For most of the full-scale war, Russia enjoyed a dangerous strategic asymmetry. It could destroy Ukraine’s power plants, refineries, heating systems, and civilian infrastructure, while much of Russia’s own war economy remained far behind the front line and largely out of Ukraine’s reach.
Not anymore.
Ukraine appears to have found one of the few pressure points capable of changing the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculation: the oil industry. The purpose is not symbolic retaliation. It is to raise the economic, military, and political cost of continuing the war until Moscow understands that prolonging it may become more expensive than ending it.
This logic was clear from the beginning of the invasion. Ukraine had to convince Russia that the war would become unaffordable. Yet in 2022 and 2023, it lacked the long-range weapons to systematically strike the infrastructure that funds the Kremlin’s war machine.
Western allies, meanwhile, were reluctant to provide long-range weapons or allow their use against targets deep inside Russia, fearing escalation. In 2024, Washington urged Kyiv to halt strikes on energy infrastructure, warning that they could provoke retaliation and drive up global oil prices in an election year.
Ukraine therefore had to build much of this capability itself. Over the past year, it has made significant progress in developing mid- and long-range drones, while also demonstrating several domestically produced cruise missile capabilities. The results are now visible. The expanding strike system was first used to hit Russian military and energy infrastructure 400–600 km (250-370 miles) from the border. It is now reaching targets more than 2,500 km away.
The clearest example is the Omsk oil refinery, located roughly 2,700 km from Ukrainian-held territory. On July 6, drones struck the facility in one of the most ambitious attacks of the war. The target was not peripheral: Omsk is Russia’s largest refinery and one of the pillars of its domestic fuel market, responsible for roughly 12.5% of national gasoline output. Reuters reported that the plant halted operations after the attack, with key crude-processing units damaged and repairs expected to take months.
It’s not just about distance. The new drones are extremely accurate and are hitting key and hard-to-repair refinery facilities. The Omsk targets include crude distillation units (CDUs), which are the initial processing point. CDU-10 was damaged and caught fire; it processes 38% of the refinery’s production, and CDU-11 likewise. It accounts for another 37%.
This was a strategic milestone, and the message was unmistakable: even Russia’s most important energy assets deep in Siberia are no longer beyond Ukraine’s reach. Earlier Ukrainian attacks had shown that refineries in western and southern Russia were also vulnerable. Omsk proved something more consequential: Russia no longer has a safe rear, and distance is no longer protection.
This was not an isolated operation. Ukraine has turned refinery strikes into a systematic campaign against the core of Russia’s oil-processing network. Meduza reported that by the end of May, citing Reuters, every large refinery by processing volume in the European part of Russia has now been attacked at least once by Ukrainian drones.
The Moscow refinery is another important example. It was the largest fuel supplier to the capital region and therefore one of the most politically sensitive energy facilities in the country. The plant was struck three times in June, forced to halt operations, and was unlikely to resume production this year.
The cumulative effect is now visible. Ukraine’s General Staff has claimed that its strikes disabled more than 40% of Russia’s gasoline production capacity. Independent reporting confirms a large-scale disruption of gasoline supply in Russia, with long queues at filling stations across all its regions.
The Kremlin’s emergency measures show the scale of the problem. Russia has begun seaborne gasoline imports from India, and Moscow has also considered temporarily relaxing fuel-quality standards. On July 8, Russia banned diesel exports in an effort to stabilize domestic supply and gasoline exports have also been restricted.
This is a profound reversal given Russia is one of the world’s largest oil producers and exporters.
Ukraine’s refinery campaign is also reshaping Russia’s export flows. With damaged refineries unable to process normal volumes of crude, Moscow is being forced to push more unprocessed oil into global markets while exporting fewer refined products. Unrefined exports generate lower revenues.
The political context is shifting as well. In 2024, Washington worried that Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure could escalate the war or raise global oil prices. By July, the tone had changed. At the NATO summit in Ankara, President Donald Trump said Ukraine’s long-range strikes on Russian refineries were “an escalation, but it’s also an escalation that could help lead to an end” of the war.
That is an important signal. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign should no longer be viewed primarily as an escalation problem. It should be understood as a means to war-shortening.
The Kremlin is unlikely to stop the war because it is asked politely. It may stop only when the cost of continuing becomes higher than the cost of ending it. Striking Russia’s oil industry moves the war closer to that point.
But Ukraine cannot exploit this opportunity alone. Partners should act on three priorities.
First, Ukraine urgently needs stronger air defenses. It says it can cope alone, except in anti-ballistic missile systems. Time is short because Russia is ahead on this metric and will use it ruthlessly, especially against power facilities during the winter.
Second, partners should help Ukraine raise domestic long-range strike production. The Omsk strike shows that Ukrainian systems can reach strategic targets once considered safe. More financing, components, intelligence support, and joint production are needed. Every additional Ukrainian long-range drone or missile forces Russia to disperse air defenses, protect assets thousands of kilometers from the front, shut down exposed facilities, and spend more resources defending the rear.
Third, the West should intensify pressure on Russia’s oil revenues. Ukraine is physically degrading Russia’s refining and export system. Sanctions should reinforce that pressure by targeting shipping, insurance, shadow-fleet logistics, port services, payments, and the supply chains needed to repair damaged refineries.
Ukraine has not found a magic key to peace. But it may have found something more realistic: a means of striking at the economic foundations of Russia’s war.
There is now a rare opportunity. Ukraine has shown that Russia’s oil system can be disrupted. Russia is visibly in trouble as a result. The West can help to raise the cost of the war for the Kremlin.
That may be the most credible path toward ending it.
Sergiy Makogon is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is a seasoned executive and energy expert with over 20 years of expertise in the Ukrainian and Central and Eastern European (CEE) gas markets, as well as European security.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
