Low-cost Russian cruise missiles are the latest evolution of the Russian airborne threat. They are substantially cheaper than the higher-end legacy cruise missiles and, at the same time, they are more powerful and lethal than the masses of long-range drones Russia has so far relied on for saturation strikes.
As a result, Russia has found a new cost-effective, mass-produced tool to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses and pummel its critical infrastructure. It would be wrong, however, to assume that these missiles challenge only Ukraine. In a direct confrontation with Russia, European NATO states would be equally ill-prepared.
Russia’s shift from long-range drones to low-cost cruise missiles began with Geran-3. The Geran-3 was functionally very similar to the Geran-2 long-range drone but replaced its piston engine with a JT80 turbojet produced by the Chinese manufacturer Telefly. This roughly doubled the system’s speed from 185 kph to 350 kph (115 mph to 214 mph) and raised its cruising altitude from 4,000 meters to 7,000 meters (13,000 ft. to 23,000 ft.), allowing it to escape existing Ukrainian long-range drone defenses.
More recently, Russia has built on this success with Geran-4, Geran-5, S-8000 Banderol, and other low-cost cruise missiles. With more powerful engines and airframes optimized for higher-velocity flight, these systems now reach speeds of 600 kph or more and cruise at altitudes far outside the engagement limits of simple Ukrainian interceptor drones.
For Russia, low-cost cruise missiles occupy a new sweet spot on the cost-capability scale. While undoubtedly more expensive than traditional long-range drones (roughly $150,000-$250,000 compared to $50,000), they offer a significantly higher chance of penetrating Ukrainian air defenses, which had become increasingly capable and optimized against long-range drones before the transition. From this perspective, the higher price is therefore entirely justified.
To offer a reasonable chance of interception, air defenses must match the higher speed of the threat. This means, for example, building an interceptor drone fleet that, like the systems it is meant to defeat, is jet-propelled.
Ukraine has indeed had success employing jet-propelled interceptor drones. Air defense units, for example, reported using repurposed Bars mini cruise missiles to down incoming Russian missiles.
The big problem for Ukraine is that jet engines are in short supply. Too few suppliers in Europe and the United States can meet growing Western demand. Initially, this shortage affected only the build-up of Europe’s own low-cost cruise missiles. Defensive needs now add to that demand, while supply has multiplied far beyond capacity.
Engines are the critical link in the supply chain. Without a jet engine, no jet-propelled interceptor flies. Other tools to defeat Russian low-cost cruise missiles theoretically exist, such as gun-based systems (Gepard, Skynex) or higher-end missile defense capabilities (like IRIS-T SLS/SLM or NASAMS), but these are either unavailable in sufficient numbers or hugely cost-inefficient.
The result is a new and affordable Russian long-range strike threat that Ukraine is not prepared to meet at the scale at which it arrives. Together with the enormously challenging ballistic missile threat Ukraine faces this winter, this puts air defense on the back foot.
But Russia’s evolving long-range strike capabilities do not challenge Ukraine alone.
European NATO states would be equally ill-prepared in a direct confrontation with Russia. Like Ukraine, both European frontline states and others further in the European rear lack the means to defend effectively and cost-efficiently against swarms of Russian low-cost cruise missiles. In fact, they would likely be even more vulnerable than Ukraine, since they lack the technical and operational experience that it has built up over years of war.
As NATO states increasingly look to acquire their own low-cost cruise missiles – and for good reason – they must devote renewed attention to countering the Russian low-cost cruise missile threat. This will require dedicated funding and additional industrial effort to supply the components needed to build a capable interceptor force.
Fabian Hoffmann is a Senior Research Fellow at the Ukraine and Full Spectrum Threats Program at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and a Non-Resident Fellow with CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense and Security program. His research focuses on missile technology, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence. His research and commentary have been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, European Security, Foreign Affairs, and War on the Rocks, among others.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
