The energy blockade has become the principal instrument of pressure employed by Washington against the Cuban regime. Unlike other coercive measures, restrictions on hydrocarbons directly affect the country’s ability to function and have resulted in repeated and lengthy nationwide power cuts.
The strategy became particularly significant after the overthrow and capture of Nicolás Maduro in January, which enabled the US to disrupt oil shipments from Venezuela, one of the principal sources of support for Cuba’s economy. Washington also put pressure on Mexico, which had become an increasingly important energy supplier to the island.
President Donald Trump’s January 29 executive order, which established a mechanism for imposing additional tariffs on countries supplying oil to Cuba, joined together sanctions on key sectors of the Cuban economy in a strategy intended to increase the costs of sustaining the communist regime from abroad.
But the effectiveness of the blockade depends on Washington’s ability to deter other states from providing Havana with the resources it needs.
China has become increasingly important, particularly through renewable energy projects. Across August and September, Beijing delivered 10,000 solar power systems intended for rural households, healthcare facilities, and other public institutions. It followed a similar shipment in November 2025 to provide power to communities isolated by Hurricane Melissa.
The deliveries complemented China’s role in the construction of new solar parks, including 15 facilities with a combined capacity of 85 MW and a 200 MW project incorporating energy storage (peak Cuban energy demand can be around 3,000 MW).
Although these initiatives provide benefits to some Cubans, they should not be seen as acts of altruism. Energy cooperation allows Beijing to consolidate its image as a responsible power committed to addressing the development needs of poorer nations. While Washington tightens restrictions on fuel supplies, Beijing paints itself as a partner willing to provide tangible solutions to the island’s difficulties.
The cooperation also serves China’s broader industrial and technological objectives. The global expansion of renewable energy is part of a strategy advanced through initiatives such as Made in China 2025 and China Standards 2035, which aim to position Beijing as a central player in advanced technologies and the establishment of international standards.
Helping reduce Cuba’s energy vulnerability also means limiting the effectiveness of one of Washington’s main instruments of pressure, and potentially preserving the stability of a strategic ally in the Caribbean.
Russia’s approach is different. Although Moscow has repeatedly condemned US restrictions and reaffirmed its willingness to support Havana, its material assistance has been more limited and irregular. The most significant development was in late March, when the Russian oil tanker Anatoly Kolodkin arrived in Matanzas carrying approximately 100,000 metric tons of crude oil. The Trump administration allowed the vessel to enter on humanitarian grounds, without signaling any broader change in its sanctions policy.
A few days later, Moscow announced its intention to send a second fuel shipment. This possibility appeared to gain momentum with the voyage of the tanker Universal, carrying an estimated 270,000 barrels of diesel.
However, after several weeks at sea, the vessel changed course in late May and moved away from Cuba without completing the delivery. There had been mounting US pressure on maritime oil shipments, including the January seizure of the Russian-flagged tanker Marinera, which had attempted to evade restrictions imposed on Venezuelan oil.
Moscow has opted for a strategy of selective support while trying to avoid helping Havana become another source of direct confrontation with Washington. The recent rapprochement between Trump and Vladimir Putin could alter this.
In early October, the New York Times reported negotiations over the international assets of Russian oil company Lukoil, potentially involving investors with ties to US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Restrictions on US imports of Russian diesel were also eased, revealing pragmatism in US-Russian relations that could indirectly benefit Havana.
While Chinese and Russian energy cooperation with Cuba involves a variety of instruments, time horizons, and constraints, both strategies aim to preserve the viability of a regime that continues to serve as a foothold for their interests in Latin America.
The effect of the aid, however, should be assessed cautiously. Chinese photovoltaic systems are unlikely to resolve the structural deficiencies of the island’s electricity sector, while the continuity of Russian oil shipments remains subject to political decisions over which Havana has little influence.
But if the rapprochement between Washington and Moscow eventually facilitates new oil shipments to Cuba, Trump’s maximum-pressure strategy could change. Supplies would provide the Cuban regime with a new lifeline and even delay political transition on the island.
César E. Santos is a philosophy graduate and master in Social Sciences. He is a researcher at Government and Political Analysis AC (GAPAC), specializing in theory and praxis of illiberalism and Russia’s and China’s authoritarian influence in Latin America.
This article draws on the ongoing monitoring of Cuban influence in the Western Hemisphere conducted by Gobierno y Análisis Político A.C. (GAPAC) through its Alerta Sharp initiative.
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