facing several compound issues that will affect wider C2 functions in the short to medium terms:

• Recreating a sense of wider C2 coherence with other MDs, especially across the Central and Eastern MDs, who are also responsible for AZRF security,
• Upscaling and staffing the new divisions while considering limited resources and manpower due to the war effort and infrastructure constraints,
• Establishing a proper order of battle for the High North, especially the allocation of troops and capabilities between Moscow and Leningrad MDs.⁵⁰

The next few years will tell whether the LMD is effective in achieving its main missions or whether reintroducing Soviet-inherited structures will cause further C2 incoherence.

The Modernization of Arctic Bases and Infrastructure

To strengthen its ambitions of control and denial across the AZRF and the NSR, the Kremlin has been expanding and modernizing the Soviet-era network of airfields, forward bases, and ground facilities scattered throughout the region since the late 2000s.⁵¹

Considering the extensive geography and climate challenges, Russia’s Arctic infrastructure is essentially “double dual”, meaning it is simultaneously dual-use (interchangeably used for civilian and military purposes) and dual-purpose (blurring the line between offensive and defensive goals).⁵² As such, the Kremlin views civilian infrastructure in the Arctic as a potential military asset, especially since the military rebuilt the majority of these assets from pre-existing Soviet outposts.

The war against Ukraine has prompted Moscow to revisit its approach to Arctic infrastructure. Instead of building new bases and expanding the network, the armed forces are concentrating on maintaining and upgrading existing bases where possible. Another aspect is the need to build additional storage facilities for military hardware and equipment in the Arctic,⁵³ particularly given the expansion of LMD troops.

The first priority remains the protection of the nuclear deterrent around the Kola Peninsula and Murmansk. This involves the “Bastionization” of the nuclear deterrent infrastructure – taking after the Bastion Defense concept on the Kola Peninsula (see Chapter 6). Military installations there undergo constant cycles of infrastructure upgrades, especially at the Severomorsk 1, Severomorsk 2, and Gadzhiyevo bases, as well as in military towns in the Murmansk Oblast. Despite modernization and the deployment of advanced radar systems, Kola military infrastructure remains constantly at risk from Ukrainian drone strikes⁵⁴ and overflights.⁵⁵ This had already forced Moscow to disperse air assets and relocate them across Arctic infrastructure.

The second priority is to maintain and modernize the military infrastructure located at critical geographical chokepoints along the NSR, across the Russian archipelagos:

• By the Kara Strait at the European entrance of the NSR, with the Rogachevo base located on Novaya Zemlya and the Nagurskoye installations on Alexandra Land Island on Franz Joseph Land (Arctic Shamrock base),
• By the Laptev and Sannikov Straits by the New Siberian Islands, with the Northern Clover base on Kotelny Island by the Laptev Sea,
• By the strait south of Wrangel Island, between the Chukchi and East Siberian Seas, with the Zvyozdny base on Wrangel.

It should be noted that Wrangel Island recently became the focus of Western misinformation after an article incorrectly claimed Russia was constructing a military base “on American land.⁵⁶ The Russian press quickly picked it up,⁵⁷ but rigorous research has since debunked the historical and factual inaccuracies.⁵⁸ Moscow did, however, plant a replica of a Soviet flag in October 2024 to honor the first raising of the flag in 1924.

The third and final priority is the renovation of the 13 Soviet-inherited airbases. This includes, first and foremost, runway extensions to host a wider variety of air assets, notably attack and reconnaissance aircraft (MiG-29K, MiG-31, MiG-31BM, Su-24, Su-33), transport and support aircraft (Il-76 transport aircraft and Il-78 refueling tankers, Il-38 surveillance aircraft), and long-range bombers (Tu-160, Tu-95MS, and Tu-22M3).⁵⁹

The official plan remains to renovate seven airfields by 2030, including (Severomorsk-1, 2 and 3, Rogachevo, Talagi, Kipelovo, and the Safonovo seaplane facility).⁶⁰ Recently, runways were extended at the Rogachevo and Temp⁶¹ (part of the Kotelny installations) airbases. However, budget constraints and the demands of the war against Ukraine might temper these ambitions, leading to renovation delays.

Beyond these priorities, Moscow is considering upgrading existing port infrastructure, especially in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Dikson, Tiksi, and Pevek.⁶² Discussions are also ongoing about future modernization and upgrades at the Naryan-Mar, Alykel (Dudinka), Vorkuta, and Ugolny facilities.

Most military bases and outposts along the coast follow a similar pattern in deploying a multi-layered protective dome that complements the Bastion Defense concept around Kola. Installations are generally equipped with a comprehensive set of air defense, anti-ship, and coastal defense missile capabilities, alongside radar installations for early warning and surveillance (notably Sopka-2 radars, the Rezonans‑N radar complexes, and the Monolit-B coastal radars)⁶³ as well as electronic warfare capabilities. In recent years, aerial drones have been used to improve situational awareness and to support anti-drone systems.

Infrastructure determines how wars are fought and won, which is especially critical in Russia’s Arctic due to climate, geography, and distances. Despite reinvestment in Arctic infrastructure, the Russian network remains relatively small, disconnected, understaffed, and plagued by resupply problems, poor construction quality, and climate change impacts.⁶⁴ Like many aspects of modern Russia, it remains a “good enough” increment from Soviet design.

Troops frequently complain that living conditions in Arctic military towns like Pechenga and Sputnik are unsustainable.⁶⁵ In the European High North, expanding existing brigades into divisions has already caused infrastructure changes across the LMD, but they remain small compared to the task of upsizing units. How these units will be staffed, given the sparsely populated areas and the manpower shortages caused by the war, remains unknown.⁶⁶ Overall, Russia’s willingness to create more mass may already be a lost gamble, especially considering the impact of climate change on existing infrastructure.⁶⁷

Nuclear Risks in a Changing Arctic

Given the current geopolitical context, the Kremlin has become increasingly aggressive in its nuclear signaling in the Arctic. Worrying signals are coming from recent rhetoric that Moscow could potentially resume nuclear testing on the Soviet-era Novaya Zemlya test site.

In 2023, Putin mentioned such a possibility, “if the United States conducts tests”⁶⁸ – a message that Russian media relayed as well.⁶⁹ In December 2024, former head of the 12th Main Directorate Vladimir Verkhovtsev assured that the test site had been fully prepared for the resumption of nuclear testing for several years and would be able to do so “if this becomes necessary from a political standpoint”.⁷⁰  The Central test site at Novaya Zemlya “celebrated” its 70^th anniversary in 2024.⁷¹

This situation reinforces Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling and implies that the United States will be held responsible if Moscow resumes nuclear testing in the Arctic. Furthermore, in November 2025, Putin instructed officials to draft “proposals on the possible start of work on the preparation of nuclear weapons tests” if the US also decided to resume nuclear testing.⁷²

It is also possible that some level of nuclear activity has already occurred on Novaya Zemlya, potentially involving testing of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile. In September 2025, a test reportedly took place at the Pankovo launch site.⁷³ This prompted the deployment of a US reconnaissance aircraft in the Barents Sea near the Russian air defense identification zone (ADIZ) to assess radiation levels.⁷⁴ Increased military activity has been observed at the Pankovo launch site since 2025,⁷⁵ presumably linked to Burevestnik testing.

Resuming nuclear testing in the Arctic would have disastrous environmental consequences⁷⁶ and add to Russia’s appalling nuclear footprint in the region. Indeed, the Russian Arctic is mired by a large concentration of nuclear-powered assets (submarines, icebreakers, power plants, floating research barges, etc.), many of which are aging and at various levels of decay.⁷⁷ Soviet nuclear waste dump sites are poorly managed and are threatened by permafrost thaw. Meanwhile, several known sunken submarines need attention to prevent radioactive spillage.⁷⁸

Chapter 3 – Russia’s Arctic as a Fortress, a Frontline, and a Contested Space

Russia’s Arctic is changing, prompting Moscow to adjust to the new strategic and military landscape. From this perspective, there is a link between the Kremlin’s overall goals in the region and its force deployments, as evidenced by trends in military exercises. The track record of Arctic military exercises offers a unique perspective on how Moscow plans for potential escalation and conflict in (and away from) the Arctic.⁷⁹ Although there is no willingness in the Kremlin to start a conflict in the Arctic per se, Russia plans for all contingencies, including war.

Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, several trends have influenced regular training exercises between Arctic military units and commands. These trends reveal how Moscow will approach the region going forward.

• Fortress Arctic: The current retrenchment toward the AZRF emphasizes near-sea control increasingly focused on the Bear Gap,
• Contested Arctic: The Kremlin’s disputed interpretation of the NSR’s status reflects an obsession with control, driven by fears of adverse freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs),
• Frontline Arctic: Instead of conventional warfare, Russia relies on ongoing low-intensity-warfare activities and sub-threshold operations in the region, particularly with the support of China. 

Fortress Arctic: Retrenchment and near-sea control

The consequences of the war against Ukraine have been reinforcing pre-existing limitations to Russia’s power projection and multi-domain military ambitions in the Arctic:

• Personnel and equipment losses to Ukraine, particularly ground forces, reduce Russia’s conventional threat level in the European High North (see Chapter 4),

• Regardless of climate change, Russian naval fleets are not inherently Arctic-capable and therefore restricted in their operational range (see Chapter 5),
• Ukrainian drone strikes against Kola Peninsula military installations have “burst the bubble” of the impenetrable air defense protective dome in the region (see Chapter 6).

These conventional limitations only amplify the Kremlin’s increasing sense of vulnerability in a changing Arctic, particularly in the European High North. In this context, Moscow appears to be adopting a strategy of retrenchment and retreat toward near-sea approaches.

Retrenchment Toward the Bear Gap

The Kremlin is now prioritizing the protection of the AZRF and NSR approaches from the Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea. In other words, Russia is aiming to establish a “fortress” in the High North.

This comes in sharp contrast with the previous willingness to extend defense in depth and perimeter control away from Russia’s Arctic by deploying interdiction capabilities beyond the AZRF. Out-of-area ambitions of denial were traditionally putting pressure on the North Atlantic SLOC, especially at the regional chokepoints of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) gaps.

These NATO naval approaches in the seams between the North Atlantic and the High North remain important given Russia’s regional posture. Still, they have become less of a priority for the Kremlin to challenge, at least for the time being.

It should never have been assumed that Moscow could “close the gaps” across the North Atlantic by deploying and sustaining interdiction operations so far beyond the AZRF in the first place. Yet, increased Russian focus on near-sea control (and less on out-of-area denial) in the High North has different implications for the US and NATO in the region.

With fewer ambitions to extend interdiction capabilities beyond the Barents Sea, the Bear Gap has now become the new line of contact between Russia and NATO-dominated areas in the High North. The Bear Gap is situated between the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, with Bear Island (Bjørnøya) roughly halfway between the main Svalbard archipelago and mainland Norway. The current situation is also putting more pressure on the Nordic-Baltic continuum for NATO. 

In the High North, the Bear Gap is where Moscow is now refocusing its military exercises on near-sea control. Arctic-focused drills have been following the trend of retreating toward near-sea approaches to increase control on both sides of the AZRF. For the past few years, drills across the Northern and Pacific Fleets have emphasized near-sea control along the AZRF.⁸⁰

Exercises feature the multi-domain protection of Russian coastal approaches to counter enemy incursions by sea,⁸¹ by subsea,⁸² and in the air⁸³ (including against drones)⁸⁴ through precision strikes. Northern Fleet submarines are also engaging in territorial defense close to the entrance of the AZRF in the Barents Sea and by the Kola Peninsula.⁸⁵ Another major focus is regular missile test launches to ensure the integrity of the Arctic air defense network.⁸⁶ Drills regularly focus on guaranteeing the safe passage of surface combatants across sea lines of communication through reconnaissance and minesweeping operations.⁸⁷

Controlling near-sea approaches also means emphasizing aerial and naval anti-submarine warfare (ASW) – from torpedo launches from surface assets⁸⁸ to sonar submarine detection⁸⁹ and aerial submarine search with Ka-27PL helicopters,⁹⁰ as well as with Il-38 and Tu-142 aircraft.⁹¹ For the past few years, the armed forces have also trained in anti-drone warfare in an Arctic environment. Drills focus on repelling drone attacks with ship-launched Poliment-Redut anti-aircraft missiles,⁹² uncrewed surface vehicles,⁹³ and anti-drone air combat.⁹⁴ Most ground troops on the Kola Peninsula are now training for anti-drone countermeasures.⁹⁵

Recent transatlantic disagreements over Greenland have been duly noted in Moscow, although the Kremlin refrained from overtly criticizing US policy. Instead, the official narrative has so far focused on denouncing the “acceleration of the militarization of the Arctic” and denouncing the potential risk of increased NATO presence⁹⁶ – the usual background noise aimed at delegitimizing NATO in the region as a military threat.⁹⁷ Putin also mentioned that Greenland was “none of our business”.⁹⁸ The only aggressive mention is that if the US deploys the Golden Dome to Greenland, Moscow would need to take “appropriate military measures”⁹⁹ (without specifying what those would be).

Far from altering Russia’s threat perception in the European High North, the current situation benefits Moscow. While US policy attention is focusing on Greenland, there is less space to tackle another source of Arctic insecurity: the Russian and Chinese presence around the Aleutian Islands and the Bering Sea.

(In)security of the Svalbard Archipelago

The retrenchment toward the High North “fortress” is also increasing the potential military importance of the Svalbard archipelago, situated between the Norwegian and Barents Seas. Indeed, previous ambitions of control persist, particularly the goal of guaranteeing unrestricted access to and from Kola Peninsula installations for the Northern Fleet.

In wartime or during military escalation, Svalbard would serve as a crucial location for Russia to deploy air defense systems and sensor capabilities to gain control of the battlefield and secure safe passage for surface and subsurface assets. Military operations would probably focus on eliminating Norwegian and NATO assets in the region, especially by disabling air and port infrastructure in Longyearbyen, the SvalSat satellite station, and the SvalRak rocket range in Ny-Ålesund with missile strikes. The new NATO Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Bodø,¹⁰⁰ and various Norwegian air stations such as Evenes and Ørlandet, and the US-funded Vardø coastal radar installations would also be vulnerable.

Following this initial campaign, Northern Fleet surface assets would likely conduct sea denial operations between the Barents and Norwegian Seas. The Kremlin might be tempted (though unlikely) to seize Bear Island and deploy road-mobile sea-denial and air defense systems there to enhance defense in depth for naval and air operations. Such a scenario would require the use of amphibious landing ships and naval support capabilities operating far from their base in the far-sea area (see Chapter 5).

This situation does not imply that Moscow will initiate conflict over or about Svalbard, especially during peacetime. The Kremlin’s constant onslaught of sub-threshold activities that challenge Norwegian sovereignty¹⁰¹ over the archipelago is not aimed at doing away with the Svalbard Treaty or at conducting a “land grab” there. Such activities are considered “routine” and must be seen as attempts to provoke Norwegian reactions – although Oslo always manages to successfully defuse tension. Svalbard has long been the source of many myths and misconceptions, which have since been dispelled.¹⁰²

Contested Arctic: Obsession for control over the Northern Sea Route

The changing geopolitical and climate landscape in the Arctic is forcing Russia to overprotect the NSR from perceived foreign encroachment. Because of an obsession with control, the Kremlin is now turning the AZRF and the NSR into contested spaces. Russian fears have crystallized in the unfounded belief that NATO or US military forces will conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) through the NSR to assert innocent passage and freedom of navigation under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the near future.¹⁰³ 

The goal of such a FONOP would supposedly be to challenge Russia’s interpretation of the status of the NSR as a body of internal waters under Article 234 of UNCLOS. Also known as the ‘Ice Clause’, Article 234 permits national control over ‘ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone’.¹⁰⁴ The issue for the Kremlin is that under the impact of climate change and the ongoing reduction of seasonal sea ice, the definition of ‘ice-covered areas’ is becoming irrelevant.¹⁰⁵

The clock is already ticking for the Kremlin: in September 2023, Russia successfully conducted the first NSR passage without icebreaker escort.¹⁰⁶ Such unescorted passages will multiply in the coming years. In fact, thorough research recently showed that Russia’s interpretation of the Ice Clause is no longer supported by scientific climate models, as sea ice concentration and thickness no longer meet the legal requirements of UNCLOS.¹⁰⁷

In terms of legal contestation, Russia’s position on the NSR has been enshrined in recent strategic documents, such as the 2021 National Security Strategy and the 2022 Maritime Doctrine, which explicitly refer to the NSR as a “legal regime of inland sea water”.¹⁰⁸ The Kremlin has been using the Ice Clause to transform the NSR into a body of internal waterways exclusively ruled by national laws. Legal self-appropriation occurred through a series of discriminatory national rules strengthening control over access and transit through the NSR.

In particular, the December 2022 law On Internal Sea Waters, the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation¹⁰⁹ severely restricts foreign surface and submarine military access to critical chokepoints across the NSR. Navigation is now limited south of the Kara Gate, the Vilkitskii Strait by Severnaya Zemlya, and the Sannikov Strait by the East Siberian Islands – but not north of these chokepoints.¹¹⁰

The situation is comparable in the Pacific Arctic regarding passage and transit through the regional chokepoint of the Bering Strait. Moscow adheres to the USSR-US Maritime Boundary Agreement from 1990 and respects the delineation along the Baker–Shevardnadze line,¹¹¹ but the Kremlin never formally ratified the Agreement. Russia could be tempted to renege on these obligations and contest freedom of navigation across the Strait.¹¹²

As Moscow sees its control over the NSR slipping, the Russian leadership was further vindicated by recent developments with the United States. This includes the release of the 2023 Implementation Plan of the 2022 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR), which mentions the protection of freedom of navigation (objective 4.2.1),¹¹³ the passage of Coast Guard cutter Healy through the Bering Strait and into the Chukchi Sea in September 2023,¹¹⁴ and 2023 US announcement of the outer limits of the extended continental shelf, with claims on both sides of the Bering Strait.¹¹⁵

From a military perspective, Moscow is trying to mitigate self-constructed fears of potential FONOPs by paying close attention to protecting navigational chokepoints across the AZRF archipelagos¹¹⁶ – in line with the development of dual-use infrastructure (see Chapter 2). The Kremlin recognizes it has to “defend the NSR alone”¹¹⁷, a theme that has been permeating recent trends in military exercises. They are reflecting Russia’s obsession with control over the NSR and the need to counter potential adversarial FONOPs – what Moscow calls the “safety of maritime navigation” along the NSR.¹¹⁸

Drills have recently focused on naval and air operations involving coordination between the Northern and Pacific Fleets,¹¹⁹ as well as boarding and inspecting “foreign ships”¹²⁰ and “anti-terrorist operations” in the Barents and Kara Seas. These “anti-FONOP” drills specifically aim to defend NSR approaches at sea and on land.¹²¹

Demonstrations of naval presence and passage through the NSR occur regularly. Every year, the Northern Fleet executes an “Arctic voyage” to demonstrate passage through the region.¹²² At the same time, the Pacific Fleet conducts similar drills as part of the Finval exercise between the Chukchi and Bering Seas.¹²³ The FSB (which oversees the Coast Guard and the Federal Border Guard Service) is also focusing on countering “foreign influence” in the NSR.¹²⁴ The navy is also increasingly seeking to deploy naval surface assets to internal waterways along the NSR to better protect it.

Finally, Russia’s deep-rooted fears have been expressed in aggressive propagandist rhetoric denouncing that regional NATO exercises and military ambitions are focusing on the NSR as a “primary target”¹²⁵ for “aggressive action from other countries”.¹²⁶ Moscow signals regularly that NATO seeks to “storm”¹²⁷ or “snatch”¹²⁸ the NSR from Russian control.

Marginal ultra-conservative voices are also calling for Russia to conduct aggressive “counterdemonstrations” of presence, such as a coastal landing directly on US soil in Alaska.¹²⁹ A laughable idea, perhaps, but also a tell-tale sign of the Kremlin’s obsession with FONOPs.

Russian fears of a foreign FONOP are largely unfounded. Nevertheless, Moscow’s willingness to defend what it perceives as its rightful territory should not be underestimated, and the Kremlin’s readiness to escalate in response to a Western-led FONOP should be taken seriously and appraised with utmost care.

Yet conducting a FONOP in the Russian Arctic would pose unnecessary risks, including the potential for military escalation. However, by establishing legal and military conditions around Russia’s contested interpretation of the NSR’s status, the cost of Western complacency remains high. Inaction only reinforces the Kremlin’s claims, while attempting a FONOP could prove too risky,¹³⁰ in either the Russian Arctic or the Sea of Okhotsk.

Frontline Arctic: Low-Intensity-Warfare and Sub-Threshold Activities

Aside from FONOPs, and given the limitations in Russia’s Arctic posture, there is little interest in the Kremlin to over-escalate in the Arctic or create a conflict about the Arctic per se. Moscow aims to reduce tension in the AZRF and push it further away, especially toward the Bear Gap. However,

there is a strong incentive to degrade the operating environment in the Arctic by conducting low-intensity-warfare operations in peacetime.

Regardless of its willingness to retrench to the AZRF, Russia has turned the Arctic into a frontline. Through a well-established toolkit of grey zone and sub-threshold activities, Russia tests and probes the responses of Arctic nations and NATO, while increasing the cost of deterrence. The issue remains that such activities carry the risk of military escalation due to miscalculation stemming from accidents, incidents, and tactical errors.

Aggressive Demonstrations of Presence and Signaling

At sea and in the air, Russian armed forces are consistently conducting aggressive patrols and aerial overflights near the territories of NATO allies. Russian surface and subsurface naval assets frequently patrol the territorial waters of NATO countries in the North Atlantic, well beyond the AZRF.¹³¹ In February 2026, Moscow announced live artillery shootings a few nautical miles from Norwegian territorial waters.¹³²

Long-range strategic aviation patrols resumed over the Arctic in 2007 and naval aviation patrols in 2013. Air patrols now extend beyond the Barents Sea and reach the Greenland Sea, the Central Arctic Ocean, and the North Pacific. Long-range aviation overflights extend to the Norwegian Sea,¹³³ toward North Pole approaches,¹³⁴ and over the Pacific Arctic.¹³⁵ NORAD regularly detects and tracks a steady number of Russian strategic bombers within the range of the Alaska air identification zone (ADIZ).¹³⁶ Meanwhile, regional tactical aviation patrols tend to be more aggressive, with Russian assets shadowing NATO patrols and deployments in the High North¹³⁷ or practicing aerial combat.¹³⁸

Beyond testing operational capacity, these overflights are part of Russia’s contestation and active signaling against Western presence. The number of overflights remains below the averages experienced during the Cold War era.¹³⁹ The issue, however, is that Russian air sorties lead to calculated ADIZ violations of NATO countries in the High North,¹⁴⁰ as well as of Japan¹⁴¹ and South Korea in the North Pacific. These infringements remain rare but are remarkable as they increase the risk of regional miscalculation.

Russia’s aggressive behavior is further demonstrated by recent trends in Arctic-related military exercises. Northern Fleet troops regularly rehearse rapid-reaction deployments, including coastal assault landings and amphibious operations on “enemy territory”¹⁴² to counter NATO deployments.

These exercises include capturing land positions from the sea, anti-sabotage operations, elimination of enemy amphibious landing assets, and naval gunnery to suppress coastal defenses and land targets.¹⁴³ This goes hand in hand with the continued modernization of amphibious capabilities (see Chapter 5). The armed forces are also practicing Arctic mobility during regular crossings across Arctic geography.¹⁴⁴

A major wargame played out during Zapad 2025 in September. Northern Fleet units practiced amphibious coastal assault landing to retake “enemy positions” on Alexandra Land Island in the Franz Josef Land archipelago.¹⁴⁵ It involved a major joint naval and air operation, missile launches from Nagurskoye, and the creation of an isolation zone to degrade the operating environment and hamper deployments.¹⁴⁶

The Weaponization of Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMs)

Since the 2010s, the Russian armed forces have been routinely weaponizing the use of notice to air missions (NOTAMs) to justify aggressive behavior during planned live-fire air and naval exercises in the High North. As part of its sea and air denial strategy, the Russian armed forces regularly send last-minute notices for live-fire missile, air, and naval drills in areas adjacent to Norwegian territory. This situation particularly affects Norway as these drills tend to overlap with its EEZ.¹⁴⁷

Thorough research into Russia’s pattern of NOTAM use has shown that Moscow closes entire segments of the Barents and Norwegian Seas for scheduled drills that exceed strict drill requirements.¹⁴⁸ This practice has become part and parcel of aggressive signaling and military demonstrations of power. During Zapad 2025, the navy created large maritime exclusion zones in the Barents Sea to conduct missile tests.¹⁴⁹ Similar closures occurred during NATO’s Cold Response exercises in March 2026.¹⁵⁰

Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the pattern of NOTAMs has changed and is showing signs of shifting back toward the Kola Peninsula. The geographical scope, size, frequency, and pattern of Russian NOTAMs related to missile launches and drills have been reduced.¹⁵¹ This reflects Russia’s move toward near-sea control by the AZRF and reduced ambitions for extended denial beyond the Norwegian Sea.

Despite a reduced scope, the use of NOTAMs to disrupt NATO military drills¹⁵² and signal deterrence in the High North will likely continue, especially amid Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership. Last-minute NOTAMs and the closure of entire segments of Arctic air and naval spaces further increase the risk of miscalculation, especially the potential for accidents involving civilian assets.

Furthermore, constant demonstrations of presence put a heavy toll on the foreign regional assets on both sides of the Arctic. For instance, Norwegian and Japanese air patrols monitoring Russian activities must take in higher operational tempos, associated maintenance costs, and wear and tear.

Electronic Warfare Operations

Russian peacetime electronic warfare (EW) and jamming operations have become routine over large areas of Finnish Lapland and Norwegian Finnmark.¹⁵³ Russian operators routinely conduct GNSS/GPS jamming against regional receivers, which causes temporary losses in satellite navigation coverage and radio-communication interference.¹⁵⁴ Norwegian and Finnish authorities have reported ‘unprecedented levels’¹⁵⁵ of Russian EW countermeasures since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. EW operations tend to intensify during regional NATO exercises.¹⁵⁶

Electronic warfare is an integral part of Russia’s Arctic military posture, with the aim of degrading the operations of a potential adversary in a contested environment. Yet there is a high level of irresponsibility on the part of the Kremlin in conducting EW operations during peacetime. Indeed, they pose significant risks to civilian activities in the High North. The temporary loss of GNSS/GPS coverage and communication at sea and in the air could result in serious accidents for civilian aircraft crossing the region, as well as for commercial vessels at sea.

Civilian aviation is now regularly impacted by Russian EW activities in the Barents Sea and in the Gulf of Finland. In 2022, the Savonlinna airport in Finland had to cancel flights due to GNSS/GPS service disruptions, likely attributable to Russia.¹⁵⁷ In November 2025, Russia disrupted GNSS/GPS service of Norwegian air ambulance helicopters.¹⁵⁸ In the event of an accident in the High North, such operations would tremendously affect SAR operations and the coordination of efforts.¹⁵⁹

Seabed Warfare

Over the past decade, the Russian armed forces have reinvested in deploying dedicated assets and military units responsible for conducting seabed warfare activities, especially the disruption of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI). This includes maritime subsea infrastructure, fiber-optic data and communication cables, and energy pipelines.¹⁶⁰ CUI disruption and sabotage represent a low-cost, high-impact asymmetric enabler that helps Moscow prepare the informational and psychological battleground¹⁶¹ and gain a potentially critical advantage in the event of regional escalation by disrupting the flow of civilian and military information.¹⁶²

Although never entirely attributed to the Kremlin with a “smoking gun”, there is now a track record of CUI disruption across the Arctic-Baltic area that points towards Russian involvement.¹⁶³ Recent cases of infrastructure damage¹⁶⁴ involve the Lofoten-Vesterålen (LoVe) Ocean Observatory in 2021, the Svalbard Undersea Cable System in 2022,¹⁶⁵ the SHEFA-2 data cable in the Shetland Islands in 2022, the Balticconnector infrastructure in October 2023,¹⁶⁶ the cable linked to the Evenes air station in Norway in 2024,¹⁶⁷ and the Estlink-2 power line between Finland and Estonia and four data cables in the Baltic Sea in December 2024.¹⁶⁸

Moscow uses a mix of capabilities to disrupt CUI. In shallow waters, any surface vessel (primarily civilian ones)¹⁶⁹ can be employed to conduct unsophisticated anchoring and dredging operations in complete plausible deniability. In deeper Arctic waters, Russia has developed a small array of

capabilities, such as the Losharik deep-diving nuclear-powered submarine and the K-329 Belgorod SSGN¹⁷⁰. Military operations are coordinated by the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), an intelligence and special operations MoD department located with the Northern Fleet.¹⁷¹

In the Arctic, the network of fiber-optic cables resting on the seabed is particularly vulnerable to disruption and sabotage. Arctic data cables lack resilience and redundancy because of the limited number of subsea cables and landing stations, as well as the presence of geographical chokepoints. These are situated around the GIN-GIUK gaps, the Svalbard archipelago, the ‘Canada-Greenland gap’ near the Canadian North-East passage, and across the Bering Strait.¹⁷²

Grey Zone Operations and Intelligence Gathering

As part of sub-threshold warfare activities and border ‘Shadow War’,¹⁷³ Russia has maintained the Soviet practice of operating a large fleet of civilian and dual-use vessels capable of conducting espionage, intelligence gathering, reconnaissance operations, and seabed mapping in the waters of the North Atlantic, the Arctic, and the Baltic Sea area.¹⁷⁴ Russia employs civilian cargo ships and tankers (known as the ‘shadow fleet’), fishing trawlers, and research vessels, among others,

to carry out these operations. These vessels operate with plausible deniability but are equipped with discreet devices that enable them to conduct military-oriented measurements, mapping, and tracking regional military deployments.

The ’shadow fleet’ is enabled by the obfuscating nature of maritime shipping: it benefits from lax regulations on ownership structures and third-country flag registration,¹⁷⁵ making legal attribution to Russia harder in practice. Furthermore, Russian civilian vessels conducting intelligence operations tend to sail with AIS/VMS transponders switched off and often spoof their location with different geolocation data.¹⁷⁶ ‘Scientific’ research vessels are particularly known for this behavior, such as the Yantar¹⁷⁷ and the Karpinsky, a vessel the author recently dubbed a ‘modern-day Flying Dutchman’.¹⁷⁸

Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ in the Arctic poses a threat to maritime safety: it adds to the risk of miscalculation in the event of accidents or incidents involving assets sailing with transponders off or refusing to respond to radio-communication prompts.¹⁷⁹ Constantly monitoring the Russian fleet also puts pressure on Arctic states, particularly their Coast Guards, and the need for continuous MDA.

Further to intelligence-gathering operations, Nordic authorities have experienced an increase in drone overflights of onshore and offshore critical national infrastructure (CNI) in recent months.¹⁸⁰ Drone sightings intensified after 2022 over military and civilian installations.¹⁸¹ In late 2025, drone overflights likely linked to Russian activity forced the closure of Danish and Norwegian airports.¹⁸²

China as an Asymmetric Enabler and Disruptive Force Multiplier

From a security standpoint, Russia is leveraging China’s interest in Arctic operations as an asymmetric tool to destabilize regional security and create a broader disruptive impact against US and NATO interests.¹⁸³

Closer bilateral relations in the security sphere materialized in April 2023 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian FSB Border Service (Coast Guard and Border Guard) and the Chinese Coast Guard.¹⁸⁴ The agreement paved the way to soft security and maritime law enforcement cooperation. It gave rise to the first-ever joint coastguard patrol in late 2024, when Coast Guard assets from both countries sailed through the Bering Strait into the Russian Arctic¹⁸⁵ – although they only spent four days in Arctic waters.¹⁸⁶

The Coast Guard agreement could serve as a blueprint for future military cooperation between the Pacific Fleet and China’s Navy (PLAN), as both countries may find value in organizing a full-fledged military exercise in the Arctic proper in the coming months.¹⁸⁷ 

So far, bilateral military activities have centered on demonstrating presence and signaling deterrence at the edge of the Arctic. Since 2019, both nations have been regularly conducting long-range aviation overflights in the North Pacific, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan.¹⁸⁸ They tend to be organized without advance NOTAMs and range close to the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Alaska.¹⁸⁹ In 2019, the situation escalated following a violation of the Japanese and South Korean ADIZs.¹⁹⁰

Outside of the Arctic, bilateral naval drills include the regular Northern/Maritime Interaction exercise in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea.¹⁹¹  The drills focus on sea control and freedom of navigation as well as joint air defense, anti-drone warfare, and anti-submarine warfare.¹⁹² Both navies also conducted their first-ever joint submarine patrol in the Sea of Japan and East China Sea as part of Northern/Maritime Interaction in September 2025.¹⁹³

Directly connected to US security, Russian and Chinese warships are now patrolling increasingly closer to the US exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the Aleutian Islands. Since 2023, the Pacific Fleet and the PLAN have been conducting a large yearly naval patrol and ASW exercise off the Aleutians.¹⁹⁴ The Bering Sea and, especially, the Aleutian Islands remain crucial to US and North American security interests.¹⁹⁵

The current situation leaves a contrasting picture. An increasing number and scope of bilateral military exercises does not necessarily mean a deepening of regional military relations.¹⁸³ Bilateral posturing and signaling take priority over the actual substance of these exercises. It remains that joint maneuvers also raise the risk of miscalculation, especially when it comes to patrols ranging the Alaska ADIZ.

In the long run, the bilateral relationship will remain fraught with mistrust and friction points and will likely clash strategically in the future.¹⁹⁶ Moscow must manage Beijing’s growing Arctic ambitions, especially its willingness to operate independently of Russia and to transit through the Central Arctic Ocean. In September 2024, China deployed its three icebreakers in the Russian Arctic for the first time,¹⁹⁷ and in September 2025, a Chinese container ship completed a full voyage across the Arctic in 20 days.¹⁹⁸

The issue remains that most cargo transiting the NSR is one-way and destined for China (including crude oil, coal, iron ore, and container shipments),¹⁹⁹ reinforcing the view that the NSR is a one-sided captive route serving Beijing’s interests. Furthermore, since early 2026, the war in Iran and subsequent transit issues through the Strait of Hormuz are unlikely to attract international interest for the NSR.

Chapter 4 – Ground Forces and Land Warfare

From a conventional ground forces perspective, the war against Ukraine has consistently weakened Russian troops and hardware deployments, forcing quick adaptations to meet Arctic strategic priorities and the transformation of the AZRF into a fortress, especially in the European High North.

The Human Cost of Ukraine on Arctic Deployments

In the early phase of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow sacrificed some Arctic-capable troops. Specialized units usually deployed in the European High North were decimated in urban warfare in Donbas, especially elements from the 200^th  Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (MRB, Pechenga) and the 80^th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Alakurtti, near the Finnish border), also known as the “Arctic Brigade.”

The 200^th MRB reportedly lost several hundred troops to ambushes in the Kharkiv region and Kharkiv itself early in the war.²⁰⁰ Brigade commander Denis Kurilo and deputy commander of the 14^th Army Corps, General Aleksandr Zavadsky were reportedly killed during war operations.²⁰¹ The commander of the 382^nd Separate Rocket Artillery Battalion (part of the 200^th MRB), Dinar Khametov, was also likely killed in action.

The 200^th MRB aimed to replenish losses by integrating reservists and other troops with no combat experience, only to be slaughtered in Ukraine over the summer of 2022.²⁰² To “honor” its sacrifice, it was awarded the title of “Guards” in 2023. The Brigade was still reportedly deployed around Kramatorsk in 2024.²⁰³ Furthermore, the unit’s military town, Pechenga, turned into a ghost town,²⁰⁴ with soldiers’ names regularly added to the war memorial there – although probably not the complete list.²⁰⁵

The 80^th MRB also suffered heavy casualties, with satellite data showing the Alakurtti base emptied of troops and military hardware.²⁰⁶ Other Arctic-enabled units experienced similar fates, notably the 76^th Guards Air Assault Division, the 61st “Red Banner” Independent Naval Infantry Brigade (Pechenga, 14^th Army Corps),²⁰⁷ the 40^th Separate Guards Marine Brigade (Pacific Fleet),²⁰⁸ and the 155^th Marine Brigade.²⁰⁹ The commander of the 61^st Brigade, Yaroslav Kurcheev, was reportedly killed in November 2024.²¹⁰ Various estimates exist, notably that losses and deployments in Ukraine leave High North ground forces with some 20% of their pre-2022 capacity.²¹¹

Wartime Structural Adaptations

Sending troops specialized in Arctic warfare to Ukraine has come at a high cost for the Russian armed forces. Moscow has therefore been adjusting the order of battle of ground forces spread across the Leningrad MD to compensate for heavy human losses.

The first major adaptation was the formation in June 2025 of the 71^st Guards Motor Rifle Division from the 200^th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade.²¹² This unit is a diluted version of the full strength of the 200^th MRB and still lacks the necessary hardware and troops to be fully effective – its reported

strength is only 11,000 troops.²¹³ Living and infrastructure conditions in Pechenga are poor enough at brigade level that it is hard to see how the expansion into a division will be achieved.

The second change was the merger of the two main parts of the Arctic Brigade (the 200^th MRB, now the 71^st Division, and the 80^th MRB) into a Motor Rifle Division in 2023. This new division was later added to the 14^th Army Corps, which was reorganized into a full Combined Arms Army (CAA) in the process.²¹⁴

Yet reorganization does not necessarily mean proper integration of these units into a coherent order of battle. Indeed, as most of these units are still engaged in Ukraine, integration within the LMD will take some time.²¹⁵ So far, upscaling the 14^th Corps to an Army has not materialized, as there is little evidence of organizational changes or logistical preparations around it.

The third adaptation was the creation of the 44^th Army Corps for Karelia, intended to strengthen land forces along the border with Finland.²¹⁶ The 44^th will reportedly be composed of three motorized rifle brigades reorganized to Division level.²⁰³ The exact location of the 44^th Corps remains unknown, but it will allegedly be headquartered in Petrozavodsk.²¹⁶ Satellite images from early 2026 showed preliminary work in Petrozavodsk to renovate the garrison’s infrastructure,²¹⁷ although major construction is still expected in the future to host the Corps.

Meanwhile, authorities in the Republic of Karelia are encouraging the formation of local “volunteer militias” to defend the border with Finland.²¹⁸ There is also evidence that the infrastructure at the Lupche-Savino garrison, near the town of Kandalaksha in the Murmansk oblast,²¹⁹ is being renovated and new buildings are under construction.

The war against Ukraine has altered how Russia will fight in the Arctic going forward. Considering the human toll on Arctic troops in the newly formed Leningrad MD, it will take years for Moscow to staff, train, and retain, let alone deploy specialized forces back to pre-2022 levels. In the short to medium term, staffing issues will continue to hinder the LMD’s ability to recover from heavy human casualties and adequately staff the expanded units, especially the 14^th CAA. Conscripts will unlikely be able to man Arctic-dedicated units until the war ends. At the same time, the status of contracted soldiers remains uncertain, and building a new cadre of commanding officers will not be easy.

The infrastructure gap will also hinder Russia’s ability to expand Arctic-specific military units. Few significant infrastructure developments have occurred since the decisions to upgrade LMD units. New temporary constructions and buildings capable of housing vehicles were observed at Kamenka and Alakurtti in early 2025.²²⁰ Moscow is also paying closer attention to railway troops and infrastructure, aiming to develop the railway network and improve military logistics and transport within the LMD.²²¹ However, much more remains to be built to accommodate these changes and the new order of battle.

As always, Moscow has many ambitions but few results to show so far. Conclusions from previous research remain valid: For the next few years at least, Russia will pose less of a conventional threat to NATO from a land forces perspective in the European High North, along NATO’s Northern Flank.²²² Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s sense of vulnerability and conventional inferiority will undoubtedly increase.

Ground Forces Military Hardware

On top of heavy human losses, Russia lost hundreds of Arctic-enabled military platforms and hardware to the war against Ukraine. The 200^th and the 80^th MRBs, and the 61^st Brigade in particular, suffered the most equipment losses. The 200^th MRB lost several T-80BVM tanks,²²³ with only a few units still present in Pechenga.²²⁴ It also lost several units of MT-LB AFVs, BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, and 152mm Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers.²²⁵ Ukrainian sources reported that the 200^th MRB lost around 40% of its armored vehicles deployed in the war.²²⁶ The 80^th MRB lost several units of Tor-M2DT air defense missile systems in the Kherson area.²²⁷

Other units reportedly lost various systems, notably Arctic-hardened T-80BVM tanks, DT-30 Vityaz transport vehicles, GAZ-3344-20 Aleut all-terrain carriers, Tor-M2DT air defense missile systems, and 152mm self-propelled Akatsiya howitzers from 2022 onwards.²²⁸ The loss of Arctic-enabled Tor-M2DT short-range systems is more concerning for Russian air defense coverage across the LMD, as it took Russia a long time to deploy them to units across the European High North.

Given significant hardware losses, Arctic-dedicated units will be unlikely to reconstitute as long as the war continues, which will affect their ability to operate, let alone reach pre-2022 levels of readiness. The situation will continue to restrict Russia’s ability to carry out high-intensity land warfare operations from the Leningrad MD against NATO’s Northern Flank. The war has also impacted heavy infantry mobility in an Arctic environment across the High North.

So far, hardware reconstitution efforts have been focusing on the following Arctic-specific platforms:

• The DT-30PM amphibious all-terrain tracked carrier vehicle. It is designed to carry personnel and support mounted air defense systems, such as the Arctic-capable Tor-M2DT and Pantsir-SA, as well as EW stations.²²⁹ The DT-30PM is key to Russia’s Arctic mobility: It is adapted to extreme temperatures and can be deployed year-round. It is supposed to become the workhorse of Arctic mobility in tandem with the DT-10PM Vityaz tracked all-terrain vehicle.²³⁰
• Arctic-enabled 120mm Magnolia self-propelled artillery and 122mm Tornado-G MLRS (modernized from the BM-21 Grad) that can both be mounted on DT-30PM trailers.²³¹
• T-80BVM MBTs and BTR-82A armored personnel carriers (APCs) adapted for Arctic-specific operations such as assault landings.²³²
• Arctic mobility all-terrain carriers, especially the GAZ-3344-20 Aleut,²³³ the TTM-4902PS-10 Ruslan tracked carrier,²³⁴ and the TM-140 tracked carriers.²³⁵
• Arctic-enabled ATVs such as the Trekol ATV (used for scouting) and TTM-1901-40 Berkut-2 and A-1 snowmobiles.

Overall, from a ground forces perspective, Russian ambitions are constrained by the reality of declining capabilities. The war against Ukraine has disproportionately depleted Arctic-capable units, gutting personnel, leadership, and specialized equipment and leaving High North ground forces at a fraction of their pre-2022 strength. The Kremlin’s response has been ambitious but so far largely declaratory: relabeling brigades as divisions, upgrading corps to armies, and announcing new formations near Finland. These changes cannot mask underperforming units, poor infrastructure, and issues with C2 integration. Hardware losses further constrain Arctic mobility. In practice, Russia’s aspiration to defend the AZRF in the European High North contrasts with a reduced conventional land threat and a slower, uncertain force regeneration.

Chapter 5 – Naval Forces

In March 2025, Putin declared that the Northern Fleet was the “most powerful in Russia”.²³⁶ However, he failed to mention that it was still experiencing significant gaps between its deployment ambitions and the resources available for maintenance.²³⁷

The Northern and Pacific Fleets have been slightly impacted by the war against Ukraine. Both are continuing their slow modernization process to convert Soviet-inherited surface vessels and submarines into a “Kalibrized” fleet of smaller, more versatile assets equipped with standoff weapons capabilities. Yet, like the rest of the Russian armed forces, the pace of modernization is constrained by systemic issues affecting the shipbuilding and military industries, notably qualified labor shortages.²³⁸ The Pacific Fleet continues to enhance deployment and berthing capabilities from its Kamchatka bases for surface ships and submarines.

The Northern Fleet leadership is currently discussing “new approaches” to military deployments, training, and improvements in combat readiness.²³⁹ This likely refers to streamlining the integration of Northern Fleet units into the C2 system of the Leningrad MD. In operational terms, this could also refer to Russia’s willingness to extend patrols in Arctic waters and to deploy military assets to protect the “shadow fleet” of tankers and cargo ships conducting intelligence operations at sea and disrupting critical underwater infrastructure (CUI) in the region.²⁴⁰

The demotion of the Northern Fleet from its Military District status and the creation of the Leningrad MD led to personnel changes. In March 2024, Vice-Admiral Konstantin Kabantsov became acting commander of the Northern Fleet.²⁴¹ He was previously First deputy commander of the Northern Fleet and replaced Admiral Alexander Moiseyev, who became commander of the

Russian Navy. A former submariner, Kabantsov spent his whole military career with the Northern Fleet.

Several Northern Fleet units were sent to the eastern Mediterranean to support military operations against Ukraine.²⁴² Despite a slightly reduced operational tempo and additional maintenance needed for deployed assets, the Northern Fleet has not lost its overall deployment capabilities. As they cannot conduct Arctic missions independently (see below), Northern Fleet assets regularly deploy for far-sea port calls to exotic locations such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Algeria.²⁴³

Surface Vessels

Previous research conducted thorough assessments of the order of battle of both the Northern and Pacific Fleets.²⁴⁴ Considering wider constraints affecting the Russian military industry,²⁴⁵ the rate of procurement of new surface assets and the modernization of existing platforms will likely continue. The Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier has been stuck in purgatory since 2017 because of interminable repair work and will probably never enter active service again.²⁴⁶

Flagship Surface Vessels

The flagship vessels of the Northern Fleet are the Kirov-class nuclear-powered missile cruisers (Project 1144), which have been modernized and equipped with a suite of standoff capabilities. This includes anti-ship (P-700/P-800) and anti-air capabilities (modified S-300 and S-400).²⁴⁷ The Kirov-class cruiser is generally deployed in tandem with MiG-31BM interceptors for near-sea control to make up for the ship’s limitations in engaging low-altitude over-the-horizon targets.

The first vessel, the Pyotr Velikiy, sits with the Northern Fleet. As it will be sent to a scrapyard, it will be replaced by the second unit, the Admiral Nakhimov, which is currently undergoing modernization and maintenance. Nakhimov has experienced decades of crippling delays²⁴⁸ and is currently undergoing new sea trials in the Barents Sea.²⁴⁷ It will reportedly be equipped with the nuclear-capable Zirkon hypersonic anti-ship missile.²⁴⁹

The second flagship class of vessels in the Northern Fleet is the Gorshkov-class frigates (Project 22350), also undergoing modernization and equipped with standoff capabilities for power projection and far-sea denial. This includes Kalibr, P-800 Oniks, and Zirkon missile systems²⁵⁰ as well as the Poliment-Redut shipborne SAM complex. The class is designed for far-sea operations and long-distance deployments.²⁵¹ Their versatile weapons systems allow them to engage ground, surface, underwater, and aerial targets. Zirkon missile test launches are now regularly carried out onboard the frigates, including in the Barents Sea.²⁵²

Gorshkov-class assets are supposed to become the backbone of the Northern Fleet, but also the Pacific Fleet. Three assets have been deployed with the Northern Fleet (Admiral Gorshkov, Admiral Kasatanov, and Admiral Golovko) since 2018. Two assets are currently under construction for the Pacific Fleet, but delays will prevent their deployment before the late 2020s.²⁵³ Five more frigates have been ordered, and they will not join the force for another decade at least.

The Pacific Fleet continues the procurement of Gremyashchiy-class corvettes (Project 20385). The second unit, the Provorny, is still undergoing testing after experiencing delays since 2022.²⁵⁴ The corvettes perform coastal and near-sea operations, especially around the Kamchatka region.

They are equipped with the Poliment-Redut anti-aircraft missile system and Kalibr-NK missile systems. They are also scheduled to host Zirkon missiles in the near future.

The war against Ukraine appears to have sapped earlier ambitions to develop a fleet of nuclear-powered Lider-class destroyers (Project 23560) for the Northern and Pacific Fleets. As the modernization of Gorshkov-class frigates advances, the construction of the Lider-class will gradually become less relevant, and the project might ultimately be cancelled. 

Amphibious Capabilities

The armed forces are emphasizing the continued modernization of amphibious capabilities for coastal assault landings and for transport across AZRF military infrastructure. Landing ships are also useful for resupplying Arctic bases and for demonstrating control along the NSR. Ivan Gren-class heavy landing ships (Project 11711) are the workhorses of Arctic amphibious capabilities, with two units in active service with the Northern Fleet since the late 2010s and two others at various stages of construction for the Pacific Fleet.²⁵⁵ The class can carry up to 300 troops (battalion-level), a half-dozen MBTs or 40 armored vehicles, and two support helicopters.²⁵⁶ A total of 10 units (including the modified class from Project 11711M) are supposed to be built by 2035,²⁵⁷ though this is unlikely to happen on time.

The navy also deploys smaller, legacy Ropucha-class landing ships (Project 775/775M), with two units active in the Northern Fleet and three in the Pacific Fleet. One Ropucha-class unit deployed Northern Fleet ground troops to the Baltic Sea in 2022 during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.²⁵⁸

These amphibious assets are expanding the reach of naval infantry forces within the Northern and Pacific Fleets and enabling them to deploy heavy equipment, including Arctic-hardened BTR-family APCs for assault landings. Both the Ivan Gren and Ropucha classes often operate in tandem for amphibious training.

Current plans call for deploying one large amphibious assault ship of the new Ivan Rogov-class (Project 23900) with the Pacific Fleet in the coming years to bolster capabilities. The helicopter carrier has been under construction since 2020²⁵⁹ and will not be commissioned before 2028 at the earliest. Other plans include the Cayman-class (Project 117113), a modernization project for the Ivan Gren-class, although a more distant prospect.²⁶⁰

The Northern and Pacific Fleets have been procuring various anti-submarine ships, notably Udaloy-class (Project 1155) and Grisha-class (Project 1124M) vessels. The Udaloy-class is assigned for ‘NSR protection’ operations²⁶¹, but cannot operate in ice conditions – like most of the assets of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Udaloy vessels have been fitted with a vast array of offensive systems.

The new Aleksandrite-class of mine countermeasure vessels (Project 12700) is also continuing service entry with both fleets. The Northern Fleet commissioned the Afanasy Ivannikov in 2025,²⁶² while the Polyarny was recently launched.²⁶³ They will both join the Kola Flotilla as part of the Northern Fleet. Three units already serve in the Pacific Fleet.²⁶⁴ The class is equipped with underwater vehicles capable of detecting objects, planting explosive charges, and towing them for demining purposes.²⁶⁵ Such vessels could potentially be used to sabotage critical undersea infrastructure (CUI). The new Grachonok counter-sabotage boat (Project 21980) entered service with the Northern Fleet’s Kola Flotilla in early 2025.²⁶⁶

Overcoming Arctic Limitations: Enter the “Combat Icebreakers”

Despite climate change, the Northern and Pacific Fleets face a major challenge: Neither can operate or maintain a presence in the Arctic without civilian icebreakers leased from Rosatom. Essentially, the modernization of surface assets does not solve the critical problem that neither fleet was designed to be Arctic-capable. Indeed, very few assets can operate in ice conditions without ice-strengthened hulls, which limits their ability to operate in winter and spring, at night, and especially in the central part of the NSR.²⁶⁷ As Jonas Kjellén articulated, the Northern Fleet is only a “latent Arctic force”.²⁶⁸

The Russian Navy is aware of this inherent limitation. During the 13^th Arctic voyage of the Northern Fleet in August 2025, which still required the assistance of a Rosatomflot icebreaker, Vice-Admiral Golubyev admitted that the Fleet could use “more ships that are adjusted to operations in the Arctic”.²⁶⁹

Although both fleets are training for independent Arctic operations, they have limited experience with unescorted Arctic missions beyond the Kola Peninsula for the Northern Fleet and beyond the Bering Sea for the Pacific Fleet. Neither fleet is intended for full-scale, deep Arctic operations, and they rather serve as pre-Arctic “Bastion guardians” protecting strategic submarines and NSR approaches on both sides of the AZRF. The war against Ukraine and the slow pace of modernization and procurement mean that, more than ever, both fleets will remain littoral forces, ensuring near-sea control and limited power projection in the Arctic per se.

This situation might gradually change, considering the receding sea ice and recent adaptations. Indeed, the Kremlin devised a unique solution to overcome the paradox: creating “combat icebreakers”.²⁷⁰ The concept of a “military icebreaker” is not new: It dates back to the Soviet era, when support icebreakers were equipped with weapons for use by the KGB.²⁷¹

As a reminder of Russia’s “double dual” approach to the Arctic, the new Arktika-class of armed patrol icebreakers (Project 23550) is equipped with modular standoff capabilities. Developed by the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau, the Arktika-class is designed to combine the functions of an ‘icebreaker, a tugboat, and a patrol vessel.’²⁷² Military equipment includes:²⁷³

• Containerized sea-launched Kalibr-NK cruise missiles and Uran anti-ship missiles to significantly extend the navy’s reach against external threats to the NSR.
• Short-range systems for near-sea control and target engagement, such as 76mm AK-176MA artillery guns, AK‑630M CIWS, 9K38 Igla MANPADS, and heavy machine guns.
• Projection, surveillance, and ASW capabilities with a Ka‑27 helicopter and UAVs launched from the deck.
• Amphibious capabilities with two Raptor-class high-speed landing and assault boats and an air-cushion vehicle.²⁷⁴

In addition to usual civilian tasks such as SAR operations and escort, the Arktika-class will perform near-sea protection missions, support the Northern Fleet in long-range deterrence within the NSR, and provide combat support against various targets. Given its design, range of missions, and military equipment, the Arktika-class is more similar to a small ice-capable corvette than to an icebreaker equipped with weapons.

The first Arktika-class, the Ivan Papanin, completed sea trials in 2025²⁷⁵ and entered active service with the Northern Fleet in November 2025.²⁷⁶ As a reminder, construction began in 2017,

and the vessel was first launched late 2019, after which sea trials were delayed due to industrial and financial constraints.²⁷⁷

A fleet of confirmed four to six Arktika-class icebreakers is supposed to be deployed between the Northern and Pacific Fleets, as well as the FSB, by 2030. The second vessel, the Nikolay Zubov, was launched in December 2024²⁷⁸ and just started sea trials, with a projected service entry date in 2026.

Two more ships have already been earmarked for the Coast Guard, which is part of the FSB (Yermak variant). The Yermak was launched in 2025, and this variant is supposed to carry only “defensive armament” (meaning no Kalibr). Late March 2026, a Ukrainian drone strike struck the Purga, currently under construction at the Vyborg shipyard near St. Petersburg, and supposed to join the Coast Guard with the Yermak.²⁷⁹

The Arktika-class is only able to operate independently in first-year ice and low-ice conditions. Its Arc7 ice classification means it can theoretically sail in ice 5.5 feet/1.7 meters thick, while its maximum autonomy is about 70 days. In this, it will not completely replace the need for nuclear-powered icebreaker escorts for the navy during winter conditions and in thicker ice in the central parts of the NSR. Overall, the Arktika-class will likely limit its operations to low-ice patrols at both entry points of the NSR.

Beyond combat icebreakers, the navy has also deployed its own diesel-electric icebreaker from Project 21180/21180M. The Ilya Muromets entered service with the Northern Fleet in 2018 and the Evpatiy Kolovrat entered service with the Pacific Fleet in July 2024.²⁸⁰ The Svyatogor is currently being built for the Northern Fleet.²⁸¹ This class enables the navy to perform assisted patrols in low-ice conditions to protect NSR entry points and to carry out tugging operations.

Finally, the Northern and Pacific Fleets remain dependent on assisted escort in deeper parts of the AZRF, with support from civilian nuclear-powered icebreakers operated by Rosatomflot.²⁸² In light of complex civilian-military relations between the Ministry of Defense and Rosatom,²⁸³ the

state corporation has been heavily lobbying its intention to build “100 to 150 vessels of various types”²⁸⁴ as well as a “new icebreaker fleet”²⁸⁵ to accommodate increased transit through the NSR, regardless of climate change.

Rosatom is actively pushing for the construction of its flagship LK-60-class nuclear-powered icebreakers (Project 22220), which are intended to replace the aging civilian Arktika-class by 2030. Seven units are supposed to be built by 2030. Four are now in service (Arktika, Sibir, Ural, and Yakutiya),²⁸⁶ while the three remaining are under construction (Chukotka,²⁸⁷ Leningrad, and Stalingrad).²⁸⁸ The LK-60 class is increasingly used in naval deployments for NSR military logistics, escorts for naval convoys, and towing operations – to the point that it has become a main workforce for the navy in the NSR.

The new LK-60 class will hardly compensate for the gradual decommissioning of Soviet-inherited nuclear icebreakers, most of which are expected to stop operations by the late 2020s (though that may not actually happen). Meanwhile, Rosatom is also aiming to acquire a fleet of advanced LK-120 Lider-class (Project 10510) icebreakers, although it will probably only manage to obtain one unit, the Rossiya.²⁸⁹

Recent announcements in the US regarding the ICE Pact²⁹⁰ and the procurement of new icebreakers²⁹¹ did not go unnoticed in Moscow. The Kremlin will surely interpret this move as a

numbers game and will aim to maintain numerical superiority. In this context, the Trump administration’s willingness to build and acquire more icebreakers is the best way to exhaust and outspend Moscow, although the existing “icebreaker gap” remains very real.²⁹² 

Submarines and Subsurface Assets

What makes the Northern and Pacific Fleets ‘Arctic’ in essence is their submarines’ ability to deploy, maintain presence, and operate beneath the ice across circumpolar regions. Both sides of the Russian Arctic have submarine forces deployed, and respective assets from both the Northern and Pacific Fleets can operate directly in the Arctic to threaten the US and NATO with long-range precision strikes and strategic nuclear strikes.²⁹³

Pacific Fleet assets stay near Kamchatka approaches and the Sea of Okhotsk in a pre-Arctic environment. Meanwhile, Northern Fleet submarines deploy beyond the Bastion into the North Atlantic, thereby exerting pressure on sea lines of communication and regional chokepoints across the GIUK and GIN gaps.²⁹⁴

In the context of the war and the loss of conventional capabilities, reliance on the sea-based nuclear deterrent on both sides of the Arctic has undoubtedly grown in the Kremlin’s calculations.²⁹⁵ Some 640 submarine-based strategic nuclear warheads are reportedly deployed with both fleets,²⁹⁶ with two-thirds assigned to the Northern Fleet²⁹⁷ near Murmansk and the remainder to the Pacific Fleet.

Considering the impact of climate change in the AZRF, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) are now focusing on unsupported under-ice navigation. They have become vital elements in protecting the NSR and patrolling AZRF approaches, especially across Arctic archipelagos.

Under-ice training and surfacing operations are regularly conducted in deeper parts of the central Arctic and towards North Pole approaches.²⁹⁸ In 2021, nuclear submarines conducted a surfacing operation in the deep Arctic by breaking through five feet of ice.²⁹⁹ This unprecedented event opened the way for a broader range of Russian deterrence operations in the region, especially as sonar detection becomes more difficult in such locations.

Like surface vessels, Russian submarines have also been modernized to enhance their standoff capabilities, especially with Kalibr systems and an increasing number of nuclear-capable Zirkon missiles. Over time, a form of “Zirkonization” of the Russian navy might complement the ongoing “Kalibrization”. The Kremlin announced in 2025 its intention to spend over $100 billion over the next decade for the modernization of the Borei-class and Yasen–M class of submarines.³⁰⁰ Yet both fleets still rely on assets such as the Soviet-inherited Delta-IV (Project 887) and Borei II-class (Project 955) SSBNs.

The procurement and modernization of the submarine fleet continue at a slow but steady pace, while several key assets stand out. First, the continued procurement of the Borei-A class (Project 955A) of SSBNs.³⁰¹ Since the early 2010s, Borei-A units have been gradually replacing the aging fleet of Delta-IV submarines in the Northern Fleet and Delta-III from the Pacific Fleet. The Borei-A class has been equipped with Bulava SLBMs – each submarine can carry 16 missiles, each fitted with six to 10 warheads.³⁰² The Borei program was recently affected after the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate leaked classified intelligence.³⁰³

Three vessels are currently in active service with the Northern Fleet (Yury Dolgorukiy, Knyaz Vladimir, and Knyaz Pozharsky since July 2025³⁰⁴ slowly replacing Akula-class and Oscar-class submarines. The class has been fitted with a wide array of nuclear-capable standoff capabilities, including Kalibr systems and increasingly Zirkon missiles.³⁰⁵ It is supposed to become the workhorse of Russia’s Arctic submarine deployments.

Northern Fleet units are based in Zapadnaya Litsa and count three units deployed since the mid-2010s (the flagship Severodvinsk, Kazan, and Arkhangelsk).³⁰⁶ Meanwhile, Pacific Fleet assets include three units (Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Perm), which completed sea trials in August 2025.³⁰⁷ The Perm is the first unit of its class to deploy purpose-built launch modules for Zirkon missiles, rather than retrofitted ones.³⁰⁸

Three more vessels are currently being built (Ulyanovsk, Voronezh, and Vladivostok) until the late 2020s. Moscow intends to deploy up to 12 Yasen-M submarines, although current goals might need to be scaled back considering the program’s delays.³⁰⁹

Finally, the modernization of Kilo-II class (Project 636.3) diesel-electric submarines has been ongoing since the mid-2010s.³¹⁰ They are now equipped with Kalibr missiles³¹¹ and have been designated for Arctic operations since 2022.³¹² Six units are assigned to the 19^th Submarine Brigade of the Pacific Fleet, with the Yakutsk just transferred in June 2025.³¹³ The submarine destined for the Northern Fleet was ominously called the Mariupol, and should be deployed before the end of the decade.³¹⁴

Other subsurface assets include the service-life extension of the six aging Delta-IV-class (Project 667) SSBNs with the Northern Fleet. The Bryansk was deployed again in early 2025 after six years of modernization.²⁹⁷ Akula-class (Project 971 Shchuka-B) SSNs sitting with the Northern and Pacific Fleets are also being modernized and equipped with Kalibr and P-800 Oniks missiles.³¹⁵

Overall, the navy reflects a narrowing gap between projected ambitions and actual modernization efforts. Surface fleets remain constrained by slow modernization and a structural inability to operate independently in ice without civilian escorts. Yet in the face of climate impact, this situation will play in Russia’s favor in the coming decades. Plans for larger blue-water assets were effectively replaced by a smaller, more agile navy equipped with standoff systems to protect both entry points to the AZRF. The “Zirkonization” of the fleets is creating a “decoupling” between the second-strike deterrence capabilities of the submarine fleet and the first-strike, non-strategic nuclear role of the surface fleets in an Arctic context.³¹⁶

The innovative combat icebreaker concept mitigates but does not fully solve Arctic access limitations, as these vessels are restricted to low-ice conditions. By contrast, submarines remain the core of Russia’s credible Arctic power projection, reinforcing deterrence value directly inside Arctic waters as they become more navigable.

Chapter 6 – Aerospace Forces and Air Defense in the Arctic

In an Arctic context, the Aerospace Forces (VKS) were only slightly affected by the war against Ukraine. However, they were significantly destabilized by the fallout from successful Ukrainian strikes on the Arctic long-range aviation base in Olenya. Kyiv metaphorically “burst the bubble” of Russia’s fabled Bastion Defense protective dome and is prompting changes in how it plans to approach its air defense concept moving forward.

Aerospace Forces

In June 2024, Ukraine launched an unprecedented drone strike operation against four long-range aviation bases deep inside Russian territory,³¹⁷ including against the Olenya airbase, located close to Olenegorsk in the middle of the Murmansk Oblast. Russian Aerospace Forces regularly used the Olenya airfield to conduct bombing operations against Ukraine, including against civilian targets.³¹⁸ Long-range aviation assets had been permanently relocated there to support the war effort.

Ukrainian intelligence further reported at least three more drone attacks on Olenya in September 2024, January 2025, and May 2025.³¹⁹ During these attacks, reports confirmed that drones penetrated the Russian airspace and managed to hit and destroy at least four Tu-95MS strategic bombers, four Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, and one An-12 transport aircraft,³²⁰ if not more. The successful destruction of Russian long-range aviation assets will undoubtedly limit their operational tempo in the medium term, resulting in fewer Arctic patrols and overflights.

Despite successful drone strikes on Olenya, VKS and naval aviation assets in the Arctic have remained minimally affected by the war against Ukraine. To compensate for the loss of conventional forces, the modernization and procurement of more tactical aviation assets will likely continue steadily in the medium term, along with the extension of Arctic runways across the military infrastructure network (see Chapter 2).

The war and subsequent C2 changes across the Leningrad MD affected VKS and naval aviation units. In December 2023, the decision was made to merge several regional naval aviation units across the Northern Fleet (the 279^th and 100^th naval fighter regiments at Severomorsk, the 174^th fighter aviation regiment, the 403^rd and 98^th mixed aviation regiment at Monchegorsk, and the 830^th naval anti-submarine helicopter regiment) into a single command under the 45^th Air Force and Air Defense Army based in Severomorsk.³²¹ This mixed aviation corps covers the three main air infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula (Severomorsk installations, Monchegorsk, and Olenya) and also includes the two main air defense divisions present there (see below).

Fixed-Wing Aircraft

In terms of tactical aviation, both the Northern and Pacific Fleets host a combination of MiG-29K, Su-33, and Su-34 fighter aircraft and MiG-31BM and MiG-31K interceptors – which are currently going through modernization to carry Kinzhal hypersonic missile systems. Kinzhal missiles have been tested since September 2025 on MiG-31K over the Barents Sea.³²² Airwings are complemented by a mix of Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft and Su-24 bombers.

For the first time in April 2024, Su-33 fighters landed and took off from the extended runways at the Rogachevo (Novaya Zemlya) and Nagurskoye (Franz Josef Land) airfields.³²³ This marks an upgrade for Russia’s tactical aviation across the Arctic, highlighting significant operational ranges across the AZRF and the ability to maintain coverage over Russian archipelagos for extended periods of time.

Long-range aviation also benefited from the runway extensions on ARZF airfields (see Chapter 2), with more frequent rotations and patrols of Tu-160, Tu-95MS,³²⁴ and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers across Severomorsk, Vorkuta, Tiksi, and Nagurskoye. Refueling capabilities with long-range aviation assets are further extending the operational range of Russian tactical airwings and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA).³²⁵

Considering existing gaps, Russia is improving MPA capabilities for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations with a mix of Tu-142 and Il-38 aircraft as well as Ka-27, Ka-28, and Ka-31 helicopters across both sides of the Arctic. ASW operations are prevalent in the Barents Sea area. In 2024, Tu-142 long-range anti-submarine aircraft began patrolling the NSR, officially for SAR purposes and ice reconnaissance. Training includes extending their operational range, with the longest flight conducted in March 2024 over the Pacific Arctic.³²⁶

Finally, the Russian armed forces still face a shortage of Arctic-specific airlift and sealift capabilities, especially of military transport aircraft such as the An-12 and An-26. While strategic aviation can now increasingly depend on the runway extensions, the situation remains more challenging for deploying Airborne Assault Troops (VDV). Spearhead troops in the Arctic include the 76th Guards Air Assault Division (Pskov) and the 98th (Ivanovo) Guards Airborne Division, both of which specialize in Arctic operations and safeguarding Kola Peninsula installations.³²⁷

Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, VDV troops were frequently deployed in the Arctic for operational training, including near the North Pole. Such deployments, however, have become less frequent since 2022, given the high rate of VDV troop losses in Ukraine and their mobilization for the war effort.

Arctic Drones

Aerial drones have become an integral part of Arctic defensive and offensive capabilities, with the first UAV unit set up in 2015 at the Anadyr-Ugolny airbase in Chukotka. Since then, the Northern and Pacific Fleets have created dedicated drone units. Lately, in August 2025, the Pacific Fleet established a drone control center in Kamchatka for Forpost and Inokhodets/Orion ISR and attack UAVs.³²⁸ Recently, rumors surfaced of a drone launchpad being built at the decommissioned Girvas airfield in Karelia,³²⁹ though this has not been substantiated.

Operational experience in Ukraine has informed the deployment of UAVs in an Arctic context and streamlined their integration into Arctic-specific concepts of operation. This relates to the following missions:

• Maritime domain awareness with the deployment of ISR drones to patrol and protect the AZRF and the NSR,
• Maritime patrol along the NSR, and especially for anti-submarine warfare purposes,³³⁰
• Base security on the Kola Peninsula and in Kamchatka to protect the sea-based nuclear deterrent, notably with drone countermeasures and EW capabilities,³³¹
• Strike drones, especially FPV drones, to support air-defense, coastal defense, and base security,³³²
• Military logistics and infrastructure support to resupply AZRF bases.

Drones are built specifically for Arctic conditions, including winterized drones such as the Inokhodets/Orion and Forpost Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) drones, as well as the medium-range Orlan-10. They are Arctic-hardened with anti-icing systems, more resilient batteries to maintain operational range in the harsh climate, and sensors adapted to blizzards and polar night conditions.³³³ UAVs are also tested on icebreakers for ship-based ISR and ice reconnaissance.³³⁴

Troops are consistently training to fly drones in cold weather conditions for ISR³³⁵ and strike operations.³³⁶ Training is increasingly conducted with operators who have combat experience from Ukraine and who are dispatched across the Northern and Pacific Fleets.³³⁷ Rosgvardia is also training with FPV drones in Arctic conditions, notably with loitering drones to eliminate simulated “armed saboteurs”.³³⁸

In January 2026, the Northern Fleet announced plans to create specialized underwater counter-sabotage units trained to repel foreign sabotage efforts targeting Russian naval infrastructure and coastal deployment sites. Combat swimmer units will be deployed to key naval infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula and along the NSR, supported by surveillance and loitering drones.³³⁹

The formation in 2025 of a dedicated, separate military branch for UAVs, the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces,³⁴⁰ will further reflect lessons learned in Ukraine and inform the future deployment of drone capabilities in the Arctic.

In the future, the Russian armed forces are likely to consider ISR drones the primary operational enabler for maritime domain awareness (MDA) and aerial reconnaissance. Moscow envisions establishing an extensive infrastructure network of ISR drones to protect the AZRF and the NSR, with plans to open several drone bases across the region.³⁴¹

Moscow will likely prioritize the creation of this vast network of drones to operate across all ranges, from tactical UAVs to MALE and High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) drones, within the AZRF. The endeavor will take time and resources that may become scarce in the context of the war against Ukraine and the impact of international sanctions.

Although crewed patrols will remain the defining feature of Russia’s presence in the AZRF at sea and in the air, the Kremlin will need to increasingly balance a costly and militarily vulnerable human presence with the development of uncrewed, round-the-clock patrols.

Overall, Russian ambitions in the air domain continue to pose a credible threat to US and NATO interests on both sides of the Arctic. The Kremlin has also grown more aggressive in its intention to use air assets to defend the Arctic.³⁴² As tactical and long-range aviation assets now benefit from increased operational ranges, the protection of distant Arctic US and NATO assets such as air stations in Norway, the Keflavik naval air station in Iceland, the Pituffik space base in Greenland, and the Eielson Air Force Base Alaska is more critical than ever.³⁴³

Air Defense and Bastion Defense

In the early phases of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian armed forces relocated several units of air defense systems (including Tor-M2DT and S-400s) that had been reportedly earmarked for the Arctic and Rogachevo (Novaya Zemlya) in particular.³⁴⁴ Yet this redeployment does not imply a weakening of Russia’s multi-layered protective dome in the High North. 

What weakened Russian air defense, however, was the successful Ukrainian drone strikes against the Olenya base. The strikes damaged Russia’s deterrence credibility and increased Moscow’s sense of conventional vulnerability in the Arctic. From a tactical standpoint, the VKS and naval aviation units had to disperse their air assets across regional airfields, as well as build covers, deploy additional EW countermeasures, and invest in anti-drone warfare capabilities to improve their survivability against regular Ukrainian drone strike campaigns.

From a strategic perspective, the Ukrainian drone strikes metaphorically “burst the Bastion” of the multi-layered air defense protective dome around the Kola Peninsula. Ukrainian successes in intercepting Russian missiles since the start of the full-scale invasion also increase the permeability of Russia’s Arctic A2/AD apparatus.

The Bastion Defense concept is a Soviet-inherited strategy designed to protect and ensure the survivability of the sea-based nuclear deterrent located on the Kola Peninsula. It was primarily created to secure missile submarines traveling to and from their bases on Kola. Since Moscow’s reinvestment in the Arctic, a multi-layered protective dome of air defense, sea-denial, and coastal defense systems has been deployed around Kola as well as around key chokepoints of the AZRF and the NSR.³⁴⁵

By establishing an interdiction perimeter, the Bastion enhances Russia’s ability to impose costs on access to the AZRF and ensures defense in depth by projecting interdiction capabilities. This strategy degrades the operational environment for potential enemies and overall maintains near-sea control. The impact of climate change on the AZRF, along with increased human presence in the Arctic, heightens the importance of the Kola Bastion Defense concept for Russia, as well as the necessity for the Northern Fleet to safeguard the sea-based nuclear deterrent.

Yet Moscow somewhat adapted the Bastion concept in the context of the war against Ukraine and the potential for increased human access to the AZRF.³⁴⁶ As mentioned in Chapter 4, SSBNs train for under-ice operations, as they learn to operate beyond the Kola Bastion (as well as the protection of the A2/AD protective dome in Kamchatka), as well as unsupported by the surface fleets. Meanwhile, the Northern Fleet has the ambition to be more than a mere “Bastion guardian”, especially considering the presence of combat icebreakers for light-ice power projection across the region.

In the context of the Leningrad MD, the newly formed 45^th Air Force and Air Defense Army incorporated the air defense units forming the bulk of the Kola Bastion. These include the 1^st Air Defense Division, with three regiments spread across Gadzhiyevo, Severodvinsk, and Olenegorsk, as well as the 3^rd Air Defense Division, with units at Rogachevo, Tiksi, and Nagurskoye.

A separate missile brigade equipped with Iskander-M missile systems was reportedly formed in Karelia, near the Finnish border – although few details have yet emerged.³⁴⁷ Moscow also

emphasizes strengthening the Arkhangelsk Air Defense Sector, which covers approaches to the North Pole in the central Arctic.³⁴⁸

In the Pacific Arctic, the network of A2/AD capabilities is not as extensive as on the Kola Peninsula. The sea-based nuclear deterrent, located in Vilyuchinsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, is protected by a series of regional coastal and near-sea defenses covering Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk as part of a Kuril-Chukchi defensive line.³⁴⁹ These deployments, however, are far from constituting an “Okhotsk Bastion” and only display limited ambitions of control and denial.³⁵⁰

Although Ukrainian drone strikes may have somewhat diminished the credibility of the Bastion in the High North, Russia’s Arctic A2/AD protective dome remains a robust network of multi-layered interdiction capabilities across the AZRF. Most land-based systems deployed in the region have been adapted to operate in Arctic conditions and combine:

• Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) with long-range S-300 and S-400 SAMs,
• Short-range surface-to-air anti-aircraft capabilities with Pantsir-SA and Tor-M2DT, either fixed or road-mobile with the DT-30PM chassis,³⁵¹
• Anti-ship capabilities with P-800 Oniks medium-range missile systems,
• Coastal defense with K-300 Bastion (stationary Bastion-S and mobile Bastion-P)equipped with Oniks missiles as well 4K51 Rubezh systems.

As they can operate with limited support, Pantsir-SA and Tor-M2DT systems have been deployed across the remote Arctic archipelagos to protect airfields, radar stations, and the support infrastructure.⁶⁶

Russia’s Arctic air defense system is further strengthened by a strong network of radar, electronic warfare (EW), and support capabilities. Early-warning radar systems include:

• Rezonans-N long-range radar and detection complexes have been deployed since 2017 around Kola and the archipelagos. Rezonans offers advanced over-the-horizon coverage, including for hypersonic missiles and UAV detection,³⁵²
• Sopka-2 S-band radars have been deployed since 2016 across the bases and airfields in the AZRF. They are essential to Russia’s ISR capabilities in the NSR, especially airspace control.
• Voronezh early-warning radar system for long-range monitoring.⁵⁹

As Russia’s surveillance and A2/AD network tightens along the AZRF, gaps in radar coverage in the central and eastern Arctic that previously existed may have been closed, ensuring continuous and comprehensive radar coverage.

EW and counter-EW capabilities complement the A2/AD network. At least three EW centers exist in Severomorsk, Kamchatka, and the Primorsky Krai.³⁵³ Several systems are hardened to Arctic conditions, including the Murmansk-BN complex with R-330Zh Zhitel and Krasukha-4 jamming systems. Leningrad MD ground forces regularly train with EW systems, especially along the borders with Finland and Norway.³⁵⁴

The air defense network is enhanced by space-based capabilities connected to the GLONASS GNSS network. Recently launched dual-use satellites dedicated to the Arctic aim to improve regional coverage in these challenging latitudes. These include the Meridian-M communications satellites and the Arktika-M weather satellites, which were activated in 2024³⁵⁵ after two successful launches in 2021 and 2023. The Arktika constellation is planned to have 10 satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO) in the near future, but with only two more to be launched by 2031.³⁵⁶

Recently, Moscow has been actively working on revamping the Soviet-inherited Harmony undersea surveillance system. Some parts of this ASW and domain awareness network have been reactivated between the Kola Peninsula, Novaya Zemlya, and Franz Josef Land.³⁵⁷

Overall, while the Aerospace Forces benefit from greater Arctic access through expanded runways, modernized aircraft, and growing drone use, Ukrainian strikes on the Olenya base exposed critical weaknesses in the Bastion Defense concept. These attacks forced dispersion, prompted additional protective measures, and undermined the aura of an “impenetrable” Arctic air defense network. To do so, the armed forces are increasingly using the Arctic as a testing ground for various modern cold-weather technologies as part of the regional ISR architecture.³⁵⁸

Moscow will likely continue to invest in layered air defense and long-range strike capabilities, while remaining a credible regional threat doing so. Yet the need to adapt doctrine and infrastructure underscores that Russia’s confidence in regional air and missile dominance is increasingly challenged by practical exposure.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Russian authorities are vindicated but more vulnerable in the Arctic, a region where Moscow once held strategic dominance. Considering the consequences of the war against Ukraine, all operational domains of war have shown limitations that will continue to restrict Russian ambitions in the region, as military forces continue to decline in strength. Overall, the next few years might see a form of creeping demilitarization of Russia’s posture in the Arctic.³⁵⁹

Yet the Kremlin has learned lessons from the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and has begun to adapt. Russia’s Arctic has now become a fortress, a frontline, and a contested space filled with low-intensity-warfare operations. The current retreat toward territorial defense and near-sea control reflects Russia’s ongoing ambitions to turn the AZRF into a fortress in a changing Arctic. However, this retrenchment should not lead to Western policy complacency: Russia’s posture in the Arctic is not defensive. Moscow is preparing for all contingencies there, including what is increasingly seen as an inevitable conflict with NATO.

This “new normal” for the Kremlin only heightens the risk of miscalculation from accidents, incidents, and tactical errors.³⁶⁰ The situation is worsened by the stasis of the Arctic Council as the main regional cooperative framework and by the Kremlin’s willingness to take risks and its overall lack of military restraint. 

The silver lining, however, is that there is little interest for the Kremlin to over-escalate in the Arctic, let alone risk losing control and facing military escalation in a region Moscow seeks to remove tension from. The Kremlin prefers a stable and predictable Arctic, to avoid military confrontation there, and to prevent being overextended from a conventional point of view. With the war against Ukraine and the “NATO/Arctic 7” in mind, it is actually in Russia’s interest to demonstrate conventional restraint – regardless of the intensity of sub-threshold and grey zone activities.

In the context of the shifting US presence,³⁶¹ this situation has direct implications for the US homeland in the Pacific Arctic and for US forward defense in the European High North. In the Pacific Arctic, security issues in the Bering Sea and around the Aleutian Islands are becoming a new point of contention between the US and Canada on one side, and Russia and China on the other.

In Europe, Moscow’s retrenchment has established a new frontline with NATO between the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea, a region where Russian forces will fight for near-sea control. This situation will make it harder for the US and NATO to access and operate in that part of the Arctic.³⁶²

If Russia represents less of a conventional threat, at least for the time being, it also means that Moscow will continue to rely on both ends of the military spectrum, with nuclear saber-rattling on the one hand, and continuous low-intensity-warfare operations on the other.

The US and NATO allies must also evaluate the role and strategic importance of the Arctic, especially the European High North, from the perspective of burden sharing, combatant command, domain awareness, forward deployments, and Arctic-hardened military technology.³⁶³ Much work still needs to be done to achieve integrated Arctic deterrence and technological dominance over Russia, and eventually China.

Acknowledgments

First, and most importantly, to my daughter Mina. Petite plume, maybe you will read this in the future, out of curiosity or interest.

The author is grateful to Pavel Baev, Troy Bouffard, and Njord Wegge, the kind peer reviewers who offered constructive comments to improve the first draft into a (hopefully) better paper.

At CEPA, credit is due, as ever, to Catherine Sendak and Christopher Walker for their suggestions at various stages of the paper. Huge thanks to Noah Greene for making the publication process as smooth as possible, Peter Roberto and Michael Newton for making sense of my crazy map ideas, and Nadya Sagner for editing the report. Finally, the author is grateful to the Russia Strategic Initiative of US European Command for its support in making this publication possible and for its continued backing of my research.

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75. “Rosatom May Test Reactor-Powered Missile over the Next Few Days.” The Barents Observer. August 7, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/rosatom-may-test-reactorpowered-missile-over-the-next-few-days/434546. [↩]
76. Lysenko, Mikhail N., Alexander N. Vylegzhanin, and Oran R. Young. “Nuclear Safety and Security in the Arctic: Crafting an Effective Regional Governance System.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13 (2022). [↩]
77. Nikitin, Alexander. Eliminating Russia’s Nuclear Legacy: Problems and Prospects in the Context of the Military Conflict (2022–2025). Bellona Foundation, November 2025. [↩]
78. Goodman, Sherri, and Katarina Kertysova. “The Nuclearisation of the Russian Arctic: New Reactors, New Risks.” European Leadership Network, June 26, 2020. [↩]
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80. Åtland, Kristian, Thomas Nilsen, and Torbjørn Pedersen. “Bolstering the Bastion: The Changing Pattern of Russia’s Military Exercises in the High North.” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 7, no. 1 (2024): 145–160. [↩]
81. “Northern Fleet Shows Off Along Kola Coast.” The Barents Observer. May 28, 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/northern-fleet-shows-off-along-kola-coast/165197. [↩]
82. “Russian Cruiser Fires Artillery Few Kilometres from Border to Norway.” The Barents Observer. April 15, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-cruiser-fires-artillery-few-kilometres-from-border-to-norway/428280. [↩]
83. “Фрегат ‘Адмирал Головко’ выполнил зенитно-ракетные стрельбы в Баренцевом море” [Frigate ‘Admiral Golovko’ Completed Anti-Aircraft Missile Firings in the Barents Sea]. TASS. October 10, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/926388_fregat_admiral_golovko_vypolnil_zenitno-raketnye_strelby_v_barencevom_more.html. [↩]
84. “Ракетный крейсер ‘Маршал Устинов’ отработал удары по противнику” [Missile Cruiser ‘Marshal Ustinov’ Practiced Strikes on Enemy]. TASS. August 18, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1041818_raketnyi_kreiser_marshal_ustinov_otrabotal_udary_po_protivniku.html. [↩]
85. “Подводные лодки Северного флота провели учебную дуэль в Баренцевом море” [Northern Fleet Submarines Conducted Training Duel in the Barents Sea]. Izvestia. February 21, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/828136_podvodnye_lodki_severnogo_flota_proveli_uchebnuyu_duel_v_barencevom_more.html; “Two Nuclear Submarines Shot Missiles in Barents Sea.” The Barents Observer. June 20, 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/two-nuclear-submarines-shot-missiles-in-barents-sea/165653; “Russia Trains Coastal Attack Scenario 30 km from Border with Norway.” The Barents Observer. September 16, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russia-trains-coastal-attack-scenario-30-km-from-border-with-norway/437119. [↩]
86. “Северный флот выполнил ракетные стрельбы на учениях в Арктике” [Northern Fleet Conducted Missile Firings During Arctic Exercises]. Interfax. March 10, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/983881_severnyi_flot_vypolnil_raketnye_strelby_na_ucheniyah_v_arktike.html; “Russia Locates Major Naval Exercise in Previous Disputed Area of the Barents Sea.” The Barents Observer. July 23, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russia-locates-major-naval-exercise-in-previous-disputed-area-of-the-barents-sea/433793. [↩]
87. “В Баренцевом море развернули силы Северного флота в рамках учений ВМФ России” [Northern Fleet Forces Deployed in the Barents Sea During Russian Navy Exercises]. TASS. July 31, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/895991_v_barencevom_more_razvernuli_sily_severnogo_flota_v_ramkah_uchenii_vmf_rossii.html. [↩]
88. “Корабль Севфлота поразил торпедой подлодку противника на учениях в Баренцевом море” [Northern Fleet Ship Hit Enemy Submarine with Torpedo During Barents Sea Exercise]. TASS. December 31, 2023. https://vpk.name/news/807408_korabl_sevflota_porazil_torpedoi_podlodku_protivnika_na_ucheniyah_v_barencevom_more.html; “Корабль Северного флота провел стрельбы в Баренцевом море” [Northern Fleet Ship Conducted Firings in the Barents Sea]. TASS. October 31, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/848316_korabl_severnogo_flota_provel_strelby_in_barencevom_more.html. [↩]
89. “БПК ‘Адмирал Левченко’ выполнил поиск чужой субмарины в Баренцевом море” [ASW Ship ‘Admiral Levchenko’ Searched for Foreign Submarine in the Barents Sea]. TASS. October 31, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/934707_bpk_admiral_levchenko_vypolnil_poisk_chuzhoi_submariny_v_barencevom_more.html. [↩]
90. “Противолодочные вертолеты Северного флота отработали поиск субмарин в Баренцевом море” [Northern Fleet ASW Helicopters Practiced Submarine Search in the Barents Sea]. TASS. July 12, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/888388_protivolodochnye_vertolety_severnogo_flota_otrabotali_poisk_submarin_v_barencevom_more.html. [↩]
91. “Самолеты Ил-38 отработали противолодочные задачи над акваторией Баренцева моря” [Il-38 Aircraft Practiced ASW Tasks Over the Barents Sea]. TASS.  January 13, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/962449_samolety_il-38_otrabotali_protivolodochnye_zadachi_nad_akvatoriei_barenceva_morya.html; [↩]
92. “Фрегат ‘Адмирал Головко’ уничтожил ударный дрон в Баренцевом море” [Frigate ‘Admiral Golovko’ Destroyed Strike Drone in the Barents Sea]. RIA Novosti. September 25, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/920437_fregat_admiral_golovko_unichtozhil_udarnyi_dron_v_barencevom_more.html. [↩]
93. “Северный флот парирует все военные угрозы в операционной зоне” [Northern Fleet Counters All Military Threats in its Operational Zone]. TASS. May 16, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1009262_severnyi_flot_pariruet_vse_voennye_ugrozy_v_operacionnoi_zone.html. [↩]
94. “Kuznetsov’s Carrier Air Wing Pilots Learn to Target Long-Range Drones in Barents Sea Combat Drill.” The Barents Observer. July 27, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/kuznetsovs-carrier-air-wing-pilots-learn-to-target-longrange-drones-in-barents-sea-combat-drill/433971. [↩]
95. “Marines that Spread Terror in Kherson Train New Warriors on Fields of Pechenga.” The Barents Observer. June 25, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/marines-that-spread-terror-in-kherson-train-new-warriors-on-fields-of-pechenga/432130. [↩]
96. “Лед и знамя: заявления США о Гренландии ускоряют милитаризацию Арктики” [Ice and Banner: US Statements on Greenland Accelerate Arctic Militarization]. Izvestia. January 15, 2026. https://iz.ru/2024826/daniil-sechkin/led-i-znamia-zaiavleniia-ssha-o-grenlandii-uskoriaiut-militarizatciiu-arktiki. [↩]
97. Kosachev, Konstantin. Telegram. Kosachev62. January 22, 2026. https://t.me/Kosachev62/2099. [↩]
98. “Putin says who owns Greenland is no concern Russia, says it might be worth $1 billion.” Reuters. January 22, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-who-owns-greenland-is-no-concern-russia-says-it-might-be-worth-1-2026-01-22/. [↩]
99. “Ryabkov: Russia is ready to provide an adequate response to the US pumping weapons into Greenland.” TASS. February 3, 2026. https://tass.ru/politika/26327481. [↩]
100. NATO – Combined Air Operations Centre Uedem, https://ac.nato.int/about/caoc/uedem [↩]
101. Myklebost, Kari Aga, Stian Bones, and Thomas Nilsen. Hybrid Threats in High Latitudes: Facing Russia on Svalbard. Hybrid CoE Paper 26. Helsinki: European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, December 2025. [↩]
102. Østhagen, Andreas. “The Myths of Svalbard Geopolitics: An Arctic Case Study.” Marine Policy 167 (2024); Myklebost, Kari Aga, Stian Bones, and Thomas Nilsen, op. cit.; Buchanan, Elizabeth, and Mathieu Boulègue. “Is Russia Preparing for an Invasion of This Important Piece of the Arctic?” The National Interest, October 2019. [↩]
103. “The Northern Fleet: the nuclear missile shield of the Russian Arctic.” Zvezda Weekly. February 6, 2023. https://zvezdaweekly.ru/news/2023231226-pl0BF.html. [↩]
104. United Nations. Law of the Sea Convention, Part XII – Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment. New York: United Nations, 2022. [↩]
105. Boulègue, Mathieu. “The Arctic Component of Russia’s New Maritime Doctrine.” Polar Points no. 17. Wilson Center Polar Institute, November 2022. [↩]
106. “Russia Ramps Up Arctic Route Ambitions.” The Moscow Times. December 5, 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/12/05/russia-ramps-up-arctic-route-ambitions-a83325. [↩]
107. Bouffard, Troy J., Gennaro D’Angelo, Gabrielle F. Gundry, Travis R. Pitts, Stephen F. Price, and Andrew F. Roberts. “Russian Ambitions to Control Freedom of Navigation and Arctic Access.” Arctic Yearbook (2025). [↩]
108. Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2022, http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/xBBH7DL0RicfdtdWPol32UekiLMTAycW.pdf. [↩]
109. President of Russia. “A legal regime has been established for the entry of foreign military ships and other vessels operated for non-commercial purposes into the internal sea waters of the Russian Federation in the waters of the Northern Sea Route.” Kremlin.ru. December 5, 2022. http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/70018; “The Federation Council has ordered foreign military vessels to notify Russia 90 days in advance of their passage along the Northern Sea Route.” TASS. November 30, 2022. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/16462331. [↩]
110. Overfield, Cornell. “Wrangling Warships: Russia’s Proposed Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation.” Lawfare, October 17, 2022. [↩]
111. United Nations. Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary. June 1, 1990, https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/USA-RUS1990MB.PDF. [↩]
112. Thatcher, Iris. “Mitigating Transboundary Risks in the Bering Strait.” Polar Points, no. 18. Polar Institute, Wilson Center, January 9, 2023; Kaczynski; op. cit. [↩]
113. United States. White House. 2023. National Strategy for the Arctic Region: Implementation Plan. Washington, DC: White House. [↩]
114. “American Coast Guard Vessel is Sailing into Russian Arctic Waters.” The Barents Observer. September 18, 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/09/american-coast-guard-vessel-sailing-russian-arctic-waters-almost-same-time-moscow. [↩]
115. The Outer Limits of the Extended Continental Shelf of the United States of America, US Extended Continental Shelf Project, US Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ECS_Executive_Summary.pdf; Bloom, Evan T. “Five Takeaways from the US Continental Shelf Announcement.” Polar Points. Wilson Center, January 3, 2024. [↩]
116. In particular the gate of the Kara Sea and Novaya Zemlya at the European entrance of the NSR, the Vilkitskii Strait by Severnaya Zemlya, the Sannikov and Laptev Straits by the East Siberian Islands, around Wrangel Island, and by the Bering Strait. [↩]
117. “The West has intensified its confrontation with Russia in the Arctic.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. December 11, 2023. https://www.ng.ru/ng_energiya/2023-12-11/13_8899_arctic.html; “Northern Fleet to Increase Presence in the Arctic Region.” Izvestia. December 7, 2023. https://iz.ru/1616980/2023-12-07/severnyi-flot-uvelichit-prisutstvie-v-arkticheskom-regione. [↩]
118. “The Russian Navy conducted exercises with the launch of the Kalibr missile.” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye. October 5, 2023. https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2023-10-05/8_1256_fleet.html; “Russian Defense Ministry Reported Fleet Maneuvers in the Chukchi and Bering Seas with the Participation of 10,000 Military Personnel.” Interfax. September 19, 2023. https://vpk.name/news/774031_minoborony_rf_soobshilo_o_manevrah_flota_v_chukotskom_i_beringovom_moryah_s_uchastiem_10_tys_voennyh.html; “Arctic Group of the Northern Fleet Set Out on a Voyage Through the Seas of the Arctic Ocean.” TASS. August 4, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/898119_arkticheskaya_gruppirovka_severnogo_flota_vyshla_v_pohod_po_moryam_severnogo_ledovitogo_okeana.html; “Command-Staff Exercise on Troop Management Began in the Northern Fleet.” TASS. April 9, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/996569_na_severnom_flote_nachalas_komandno-shtabnaya_trenirovka_po_upravleniyu_voiskami.html [↩]
119. “Pacific Ocean Maneuvers: How It Happened.” Zvezda Weekly. April 24, 2023. https://zvezdaweekly.ru/news/20234241113-Xd83s.html; “Russia Showed How It Will Defend the Kurils.” Vzglyad. April 17, 2023. https://vpk.name/news/707960_rossiya_pokazala_kak_budet_zashishat_kurily.html. [↩]
120. “Northern Fleet Conducted Exercises to Ensure the Protection of Russia’s Interests in the Arctic.” TASS. August 29, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1045966_severnyi_flot_provel_ucheniya_po_obespecheniyu_zashity_interesov_rossii_v_arktike.html [↩]
121. “The defense of Russia’s island territories and Arctic coast will be practiced during exercises.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta. September 18, 2023. https://www.ng.ru/politics/2023-09-18/2_8829_news1.html. [↩]
122. “Detachment of Northern Fleet Ships Completed Long-Range Voyage in the Arctic.” TASS. October 22, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/931128_otryad_korablei_severnogo_flota_zavershil_dalnii_pohod_v_arktike.html; “Arctic Group of the Northern Fleet Set Out on a Voyage Through the Seas of the Arctic Ocean.” TASS. August 6, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/898119_arkticheskaya_gruppirovka_severnogo_flota_vyshla_v_pohod_po_moryam_severnogo_ledovitogo_okeana.html. [↩]
123. “Russian Defense Ministry Reported Fleet Maneuvers in the Chukchi and Bering Seas with the Participation of 10,000 Military Personnel.” Interfax. September 19, 2023. https://vpk.name/news/774031_minoborony_rf_soobshilo_o_manevrah_flota_v_chukotskom_i_beringovom_moryah_s_uchastiem_10_tys_voennyh.html. [↩]
124. “The Ministry of Defense and the Federal Security Service have developed a plan to counter provocations on the Northern Sea Route.” Kommersant. December 3, 2022. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5705728. [↩]
125. “Polar Hook: Why NATO is Conducting Exercises in the Arctic.” Izvestia. May 20, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/839946_polyarnyi_kryuk_dlya_chego_nato_provodit_ucheniya_v_arktike.html. [↩]
126. “Moscow Aims for Another Grab; Navy Chief Says Russia Will Expand Arctic Ocean.” The Barents Observer. December 7, 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2023/12/moscow-aims-another-grab-navy-chief-says-russia-will-expand-arctic-ocean. [↩]
127. “Fight for the North: NATO Tests the Northern Sea Route.” Gazeta.ru. September 8, 2020. https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2020/09/08/13241528.shtml. [↩]
128. “Military Expert Explained NATO’s Goals to Strengthen Presence in the Arctic.” Izvestia. August 29, 2022. https://iz.ru/1386988/2022-08-29/voennyi-ekspert-obiasnil-tceli-nato-po-usileniiu-prisutstviia-v-arktike. [↩]
129. “Combat Icebreaker Will Defend Russian Interests in the Arctic.” Vzglyad. April 25, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/855914_boevoi_ledokol_budet_otstaivat_rossiiskie_interesy_v_arktike.html. For more analysis, see Sukhankin (2025), Canadian Maritime Security Network, op. cit. [↩]
130. Zysk, Katarzyna, and Rebecca Pincus. “Getting Sporty in Russia’s Arctic.” War on the Rocks, October 2023. [↩]
131. “Russian Anti-Sub Aircraft on Combat Training Further South in the GIUK Gap Than Normal.” The Barents Observer. February 29, 2020. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-antisub-aircraft-on-combat-training-further-south-in-the-giuk-gap-than-normal/123355. [↩]
132. “Russia launches artillery shooting next to maritime border with Norway”. The Barents Observer: February 17, 2026. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russia-launches-artillery-shooting-next-to-maritime-border-with-norway/445387. [↩]
133. “Russian Bombers Outside Finnmark Ahead of Exercise Nordic Response.” The Barents Observer. February 12, 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russian-bombers-outside-finnmark-ahead-of-exercise-nordic-response/164895; “Russia Keeps Close Eyes on Nordic Response as NATO Expands in the North.” The Barents Observer. March 6, 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russia-keeps-close-eyes-on-nordic-response-as-nato-expands-in-the-north/165526; “Russia Trains Coastal Attack Scenario 30 km From Border with Norway.” The Barents Observer. September 16, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russia-trains-coastal-attack-scenario-30-km-from-border-with-norway/437119. [↩]
134. Suciu, Peter. “Russia’s Tu-160 White Swans are Keeping Watch Over the Arctic.” The National Interest. January 31, 2025. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-tu-160-white-swans-are-keeping-watch-over-the-arctic. [↩]
135. “Two Russian Tu-95MS Missile Carriers Performed Patrols Over the Sea of Okhotsk.” Izvestia. February 15, 2023. https://iz.ru/1470387/2023-02-15/dva-rossiiskikh-raketonostca-tu-95ms-vypolnili-patrulirovanie-nad-okhotskim-morem; “Russian Warplanes Spotted and Tracked Flying Near Alaska Again, NORAD Says.” CBS News. July 23, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-aircraft-spotted-and-tracked-flying-near-alaska-again-norad-says/; “Russian Military Aircraft Detected Off Alaska Defense Zone.” ABC News. April 15, 2025. https://abcnews.go.com/US/russian-military-aircraft-detected-off-alaska-defense-zone/story?id=120814746. [↩]
136. “NORAD Detects and Tracks Russian Aircraft Operating in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone.” NORAD. August 26, 2025. https://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Article/4287240/norad-detects-and-tracks-russian-aircraft-operating-in-the-alaskan-air-defense/; “NORAD Detects and Tracks Russian Aircraft Operating in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone.” NORAD. September 15, 2024. https://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Article/4314460/norad-detects-and-tracks-russian-aircraft-operating-in-the-alaskan-air-defense/; “NORAD Detects, Tracks and Intercepts Russian and PRC Aircraft Operating in the Alaska ADIZ.” NORAD. July 24, 2024. https://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Article/3849184/norad-detects-tracks-and-intercepts-russian-and-prc-aircraft-operating-in-the-a/. [↩]
137. “US Air Force B-1B Bombers on Barents Sea Mission Met by Russian Fighter Jet.” The Barents Observer. March 24, 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/us-air-force-b1b-bombers-on-barents-sea-mission-met-by-russian-fighter-jet/165920. [↩]
138. “MiG-29K Fighters of the Northern Fleet Practiced Air Combat in the Clouds.” TASS. April 16, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/851728_istrebiteli_mig-29k_severnogo_flota_otrabotali_vozdushnyi_boi_v_oblakah.html. [↩]
139. Friis, op. cit. [↩]
140. “F-35s Intercept Russian Maritime Patrol Aircraft Came Near Carrier Group.” The Barents Observer. October 6, 2023. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/10/f-35s-intercept-russian-maritime-patrol-aircraft-came-near-carrier-group; “Prime Minister Støre: Russian Aircraft Violated Norwegian Airspace.” The Barents Observer. September 23, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/prime-minister-store-russian-aircraft-violated-norwegian-airspace/437576; “Norway Joins NATO’s Condemnation of Russian Violation of Allied Airspace.” Regjeringen.no. September 23, 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/norge-slutter-seg-til-natos-fordommelse-av-russisk-krenkelse-av-alliert-luftrom/id3119874/. [↩]
141. “Russian Plane Draws Shots from South Korea in First Air Patrol with China”. Russia Matters. July 2019. https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/russian-plane-draws-shots-south-korea-first-air-patrol-china-belfer-experts-weigh [↩]
142. “Northern Fleet Practiced Landing on Enemy Territory in the Arctic.” TASS. September 11, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1050133_severnyi_flot_otrabotal_provedenie_vysadki_na_territoriyu_protivnika_v_arktike.html. [↩]
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     Second, the procurement of the Yasen-M-class (Project 855M) of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), ((“Атомный подводный крейсер ‘Пермь’ в море” [Nuclear-Powered Submarine Cruiser ‘Perm’ at Sea]. BMPD. September 2, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1046484_atomnyi_podvodnyi_kreiser_perm_v_more.html. [↩]

305. “В пункт базирования на Северный флот прибыл атомный подводный крейсер ‘Архангельск'” [Nuclear Submarine Cruiser ‘Arkhangelsk’ Arrived at Northern Fleet Base]. Izvestia. January 28, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/968288_v_punkt_bazirovaniya_na_severnyi_flot_pribyl_atomnyi_podvodnyi_kreiser_arhangelsk.html. [↩]
306. “Атомный подводный крейсер ‘Архангельск’ введен в строй ВМФ России” [Nuclear Submarine Cruiser ‘Arkhangelsk’ Commissioned into Russian Navy]. BMPD. December 30, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/959263_atomnyi_podvodnyi_kreiser_arhangelsk_vveden_v_stroi_vmf_rossii.html; “Nuclear Submarine Arkhangelsk Arrived at the Northern Fleet.” RIA Novosti. January 28, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/968433_atomnyi_podvodnyi_kreiser_arhangelsk_pribyl_na_severnyi_flot.html. [↩]
307. “Nuclear-Powered Multipurpose Submarine Perm Heads Out for Sea Trials.” The Barents Observer. August 25, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/nuclearpowered-multipurpose-submarine-perm-heads-out-for-sea-trials/435505; “Nuclear Submarine Perm at Sea.” BMPD. August 14, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1046484_atomnyi_podvodnyi_kreiser_perm_v_more.html; [↩]
308. Weichert, Brandon. “How Russia’s New Perm Submarine Could Dominate Arctic Circle.” The National Interest. August 28, 2025. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-russias-new-perm-submarine-could-dominate-arctic-circle-bw-082825. [↩]
309. “Стратегический вызов: строящиеся российские подлодки напугали НАТО” [Strategic Challenge: Russian Submarines Under Construction Frightened NATO]. VPK News. December 7, 2023. https://vpk.name/news/802581_strategicheskii_vyzov_stroyashiesya_rossiiskie_podlodki_napugali_nato.html. [↩]
310. “Глубокое перевооружение: как идет обновление подводного флота на Дальнем Востоке” [Deep Rearmament: How the Submarine Fleet is Being Updated in the Far East]. Izvestia. March 31, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/992845_glubokoe_perevooruzhenie_kak_idet_obnovlenie_podvodnogo_flota_na_dalnem_vostoke.html. [↩]
311. Suciu, Peter. “Russian Navy Kilo-Class Sub Tests Firing of Kalibr Cruise Missile.” The National Interest. March 31, 2025. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-navy-kilo-class-sub-tests-firing-of-kalibr-cruise-missile. [↩]
312. “Укрепление по-тихому: дальневосточные рубежи защитит подлодка ‘Якутск'” [Strengthening Quietly: Submarine ‘Yakutsk’ to Protect Far Eastern Borders]. Izvestia. September 27, 2023. https://iz.ru/1579760/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/ukreplenie-po-tikhomu-dalnevostochnye-rubezhi-zashchitit-podlodka-iakutsk. [↩]
313. “Введена в строй подводная лодка ‘Якутск’ проекта 0636.3” [Project 0636.3 Submarine ‘Yakutsk’ Commissioned]. BMPD. June 16, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1019845_vvedena_v_stroi_podvodnaya_lodka_yakutsk_proekta_06363.html. [↩]
314. “New submarine for Northern Fleet will be named ‘Mariupol’”. The Barents Observer. July 10, 2023. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/new-submarine-for-northern-fleet-will-be-named-mariupol/163358 [↩]
315. “Источник назвал сроки возвращения в боевой состав Северного флота проходящей модернизацию АПЛ ‘Волк’ проекта 971” [Source Named Return Dates for Modernized Project 971 SSN ‘Volk’ to Northern Fleet]. Military Review. March 7, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/834076_istochnik_nazval_sroki_vozvrasheniya_v_boevoi_sostav_severnogo_flota_prohodyashei_modernizaciyu_apl_volk_proekta_971.html. [↩]
316. Exchange with Mariia Vladimyrovna during an online event on the NSR organized by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), March 2026. [↩]
317. Carlin, Maya. “Ukraine Delivered a Heavy Blow to Russia’s Tu-95 Bear Bomber.” The National Interest, June 8, 2025; Suciu, Peter. “Ukraine Launches Massive Drone Strike on Russian Air Bases.” The National Interest, June 1, 2025. [↩]
318. “Attack on Kyiv Children’s Hospital Likely Carried Out by Tu-95MS Olenya Airfield.” The Barents Observer. July 9, 2024. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/07/terror-attack-kyiv-childrens-hospital-most-likely-carried-out-bomber-olenya-airfield. [↩]
319. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Telegram post. May 3, 2025. https://t.me/mod_russia/52084. [↩]
320. “Ukrainian Drone Hit Tu-22M3 Bomber at Olenya Airfield, Intel Report Claims.” The Barents Observer. July 27, 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/ukrainian-drone-hit-tu22m3-bomber-at-olenya-airfield-intel-report-claims/166511; “Satellite Images from Olenya Show 4 Strategic Bombers Destroyed.” The Barents Observer. June 4, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/satellite-images-from-olenya-show-4-strategic-bombers-destroyed/431046. [↩]
321. “Два модернизированных перехватчика МиГ-31БМ будут нести боевое дежурство на Камчатке и в районах Крайнего Севера” [Two Modernized MiG-31BM Interceptors Will Perform Combat Duty in Kamchatka and Far North Regions]. Interfax. December 22, 2022. https://vpk.name/news/669371_dva_modernizirovannyh_perehvatchika_mig-31bm_budut_nesti_boevoe_dezhurstvo_na_kamchatke_i_v_raionah_krainego_severa.html. [↩]
322. “Two MiG-31K Armed with Ballistic Kinzhal Missiles Conduct Mock Strikes over the Barents Sea.” The Barents Observer. September 13, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/two-mig31k-armed-with-ballistic-kinzhal-missiles-conduct-mock-strikes-over-the-barents-seanbspnbsp/437006. [↩]
323. “Су-33 ВКС РФ впервые выполнили посадку и взлет с аэродромов на островах Северного Ледовитого океана” [Russian Su-33s Completed Landing and Takeoff from Arctic Ocean Island Airfields for the First Time]. Military Review. April 10, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/849397_su-33_vks_rf_vpervye_vypolnili_posadku_i_vzlet_s_aerodromov_na_ostrovah_severnogo_ledovitogo_okeana.html; “Летчики Северного флота установили несколько рекордов в Арктике” [Northern Fleet Pilots Set Several Records in the Arctic]. TASS. April 10, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/849281_letchiki_severnogo_flota_ustanovili_neskolko_rekordov_v_arktike.html. [↩]
324. “Минобороны РФ сообщило о патрулировании двух Ту-95МС над Баренцевым морем” [Russian MoD Reported Two Tu-95MS Patrolling Over the Barents Sea]. Interfax. May 21, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1010880_minoborony_rf_soobshilo_o_patrulirovanii_dvuh_tu-95ms_nad_barencevym_morem.html; “Ту-95МС пролетели над нейтральными водами Берингова и Охотского морей” [Tu-95MS Flew Over Neutral Waters of the Bering and Okhotsk Seas]. RIA Novosti. September 26, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1055998_tu-95ms_proleteli_nad_neitralnymi_vodami_beringova_i_ohotskogo_morei.html. [↩]
325. Kjellén (2026), op. cit. [↩]
326. “Ту-142МЗ морской авиации ТОФ выполнил полет на максимальную продолжительность нахождения в воздухе” [Pacific Fleet Naval Aviation Tu-142MZ Completed Maximum Duration Flight]. TSAMTO. March 25, 2024. https://vpk.name/news/841756_tu-142mz_morskoi_aviacii_tof_vypolnil_polet_na_maksimalnuyu_prodolzhitelnost_nahozhdeniya_v_vozduhe.html. [↩]
327. Kjellén (2022), op. cit. [↩]
328. “Камчатская игра: ВМФ развернул первый центр управления беспилотниками” [Kamchatka Game: Navy Deployed First Drone Control Center]. Izvestia. August 7, 2025. https://iz.ru/1932476/bogdan-stepovoi-roman-krecul/kamcatskaa-igra-vmf-razvernul-pervyi-centr-upravlenia-bespilotnikami. [↩]
329. “Satellite Images Prove it Takes Mere Months for Russia to Establish an Attack Drone Base from Scratch.” Baltic Sentinel. September 15, 2025. https://balticsentinel.eu/8323925/satellite-images-prove-that-it-takes-mere-months-for-russia-to-establish-an-attack-drone-base-from-scratch. [↩]
330. “Северный флот провел в Арктике учение по противодействию морским беспилотникам” [Northern Fleet Conducted Anti-Sea Drone Exercise in the Arctic]. Interfax. September 26, 2023. https://vpk.name/news/776718_severnyi_flot_provel_v_arktike_uchenie_po_protivodeistviyu_morskim_bespilotnikam.html. [↩]
331. “Drones Not Tanks on Russia’s Training Ranges along NATO Border.” The Barents Observer. November 12, 2024. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/drones-not-tanks-on-russias-training-ranges-along-nato-border/420299; “Поставили форпост: за Камчаткой и Севморпутем присмотрят беспилотники” [Forpost Drones Will Monitor Kamchatka and NSR]. Izvestia. April 12, 2024. https://iz.ru/1680779/aleksei-mikhailov-andrei-fedorov-vladimir-matveev/postavili-forpost-za-kamchatkoi-i-sevmorputem-prismotriat-bespilotniki. [↩]
332. “The Northern Fleet Held Training Sessions for Drone Operators.” SeverPost. January 30, 2026. https://severpost.ru/read/202507/; “На Северном флоте обучают операторов ударных беспилотников и FPV-дронов” [Northern Fleet Trains Strike and FPV Drone Operators]. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. October 10, 2024. https://rg.ru/2024/10/10/reg-szfo/na-severnom-flote-obuchaiut-operatorov-udarnyh-bespilotnikov-i-fpv-dronov.html. [↩]
333. “БПЛА ‘Орион’ сможет осуществлять разведку ледовой обстановки в Арктике и Антарктике” [‘Orion’ UAV Will be Able to Conduct Ice Reconnaissance in the Arctic and Antarctic]. Mashnews. October 11, 2021. https://mashnews.ru/bpla-orion-smozhet-osushhestvlyat-razvedku-ledovoj-obstanovki-v-arktike-i-antarktike.html. [↩]
334. “Комплекс ледовой разведки прошел успешное тестирование в условиях Арктики” [Ice Reconnaissance Complex Successfully Tested in Arctic Conditions]. TASS. July 5, 2023. https://vpk.name/news/740577_kompleks_ledovoi_razvedki_proshel_uspeshnoe_testirovanie_v_usloviyah_arktiki.html. [↩]
335. “The Ministry of Defense has formed a drone detachment for the Arctic.” RBC. December 2, 2014. https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/547d5441cbb20fcde43e471e. [↩]
336. “Northern Fleet Trains Operators of Strike UAVs and FPV Drones.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta. October 10, 2024. https://rg.ru/2024/10/10/reg-szfo/na-severnom-flote-obuchaiut-operatorov-udarnyh-bespilotnikov-i-fpv-dronov.html. [↩]
337. “The Northern Fleet Held Training Sessions for Drone Operators.” SeverPost. January 30, 2026. https://severpost.ru/read/202507/. [↩]
338. “Chechen-led National Guard Spetsnaz Deploys Kamikaze Drones in Arctic Drills.” The Barents Observer. March 18, 2026. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/chechenled-national-guard-spetsnaz-deploys-kamikaze-drones-in-arctic-drills/447070. [↩]
339. “Подводные парни: на защиту Арктики направят боевых пловцов” [Underwater guys: combat swimmers will be sent to protect the Arctic]. Izvestia. January 9, 2026. https://vpk.name/news/1093538_podvodnye_parni_na_zashitu_arktiki_napravyat_boevyh_plovcov.html. [↩]
340. “What are Russia’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) forces?.” RBC. November 28, 2025. https://www.rbc.ru/base/28/11/2025/6929ade89a79473dcdbbc7b8#contents-1; “Putin spoke about the role of drones and air defense in the conflict with Ukraine.” RBC. June 12, 2025. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/12/06/2025/684b0a599a794799f6d6d87f. [↩]
341. “Forpost drones will Monitor Kamchatka and the Northern Sea Route.” Izvestia. April 12, 2024. https://iz.ru/1680779/aleksei-mikhailov-andrei-fedorov-vladimir-matveev/postavili-forpost-za-kamchatkoi-i-sevmorputem-prismotriat-bespilotniki; “Kamchatka Game: Navy Deployed the First Drone Control Center.” Izvestia. August 7, 2025. https://iz.ru/1932476/bogdan-stepovoi-roman-krecul/kamcatskaa-igra-vmf-razvernul-pervyi-centr-upravlenia-bespilotnikami. [↩]
342. Sukhankin (2025), Canadian Maritime Security Network, op. cit. [↩]
343. Boulègue (2024), Polar Institute, Wilson Center, op. cit. [↩]
344. X. AS_22im. July 5, 2024. https://x.com/AS_22im/status/1809217169978503304. [↩]
345. Boulègue (2019), op. cit.; Kjellén (2022), op. cit. [↩]
346. Kjellén, Jonas. “The Russian Northern Fleet Bastion Revisited.” Journal of Advanced Military Studies (2025). [↩]
347. “Северное стояние: зачем НАТО укрепляется в арктической зоне у российских границ” [Northern Standoff: Why NATO is Strengthening in the Arctic Zone Near Russian Borders]. Izvestia. October 3, 2025. https://vpk.name/news/1057963_severnoe_stoyanie_zachem_nato_ukreplyaetsya_v_arkticheskoi_zone_u_rossiiskih_granic.html; “В Карелии сформирована отдельная ракетная бригада с ОТК ‘Искандер-М'” [Separate Missile Brigade with ‘Iskander-M’ Formed in Karelia]. Izvestia. April 19, 2024. https://iz.ru/1684603/2024-04-19/v-karelii-sformirovana-otdelnaia-raketnaia-brigada-s-otk-iskander-m. [↩]
348. Sergunin (2024), op. cit. [↩]
349. Kaczynski, Vlad. “US-Russian Bering Sea Marine Border Dispute: Conflict over Strategic Assets, Fisheries and Energy Resources.” Russian Analytical Digest, no. 20 (2007): 6-8. [↩]
350. Boulègue (2022), op. cit. [↩]
351. “Russia Showcases New Arctic Tor and Pantsir Systems at Military Parade in Moscow.” Sputnik. May 9, 2017. https://sputnikglobe.com/20170509/russia-arctic-defense-systems-to-pantsir-1053409405.html. [↩]
352. “From Ukraine to the Arctic: Russia’s Capabilities in the Region and the War’s Impact on the North.” High North News. September 22, 2024. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/ukraine-arctic-russias-capabilities-region-and-wars-impact-north. [↩]
353. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). “Chapter II: The Balance of Capabilities in the Subsurface Domain”. Whitehall Papers, 100, no. 1 (2022):15-41. [↩]
354. “The Russo-Ukrainian War’s Expansion into the High North Poses Electronic Warfare Challenges for NATO.” The Barents Observer. June 8, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/opinion/the-russoukrainian-wars-expansion-into-the-high-north-poses-electronic-warfare-challenges-for-nato/431197. [↩]
355. “Russia Turns on World’s First Satellite System for Arctic Monitoring.” The Maritime Executive. April 28, 2024. https://maritime-executive.com/article/russia-turns-on-world-s-first-satellite-system-for-arctic-monitoring. [↩]
356. “Российская Арктика-М передала 50 терабайтов данных” [Russian Arktika-M has transmitted 50 terabytes of data]. Lenta. March 4, 2026. https://vpk.name/news/1106222_rossiiskaya_arktika-m_pLeredala_50_terabaitov_dannyh.html. [↩]
357. “Russia Acquired Western Technology to Protect its Nuclear Submarine Fleet.” The Washington Post. October 23, 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/23/russia-nuclear-subs-western-technology-surevillance/. [↩]
358. Sukhankin, Sergey. “Frozen Frontier to Information Battlespace: The Evolution of Russia’s Arctic ISR Ecosystem.” Canadian Maritime Security Network. March 2026. [↩]
359. Credit is due to Pavel Baev for this elegant turn of phrase. [↩]
360. For more on scenarios involving potential accidents and the risk of miscalculation, see Grisé, Michelle, Yuliya Shokh, Stephanie Pezard, Alexandra T. Evans, Joe Haberman, Miriam Pasternak Joergensen, and Mark Cozad. Russia in the High North: Russian Strategy and Escalation Risks in the High North After the Russia-Ukraine War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. [↩]
361. The White House. 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: December 2025. [↩]
362. Baev, Pavel K. Russia’s New Challenges in the Baltic/Northern European Theater. Paris: The French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), 2023. [↩]
363. Mathieu Boulègue et al. (2024), Up North: Confronting Arctic Insecurity: Implications for the United States and NATO, Comprehensive Reports, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), December 2024; Mathieu Boulègue, Rebecca Pincus, Madison Lipson (2025), op. cit.; Borsari, Federico, and Gordon B. Davis Jr. High Stakes in the High North: Harnessing Uncrewed Capabilities for Arctic Defense and Security. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), December 2026. [↩]